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Empirical research of pensions and its role in the labor market has been lim-
iting and has led to inconclusive and sometimes contradictory results. What is
needed to have a better understanding of the role of pensions is better data that
are longitudinal and national, include worker and ￿rm information, and provide
information that helps deal with endogeneity between certain variables. This dis-
sertation discusses such a new data set and discusses the empirical uses of the data
when investigating the role of pensions on ￿rm productivity. This dissertation
comprises of two chapters. Each chapter is discussed below.
Chapter 1, "Results from Integrating the Form 5500 Pension Information with
the U.S. Census Business Register and the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics State Data" discusses the process in creating a new, unique data set which
is longitudinal and includes information about private ￿rms, their employees, and
the di⁄erent pensions that they o⁄er. This data has ￿rm and pension information
for all private employers in the United States for years 1994 through 2001 and
added employee information for ￿rms that exist in twelve states over the same
period. This data set is shown to be far superior to any currently available data
set.
Chapter 2, "Do Changes in Deferred Compensation Lead to Changes in Pro-
ductivity?" empirically examines the e⁄ects on ￿rm productivity when a ￿rm ter-
minates a de￿ned bene￿t plan and replaces it with a de￿ned contribution plan.
The empirical analysis was done using the data set discussed in Chapter 1. The
empirical results show that when performing two-step estimations and comparingone group of ￿rms that kept their de￿ned bene￿t plans to another group of ￿rms
that converted their pension plans, the group that converted experienced a reduc-
tion in productivity between the years 1995 and 2000. There is some evidence
that this result occurred because workers no longer had the incentive to remain
with the ￿rm once the de￿ned bene￿t plan was replaced, and as a result, workers
were leaving the ￿rm before gaining ￿rm-speci￿c skills. However, more work needs
to be done to determine if the reduction in employee retention is truly the cause.BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
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Results from Integrating the Form 5500 Pension
Information with the U.S. Census Business Register and
the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics State
Data
Over the past three decades, there has been much research on pensions and their
implications in the labor market. Because of changes in labor force demographics,
new pension laws and ￿rms￿￿nancial pressures, the expectations about the e⁄ects
of pensions on workers and ￿rms have changed dramatically. Many policy makers
and economists are currently trying to determine what is the pensions￿role in
personnel policy and how their role has changed over time, but have found that
this is di¢ cult to answer. The culprit for this is limitations in current data. Data
limitations including the lack of data speci￿cs and endogeneity issues between
variables have restricted new developments in pension research.
What is needed to help researchers better understand the relationship between
pensions and labor market activity is longitudinal data combining company-side
information with employee information. In this paper, I introduce such a data
set. With this new wealth of information now available, this unique data set is
ideal for any researcher who wants to answer certain research questions like how
do pensions attract certain workers and discourage shirking, and how do pensions
a⁄ect compensation and employment outcomes. This data set can also be used
to distinguish theories that emphasize ￿rms￿motivations for pensions.
In this paper, I discuss how this data set is created when integrating admin-
istrative data combining ￿rm data, pension data and employee data into one ￿le.
The three administrative ￿les used are the Form 5500, the U.S. Census Business
Register and U.S. Census Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD)
1state data. This new data set that is created is longitudinal covering years 1994
to 2001, and it includes most of the private ￿rms in the United States with added
information about workers from twelve states. The twelve states are California,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina,
Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin. The data set is on the ￿rm level and has
information on what type of pension coverage is o⁄ered, the actuarial and ￿nancial
information of the pensions, and variables which provide descriptive information
including, for instance, industry classi￿cation, total sales, total number of workers
employed by the ￿rm within each state, the age distribution of the workers, and
the sex and race composition of the workers.
This paper is organized as follows: In the second section, I provide background
information on the Form 5500, U.S. Census Business Register and LEHD state
data. The third section discusses how the pension information from the Form 5500
is cleaned and then used. The fourth section discusses the integration in two stages.
The ￿rst stage is the integration of the pension information from the Form 5500 to
￿rm level information from the U.S. Census Business Register creating a national
longitudinal data set. The second stage is adding the employee information from
￿rms that exist in twelve states to the Form 5500-Business Register merged ￿le.
In the ￿fth section, I compare my results on pension coverage to publicly released
reports and statistics generated from public-use ￿les. I then compare pension plan
o⁄ers by ￿rm and coverage rates from the national data set I created to pension
plan o⁄ers by ￿rm and coverage rates in the twelve-state subset that includes the
worker information. In the sixth section I discuss reasons for some non-matches.
The seventh section has concluding remarks.
21.1 Background Information on Administrative Data Sets
In this section I discuss in more detail the Form 5500, the U.S. Census Business
Register and the LEHD state data. Each administrative ￿le provides unique infor-
mation that enhances and complements one another and makes the overall data
set that is created from these three ￿les much more useful. I discuss the Form
5500 ￿rst, followed by the U.S. Census Business Register and then end with the
LEHD state data.
1.1.1 Form 5500
All bene￿t information comes from the Form 5500 and is provided by the Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL) and the Internal Revenue Services (IRS). The Form 5500
details information about all pension, health, dental, life insurance, education at-
tainment and adoption assistance bene￿t plans sponsored by each ￿rm and stems
from the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
in 1974. For-pro￿t ￿rms, non-pro￿t organizations, local and state government
employers are included in the Form 5500. Information about bene￿ts at the fed-
eral government is not included. The bene￿t information is on the plan level
and includes identifying information about the ￿rms including company name and
Employer Identi￿cation Number (EIN), statistics on participants, a balance sheet,
a statement of income and expense, and other information about the operation of
the plans. The Form 5500 also has schedule forms, which provide supplemental
information about the plans including actuarial, insurance, and trustee informa-
tion.
I focus on the pension information in the Form 5500, although using the health
information is suitable when looking at health coverage (Refer to Decressin, Hill
and Lane (2005)). Not all pension plans are included in the Form 5500 data.
Some pension plans are not in the Form 5500 ￿le because some ￿rms may not be
3obligated to ￿le. The following are the plans that are exempt from ￿ling. (1)
Pension plans that are unfunded and the bene￿ts go only to a select group of man-
agement of highly compensated employees. (2) Pension plans maintained outside
the United States if they are quali￿ed foreign plans. (3) Simpli￿ed Employee
Pensions (SEP) which are pension plans that meet certain minimum quali￿cations
regarding eligibility and employer contributions. (4) Savings Incentive Match
Plans for Employees (SIMPLE) of Small Employers. (5) Pension plans that are
church plans. (6) Pension plans that cover residents of Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, Guam, Wake Island, or American Samoa.
Prior to 1999, the Form 5500 consisted of three forms, the F form, which was
￿led annually by bene￿ts providers with more than 100 participants in a plan, and
the C and R forms, which were ￿led by providers with less than 100 participants.
The C form was ￿led one out of every three years and the shorter R form was ￿led
two out of every three years. In 1999, the Form 5500 form changed so that now all
bene￿t providers ￿ll out only one revised form annually. This new form is not as
detailed as the previous forms. Only the general plan information and the number
of plan participants are provided. However, the information that was available
on the previous basic Form 5500 is now provided on the attached Schedule H for
the new Form 5500. This attachment includes four separate sections: (1) Asset
and Liability Statements, (2) Income and Expense Statement, (3) Accountant￿ s
Opinion, and (4) Transactions During Plan Year. The questions that are contained
on the Schedule H are virtually the same as those included on the basic Form 5500
from the previous years. Thus, using the Schedule H with the basic Form 5500
makes it possible to track plans in the same way as in previous years.
Actuarial information for de￿ned bene￿t pension plans is collected on another
attachment, the Schedule B, for all years. This attachment contains actuarial
4asset and liability statements, and contributions made to de￿ned bene￿t plans by
the employer and employees. The Schedule B, used with the basic Form 5500 and
Schedule H for the later years, helps provide liabilities and funded status for each
pension plan.
1.1.2 U.S. Census Business Register
The U. S. Census Business Register is a ￿le that is maintained by the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau and contains information about all multi-establishment and single-
establishment employer ￿rms in the United States. This ￿le is a list of all es-
tablishments that have tax return records at the IRS. In the single-unit ￿le, the
establishments are listed on an EIN level. In the multi-unit ￿le, the establish-
ments are listed on an enterprise level. The establishments on the multi-unit ￿le
belonging to the same ￿rm will have the same EIN, and the EINs that are a¢ liated
with an enterprise will have the same alpha number. The minimum information for
each organizational unit of the company includes the company name and EIN, in-
dustry code, geographical code, legal form of organization, employment size, total
payroll, age of establishment, imputed total sales1, and other economic variables.
The Business Register includes both part-time and full-time workers. All public
administrative establishments are excluded. Thus, government businesses on all
levels are not available.
1.1.3 Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) State Data
The LEHD state data, collected by the U.S. Census, are administrative information
constructed primarily from quarterly Unemployment Insurance (UI) system wage
reports and provided by the state governments. Every state in the United States
1Approximately half of sales are missing on the single-unit ￿le and approximately 90 percent
of sales are missing on the multi-unit ￿le in each year. I multiply-imputed the total sales on an
establishment level and then sum the results to an EIN level. I make no distinction between a
single unit establishment and a multi-unit establishment when imputing the sales information.
5through its Employment Security Agency collects quarterly earnings and employ-
ment information to manage its unemployment compensation program. The char-
acteristics of the UI wage vary slightly from state to state, but the UI coverage
is broad and comparable from state to state. Using these records, LEHD creates
a database that provides longitudinal information on workers and the matches to
their employers. The LEHD data includes approximately 96% of private, non-farm
and salary workers. The coverage of agricultural and federal government workers
is less comprehensive. Self-employed individuals and independent contractors are
also not covered. Although the identi￿ers in the administrative records are sub-
ject to some error, researchers have invested substantial resources in editing the
identi￿ers and making them internally consistent. More information can be found
in Abowd and Vilhuber (2002).
Basic demographic information (date of birth, foreign-born status, sex, race,
education imputation) is integrated into the UI records via the person identi￿er
link for almost all workers in the data. The non-match rate is approximately 4%.
The quarterly earnings listed are a measure of total compensation, including gross
wages and salary, bonuses, stock options, tips and gratuities and the value of meals
and lodging when these are supplied. There are currently forty-three states and
the District of Columbia that are partners with LEHD and provide information to
be used in the LEHD program.
The LEHD state data, the Form 5500 and the U.S. Census Business Register
have very useful information, but are limiting when used solely to research bene￿ts.
Although the LEHD data describes the employees￿work history within the state,
it is limiting in that is contains little information about the ￿rm on a national
level. The Form 5500 provides information identifying ￿rms that o⁄er pensions
and which types. However, the list of ￿rms identi￿ed is incomplete because the
6Form 5500 lists only one sponsoring ￿rm for each plan even though several a¢ liates
pool their resources to provide bene￿ts for their employees. The U.S. Business
Register has no information about the characteristics of the ￿rms￿workforce and
contains no information about bene￿ts. Therefore, the integration of all three ￿les
is required to research the unanswered questions about pension bene￿ts. However,
before the integration, much work was needed to clean the Form 5500.
1.2 Preparing the Form 5500
It is important to note that a considerable amount of time was used in cleaning and
preparing the Form 5500 because the data as provided was very messy, incomplete,
and ￿lled with obviously erroneous information. I along with several researchers
in LEHD worked together to provide a clean version of the Form 5500. This
section provides more detail on how the Form 5500 was cleaned and discusses the
improved information.
1.2.1 Edits to Form 5500 on Plan Level
When gathering pension records from the Form 5500, I use ￿le years 1993-2001.
Some of the information in the Form 5500 was missing or clearly incorrect, so
edits are made. Only plans that have a marked indicator for pension plans are
used. If the words ￿ de￿ned bene￿t￿ , ￿ de￿ned contribution￿or ￿ pension￿or some
variant of these words are found in the plan name and the features are indeed
pension features, but the indicator shows it is not a pension plan, the indicator was
changed. Many records appear more than once in the annual ￿les. All duplicates
of pension records with identical Employer Identi￿cation Numbers (EINs), plan
numbers, plan end dates, and number of participants are deleted within each ￿le
year. If more than one plan have identical EINs, plan numbers and plan end
dates, but di⁄erent employee participation counts, only plans with the largest
7participation count are kept. Plans with no active participants are kept because
I am unable to determine if the number of active participants is actually zero or
just missing. Plans that are indicated as being maintained by a multiemployer or
a union are not used. To control for di⁄erent reporting dates between the Form
5500 and Business Register, plan end year dates are used instead of ￿le year dates.
The plans￿end year dates are from 1994 to 2001.
Table 1.1 lists all the pension, welfare, fringe bene￿ts (i.e. adoption assistance
and education attainment plans) and undetermined plans found in the Form 5500
data set by year. The pension plans cover a majority of plans ￿led with a sharp
increase from 72% to 87% from 1994 to 2001. However, the overall number of
plans increases and then drops from 972,180 to 828,144.
Plan End Year
Pension
Plans
Welfare
Plans
Fringe Benefit
Plans Undetermined Total
1994 700,783 111,213 153,438 6,746 972,180
(row percentage) 72.08% 11.44% 15.78% 0.69% 100.00%
1995 712,372 109,588 174,128 7,116 1,003,204
71.01% 10.92% 17.36% 0.71% 100.00%
1996 727,425 108,658 190,803 7,185 1,034,071
70.35% 10.51% 18.45% 0.69% 100.00%
1997 746,554 108,184 208,815 8,469 1,072,022
69.64% 10.09% 19.48% 0.79% 100.00%
1998 740,837 101,666 215,358 11,339 1,069,200
69.29% 9.51% 20.14% 1.06% 100.00%
1999 523,198 57,348 46,885 19,453 646,884
80.88% 8.87% 7.25% 3.01% 100.00%
2000 671,798 79,404 358 19,182 770,742
87.16% 10.30% 0.05% 2.49% 100.00%
2001 719,914 88,084 225 19,921 828,144
86.93% 10.64% 0.03% 2.41% 100.00%
Table 1.1: Form 5500 Plans by Benefit Type for Plan-End Years 1994-2001
Because the layout of the Form 5500 form changed in 1999, questions about
pension type also changed. To determine the di⁄erent types of pensions that were
o⁄ered for ￿le years 1993-1998, the pension bene￿t features found in Question 6C
are used. For ￿le years 1999-2001, pension features found in Question 8A are
used. There are actually three types of pension plans identi￿ed on the Form 5500.
8They are de￿ned bene￿t plans, de￿ned contribution plans, and ￿ other￿de￿ned
bene￿ts. ￿ Other￿de￿ned pension plans are de￿ned di⁄erently after 1999 on the
revised form2. There are some pension plans that are identi￿ed as a pension plan
but the type of plan was undetermined. The number of undetermined pension
plans is insigni￿cant in each year and are included with the "other" plans.
Plan End Year
Defined
Benefit
Plans
Defined
Contribution
Plans
"Other" or
Unclassified
Pension Plans Total
1994 80,424 603,214 17,145 700,783
(Row percentage) 11.48% 86.08% 2.45% 100.00%
1995 73,938 617,168 21,266 712,372
10.38% 86.64% 2.99% 100.00%
1996 69,273 635,039 23,113 727,425
9.52% 87.30% 3.18% 100.00%
1997 64,313 657,325 24,916 746,554
8.61% 88.05% 3.34% 100.00%
1998 58,163 655,992 26,682 740,837
7.85% 88.55% 3.60% 100.00%
1999 34,255 481,431 7,505 523,191
6.55% 92.02% 1.43% 100.00%
2000 46,357 620,360 5,078 671,795
6.90% 92.34% 0.76% 100.00%
2001 47,753 668,079 4,082 719,914
6.63% 92.80% 0.57% 100.00%
Table 1.2: Pension Plans by Type Found in Form 5500
Table 1.2 lists the number of pension plans found that are de￿ned bene￿t,
de￿ned contribution, and "other" or undetermined pension plans. As shown, the
number of de￿ned bene￿t plans dropped sharply by 41% drop. However, the
number of de￿ned contribution plans increased by approximately 11%. Because
the number of overall plans dropped, particularly after 1999, one could conclude
2Prior to 1999, ￿ other￿pension plans include (1) de￿ned bene￿t plans with bene￿ts based
partly on balance of separate account of participant, (2) annuity arrangements of certain exempt
organizations, (3) custodial accounts for regulated investment company stock, (4) pension plans
utilizing individual retirement accounts (IRAs) or annuities are the sole funding vehicle for pro-
viding bene￿ts. In 1999 and afterwards, ￿ other￿pension plans are de￿ned as (1) Non-U.S. plans,
(2) Plans covering self-employed individuals, (3) Unquali￿ed plans, (4) Master plans, (5) Pro-
totype plans, (6) Plans in which the plan sponsors received services of leased employees during
the plan year, (6) One-participant plans (7) Plans in which the plan sponsors are members of a
controlled group.
9than many de￿ned bene￿t pension plans have merged with other plans or were
dropped by the ￿rm during this time period. However, to have more clarity as to
whether pension plans merged or were dropped over the time period, I determine
if some plans are simply missing from the ￿le.
1.2.2 Identifying Missing Pension Plans in Form 5500 Data
To ￿nd pension plans that are missing on the Form 5500 annual ￿les, I designed an
algorithm to identify them. To simplify identifying missing pension plans, I only
focus on plans identi￿ed as either a de￿ned bene￿t plan or a de￿ned contribution
plan. The plans identi￿ed as "other" or undetermined are discarded and are no
longer used in the integration process. To ￿nd the missing pension plans, I look at
three consecutive plan end years by EIN and plan number. I create a subset of all
records that have EINs and plan numbers that matched in the previous ￿rst year
and in the subsequent third year, but did not exist in the current second year. I
then determine if these plans are also identi￿ed as either a de￿ned bene￿t plan or
a de￿ned contribution plan in both the ￿rst and third years. If there is a match,
then the plan is identi￿ed as a missing plan and is added to the ￿le for the second
current year. All the ￿nancial, actuarial and employment coverage information
for the missing plans is calculated as simply the average of the actuarial, ￿nancial
and employment coverage information from plans in the ￿rst and third years.
10Plan End Year
Defined Benefit
Plans
Defined
Contribution Plans Total
1994 618 7,051 7,669
(Row Percentages) 8.06% 91.94% 100.00%
1995 1,280 11,890 13,170
9.72% 90.28% 100.00%
1996 995 13,121 14,116
7.05% 92.95% 100.00%
1997 757 11,776 12,533
6.04% 93.96% 100.00%
1998 1,323 16,743 18,066
7.32% 92.68% 100.00%
1999 12,268 129,778 142,046
8.64% 91.36% 100.00%
2000 2,093 34,060 36,153
5.79% 94.21% 100.00%
2001 547 3,941 4,488
12.19% 87.81% 100.00%
Table 1.3: Number of Missing Pension Plans Found in Form 5500 by Year
Table 1.3 lists the number of missing pension plans that are found by year.
The number of missing plans found is small for most years except in 1999 where
the number of missing plans increased the number of pension plans by over 21%.
The reason why a large number of missing plans in 1999 are found may be because
in 1999 it became mandatory for all providers to ￿ll out the Form 5500 with the
new layout. Some employers may not have known that. Also, some records sent
to the Department of Labor were lost in 1999.
Table 1.4 lists all the de￿ned bene￿t plans and de￿ned contribution plans,
which will be integrated to the Business Register and are the total of the pension
plans shown in Table 1.2 and the missing plans found in Table 1.3. From 1994
to 2001 the number of de￿ned bene￿t plans decreased by 40% and the number
of de￿ned contribution plan increased by 10%. Again, because there is such a
large drop in de￿ned bene￿t pensions, and a relatively small increase in de￿ned
contribution plans, it appears more strongly that many of the de￿ned bene￿t plans
either merged with other pension plans or they were dropped by the ￿rm.
11Plan End Year
Defined
Benefit Plans
Defined
Contribution
Plans Total
1994 81,042 610,265 691,307
(Row Percentages) 11.72% 88.28% 100.00%
1995 75,218 629,058 704,276
10.68% 89.32% 100.00%
1996 70,268 648,160 718,428
9.78% 90.22% 100.00%
1997 65,070 669,101 734,171
8.86% 91.14% 100.00%
1998 59,486 672,735 732,221
8.12% 91.88% 100.00%
1999 46,523 611,209 657,732
7.07% 92.93% 100.00%
2000 48,450 654,420 702,870
6.89% 93.11% 100.00%
2001 48,300 672,020 720,320
6.71% 93.29% 100.00%
Table 1.4: Listed and Missing Pension Plans from Form 5500 File
To Be Used for Integration
1.2.3 Discussion of Pension Financial Information from Form 5500
To have a better understanding of the ￿nancial aspects of the de￿ned pension plans
over the eight-year period, I use the liability and asset information provided on the
Schedule B attachment to calculate the de￿ned bene￿t pension funding on the plan
level. Pension funding is a way for a ￿rm to assign an expected cost of a de￿ned
bene￿t pension plan to the years of service that give rise to that cost. Current
liability is used to determine the expected cost of the pension plan. Current
liability is the sum of (1) the value of bene￿ts for retirees, (2) the value of bene￿ts
for employees who have left the ￿rm with vested pension rights, but have not yet
retired, (3) the value of vested bene￿ts accrued to date for active employees and
(4) the value of nonvested bene￿ts for active employees.
When current liability is compared to the actuarial value of assets in the de￿ned
bene￿t pension plan, the funding status of a de￿ned bene￿t plan is determined.
Table 1.5 lists the median funding ratios for de￿ned bene￿t plans for all years.
12The funding ratio is de￿ned as the current assets divided by the current liability
under OBRA ￿ 87 rule3. The de￿ned bene￿t plans have more assets than liabilities
in most years. There is an increase in assets for the de￿ned bene￿t plans in the
late nineties, which is probably due to the boom in the stock market in the 1990￿ s.
However, by year 2000 the funding ratios drop although they still remain above
one. In 2001, the assets fall below liabilities.
Plan End Year Defined Benefit Plans on Plan Level
1994 1.21
1995 1.106
1996 1.146
1997 1.145
1998 1.163
1999 1.121
2000 1.06
2001 0.988
Table 1.5: Median Funding Ratios (Assets/Current
Liability) for All Defined Benefit Plans on Plan Level
1.2.4 Aggregation of Pension Information from the Form 5500 to EIN
level
Although, looking at pensions and their ￿nancial status on a plan level tells an
interesting story, looking at plans on an EIN level, gives more detail on what types
of plans are o⁄ered to the employees collectively. This is a better way of looking
at the pension coverage rates and the overall ￿nancial status of the pension plans.
If one only looks at pensions on the plan level, one would be misled about how
well ￿rms are managing their pension plans because many ￿rms have more than
one plan and each are designed for a particular subset within its labor force. For
example, General Motors had ￿ve active pension plans in 1997. General Motors
has designed separate plans for its salaried, unionized workers and salaried, non-
3The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 contained provisions that a⁄ected the min-
imum funding standards.
13unionized workers as well as for its hourly, unionized workers and hourly, non-
unionized workers. Each plan sponsored by General Motors varies by its asset
performance, participant coverage and funding. To fully understand how pension
plans are handled at General Motors as well as other ￿rms, it is important to look
at the pension information on an aggregate EIN level.
Plan End Year
EINs with Defined
Benefit Plans Only
EINs with Defined
Contribution Plans
Only
EINs with Defined
Benefit and Defined
Contribution Plans Total EINs
1994 47,216 495,044 24,446 566,706
(row Percentage) 8.33% 87.35% 4.31% 100.00%
1995 42,943 514,188 23,542 580,673
7.40% 88.55% 4.05% 100.00%
1996 39,651 532,148 22,438 594,237
6.67% 89.55% 3.78% 100.00%
1997 35,673 556,269 21,795 613,737
5.81% 90.64% 3.55% 100.00%
1998 32,467 564,726 20,263 617,456
5.26% 91.46% 3.28% 100.00%
1999 26,464 521,401 14,916 562,781
4.70% 92.65% 2.65% 100.00%
2000 26,891 551,737 16,286 594,914
4.52% 92.74% 2.74% 100.00%
2001 25,980 564,031 16,729 606,740
4.28% 92.96% 2.76% 100.00%
Table 1.6: Number of EINs That Offer Defined Benefit Plans Only, Defined Contribution
Plans Only, and Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans Based on Form 5500
Table 1.6 lists the number of EINs that o⁄er only a de￿ned bene￿t plan, only a
de￿ned contribution plan or o⁄ered both by year. Just like on the plan level, the
number of EINs o⁄ering only de￿ned bene￿t pension plans has dropped tremen-
dously, approximately 45% over an eight-year span. However, the number of ￿rms
o⁄ering only a de￿ned contribution plan increased by 14%. The number of ￿rms
o⁄ering both de￿ned pension plans and de￿ned contribution plans is only a small
subset of ￿rms overall. However, the number of ￿rms that do o⁄er both types of
plans decreases throughout the eight-year span by 32%.
141.2.5 Discussion of Pension Financial Information from the Form 5500
on EIN level
To have a better understanding of the overall ￿nancial performance of the ￿rms￿
pensions, I aggregate the actuarial and ￿nancial information to an EIN level. I
use the combined total ￿nancial information to determine the ￿nancial cost or
funding status of the pensions for each ￿rm. For the de￿ned bene￿t plans, I used
the aggregate value of current assets in the pension fund and aggregate current
liability under OBRA ￿ 87 rule found in Schedule B. Table 1.7 shows the median
funding status for all ￿rms or EINs o⁄ering a de￿ned bene￿t plan for years 1994
to 2001. The average funding ratios slightly increase and then decrease over this
time period. In 2001, the median funding ratio falls below one.
Plan End Year Defined Benefit Plans on EIN Level
1994 1.226
1995 1.130
1996 1.161
1997 1.161
1998 1.174
1999 1.131
2000 1.070
2001 0.997
Table 1.7: Median Funding Ratios (Assets/Current
Liability) for All Defined Benefit Plans on EIN Level
Thus, after spending considerable time editing and correcting, this clean version
of the Form 5500 aggregated to an EIN level provides much more accurate infor-
mation about the overall ￿nancial status of pensions, the total number of pension
plans o⁄ered and a limited view of how many ￿rms o⁄er pensions. Unfortunately,
as stated earlier, the Form 5500 only lists one EIN per record although several
a¢ liates may provide the same pension coverage. Thus, the number of ￿rms
o⁄ering pensions is underestimated when using the Form 5500 alone. However,
using the U.S. Census Business Register, which provides a list of all private ￿rms
15in the United States and whether these ￿rms are a¢ liates within an enterprise,
becomes very important. The next step is to integrate the pension information
from the Form 5500 to the ￿rm information from the U.S. Business Register and
the worker information from the LEHD data so that a more accurate assessment
on which ￿rms are o⁄ering pensions and who is covered is determined.
1.3 Integration Process
The integration of the Form 5500, U.S. Census Business Register and the
LEHD state data occurs in two stages. First, I integrate the pension information
from the Form 5500 with the ￿rm information from the Business Register. After
this ￿rst stage of the integration, I am able to provide detailed information about
which ￿rms o⁄er certain types of pensions, the pensions￿￿nancial status as well as
the ￿rm characteristics including ￿rm age, total number of employees nationally,
total payroll nationally, total imputed sales and revenue nationally, and industry
classi￿cation on an EIN level. This data set includes most private ￿rms in the
United States. The second stage of the integration is linking the LEHD state infor-
mation about the workers from twelve states onto the Form 5500-Busines Register
data set created in the ￿rst stage. This second stage provides additional informa-
tion about some of the ￿rms￿workers including race and sex group percentages,
age pro￿le of the workers, the percentage of workers with at least a college degree,
the percentage of workers who are foreign-born, and the average annual earning on
an EIN-state level. This section discusses in detail both stages of the integration.
1.3.1 First Stage of Integration: Integrating the Form 5500 Pension
Data with the U.S. Census Business Register Data
Once the Form 5500 ￿le is cleaned and aggregated to an EIN level, I integrate the
information with the U.S. Census Business Register￿ s single-unit and multi-unit es-
tablishment ￿les. I ￿rst integrate the pension information with the Business Reg-
16ister￿ s single-unit ￿le by using the EINs and keep the establishments that match.
Only the establishments that are listed as active and have a positive payroll as
listed on the U.S. Census Business Register are kept. Since the EINs are unique
on this ￿le, the integration to the single-unit establishment ￿le is straightforward.
However, integrating the Form 5500 to the multi-unit establishment ￿le is more
complicated. I integrate the pension information with the Business Register￿ s
multi-unit establishments using the EINs and keep the establishments that match.
I then split the matches found on the multi-unit ￿les into two groups. The multi-
unit establishments that match to the Form 5500 EINs and are listed as active
and have a positive payroll on the U.S. Census Business Register are placed in
the Valid Group. The multi-unit establishments that match to EINs on the Form
5500, but are listed as out-of-business, sold, duplicate, predecessor of another EIN,
an administrative EIN, or have zero payroll on the U.S. Business Register are
listed as the Invalid Group. At this point, I know which ￿rms from the Form
5500 have a match on the Business Register. However, I do not know if these
￿rms have a¢ liates. The next task is to ￿nd the a¢ liates of these EINs because
I presume that the a¢ liates to these EIN matches also provide the same pension
plan coverage.
To ￿nd a¢ liates of ￿rms that are listed in the Form 5500, I use the alpha
number variable. All establishments with di⁄erent EINs, but identical alpha
numbers belong to the same enterprise. For the Valid Group, after I use the alpha
number to ￿nd all a¢ liates, I keep only the establishments that are active and
have a positive payroll, capturing di⁄erent EINs within an enterprise. Thus, the
EIN listed on the Form 5500 and the active a¢ liates to this ￿rm are identi￿ed as
o⁄ering the same pension coverage to all of their employees.
As for the EINs in the Invalid group, although the ￿rms in this group are listed
17on the Form 5500 and are listed as inactive on the U.S. Business Register, some
of these ￿rms have a¢ liates within the same enterprise that are active. I use
the alpha number to ￿nd all the a¢ liates within an enterprise and keep only the
establishment of ￿rms that are active and have a positive payroll. Hence, the
establishments in the invalid group that has the same EIN listed on the Form 5500
are dropped. But, the a¢ liates of these ￿rms are kept and are assumed to o⁄er
pensions that were reported on the Form 5500. Sometimes, all establishments
within an enterprise are listed as not active. Thus, all the establishments within
an enterprise are dropped in its entirety and there are no matches. Having an
enterprise that is entirely inactive but still has an a¢ liate EIN listed on the Form
5500 is not uncommon because by law, an enterprise is still obligated to ￿le a Form
5500 if the pension still has positive assets in a pension fund or if retirees are still
receiving pensions.
1.3.2 Discussion of Results from the First Integration: Pension Cov-
erage on EIN Level
Once I have found the establishment matches in each ￿le, I aggregate the estab-
lishment matches and non-matches to an EIN level. Table 1.8 shows the Form
5500 EINs that have a match to the U.S. Business Register. For each year, at least
95% of the EINs are found in the Business Register. Table 1.9 has the numbers
of EINs in the U.S. Business Register single-unit ￿le that match to an EIN in the
Form 5500 ￿le for all years. The number of EINs that matched are very small,
approximately 8% for all years. However, although this is a low match rate, this is
actually not surprising. Most of the single-unit ￿rms tend to have a small number
of employees, and small ￿rms are less likely to o⁄er pensions when compared to
larger ￿rms. In fact, approximately 55% of the single-unit ￿les have less than 100
18employees4. Table 1.10 shows the number of EINs in the U.S. Business Register
multi-unit ￿les that either match to an EIN in the Form 5500 ￿le or are a¢ liates.
The match rate is approximately 57%. Since approximately 93% of the multi-unit
EINs have 100 employees or more5, it is understandable that the match rate is
much higher.
Plan End Year
Form 5500
EINs
Single Unit
Matches
Through Valid
EINs
Multi-Unit
Matches
Through  Valid
EINs
Multi-Unit
Matches
Through Invalid
EINs
Total
Matches to
Form 5500
1994 566,706 420,454 97,562 30,936 548,952
74.19% 17.22% 5.46% 96.87%
1995 580,673 432,318 98,498 33,366 564,182
74.45% 16.96% 5.75% 97.16%
1996 594,237 451,069 91,384 16,196 558,649
75.91% 15.38% 2.73% 94.01%
1997 613,737 444,381 106,386 32,205 582,972
72.41% 17.33% 5.25% 94.99%
1998 617,456 454,601 105,210 33,742 593,553
73.62% 17.04% 5.46% 96.13%
1999 562,781 416,745 93,893 30,671 541,309
74.05% 16.68% 5.45% 96.18%
2000 594,914 440,039 94,674 33,663 568,376
73.97% 15.91% 5.66% 95.54%
2001 606,740 450,446 86,626 36,964 574,036
74.24% 14.28% 6.09% 94.61%
Table 1.8: EINs from the Form 5500 That Are Found in the U.S. Census
Business Register
4Refer to Appendix A for details on ￿rm size determined by the number of employees.
5Refer to Appendix A for details on ￿rm size determined by the number of employees
19Plan End Year
Single-Unit Valid
Matches
Single-Unit
Non-Matches Total
1994 420,454 5,048,596 5,469,050
(Row Percentages) 7.69% 92.31% 100.00%
1995 432,318 5,127,876 5,560,194
7.78% 92.22% 100.00%
1996 451,069 5,229,483 5,680,552
7.94% 92.06% 100.00%
1997 444,381 5,180,346 5,624,727
7.90% 92.10% 100.00%
1998 454,601 5,266,618 5,721,219
7.95% 92.05% 100.00%
1999 416,745 5,341,109 5,757,854
7.24% 92.76% 100.00%
2000 440,039 5,359,645 5,799,684
7.59% 92.41% 100.00%
2001 450,446 5,349,611 5,800,057
7.77% 92.23% 100.00%
Table 1.9: EIN Matches and Non-Matches from the Single-Unit Files
of the U.S. Census Business Register
Plan End Year
Valid Multi-Unit EINs
Found Through
Valid EINs
Valid Multi-Unit EINs
Found Through
Invalid EINs No Matches Total
1994 166,564 2,735 151,139 320,438
(row percentages) 51.98% 0.85% 47.17% 100.00%
1995 168,181 2,743 147,280 318,204
52.85% 0.86% 46.28% 100.00%
1996 158,461 4,736 115,120 278,317
56.94% 1.70% 41.36% 100.00%
1997 172,820 3,049 126,557 302,426
57.14% 1.01% 41.85% 100.00%
1998 175,607 3,467 127,247 306,321
57.33% 1.13% 41.54% 100.00%
1999 167,015 3,393 136,156 306,564
54.48% 1.11% 44.41% 100.00%
2000 163,740 6,430 132,618 302,788
54.08% 2.12% 37.58% 93.78%
2001 156,553 6,316 100,992 263,861
59.33% 2.39% 38.27% 100.00%
Table 1.10: EINs Matches or Affiliates and Non-Matches from the Multi-
Unit Files of the U.S. Census Business Register
I next determine exactly how many ￿rms o⁄er only de￿ned bene￿t plans, how
many o⁄er only de￿ned contribution plans and how many o⁄er both types of plans
to their employees. To avoid redundancy I report statistics for the year 1997 only.
Table 1.11 shows the numbers of single-unit and multi-unit ￿rms that o⁄er de￿ned
20bene￿t plans, de￿ned contribution plans, or both in year 1997. It is not surprising
that an overwhelmingly large proportion of single-unit ￿rms o⁄er more de￿ned
contribution plans than de￿ned bene￿t plans. Again, these ￿rms are typically
smaller and the administrative costs of de￿ned contribution plans are much less.
Approximately 96% of all single-unit ￿rms o⁄er only de￿ned contribution plan.
Interestingly, multi-unit ￿rms also o⁄er predominantly de￿ned contribution plans,
but they also o⁄er most of the joint plans. Approximately 79% of joint de￿ned
bene￿t and de￿ned contribution plans o⁄ered are o⁄ered by multi-unit ￿rms.
Single-
Unit EINs
Multi-Units
EINs Through
Valid Match
Multi-Unit
EINs through
Invalid Match Total
DB Plans Offered Only 24,314 6,129 97 30,540
(Row Percentages) 79.61% 20.07% 0.32% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 5.47% 3.55% 3.18% 4.92%
DC Plans Offered Only 409,962 125,647 2,401 538,010
76.20% 23.35% 0.45% 100.00%
92.25% 72.70% 78.75% 86.74%
DB and DC plans Offered 10,105 41,044 551 51,700
19.55% 79.39% 1.07% 100.00%
2.27% 23.75% 18.07% 8.34%
Total 444,381 172,820 3,049 620,250
71.65% 27.86% 0.49% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.11: Different Pension Types Offered by Single-Unit and Multi-Unit
Firms in Year 1997
I then determine if there are distinct trends in pension coverage. In Table 1.12,
I look at the number of ￿rms that o⁄er only de￿ned bene￿t plans, the number of
￿rms that only o⁄er de￿ned contribution plans and the number of ￿rms that o⁄er
both, and determine if the types of pension bene￿t coverage change over the eight-
year time period. From 1994 to 2001, the number of ￿rms o⁄ering de￿ned bene￿t
plans decreases every year. The number of ￿rms o⁄ering only de￿ned bene￿t plans
drops by 50% and the number of ￿rms o⁄ering both types of plans drops by 25%.
The number of ￿rms o⁄ering only de￿ned contribution plans increase by 12%. The
21overall number of plans increases slightly by 4%.
Plan End Year
Defined Benefit
Plans Only
Defined
contribution Plans
Only
Defined Benefit
Plans and Defined
Contribution Plans Total
1994 42,748 488,017 58,988 589,753
(Row Percentages) 7.25% 82.75% 10.00% 100.00%
1995 38,594 507,951 56,697 603,242
6.40% 84.20% 9.40% 100.00%
1996 34,959 526,927 52,380 614,266
5.69% 85.78% 8.53% 100.00%
1997 30,540 538,010 51,700 620,250
4.92% 86.74% 8.34% 100.00%
1998 28,331 555,922 49,422 633,675
4.47% 87.73% 7.80% 100.00%
1999 22,844 521,015 43,294 587,153
3.89% 88.74% 7.37% 100.00%
2000 23,202 544,401 42,606 610,209
3.80% 89.22% 6.98% 100.00%
2001 21,459 547,789 44,064 613,312
3.50% 89.32% 7.18% 100.00%
Table 1.12: Different Pension Plans Offered by Single-Unit and Multi-Unit Firms for Years
1994-2001
Thus, there seems to be an expected pattern of ￿rms shifting away from de￿ned
bene￿t plans and toward de￿ned contribution plans. This does not take into
consideration the number of ￿rms that have frozen the pension accruals in their
de￿ned bene￿t pension plans or those that have grandfathered their de￿ned bene￿t
plans. It is important to remember that ￿rms with frozen and grandfathered plans
are in the same category as the ￿rms with active pension plans because they have
currently employed workers under the plans.
1.3.3 Pension Coverage on Employment Level
After looking at ￿rms￿pension o⁄erings and identifying trends, I next determine
how many employees had pension coverage over the eight-year period. I use the
total number of employees provided on the U.S. Census Business Register data to
determine how many workers are eligible for certain type of pension plan coverage.
Table 1.13 shows the total number of employees working for ￿rms in the single-unit
￿les that matched to an EIN in the Form 5500 ￿le for all years. Approximately
2220% of workers who work for single-unit ￿rms are eligible for some form of pension
plan. Table 1.14 shows the total number of employees working for ￿rms in the
multi-unit ￿les that either match to an EIN in the Form 5500 ￿les or are a¢ liates
after using EINs and alphas to integrate for all years. The number of workers
eligible for a pension plan is much higher. Approximately 86% of the employees
are eligible. I then combine the single-unit and multi-unit workers to create a more
accurate depiction of the pension eligibility rate on a national level. Table 1.15
shows the total number of employees from the single-unit and multi-unit ￿les who
are eligible for a pension plan. When combining both lists, the number of workers
eligible is slightly more than half of the workforce for all years.
Plan End Year
Single-Unit Valid
Matches
Single-Unit
Non-Matches Total
1994 10,922,480 49,660,848 60,583,328
(Row Percentages) 18.03% 81.97% 100.00%
1995 12,002,470 51,543,226 63,545,696
18.89% 81.11% 100.00%
1996 13,029,905 52,847,315 65,877,220
19.78% 80.22% 100.00%
1997 12,636,415 50,921,653 63,558,068
19.88% 80.12% 100.00%
1998 13,208,475 53,466,360 66,674,835
19.81% 80.19% 100.00%
1999 13,234,085 54,081,805 67,315,890
19.66% 80.34% 100.00%
2000 14,607,905 54,696,012 69,303,917
21.08% 78.92% 100.00%
2001 15,443,406 53,386,953 68,830,359
22.44% 77.56% 100.00%
Table 1.13: Total Number of People Employed in Single-Unit EINs
That Are Matches and Non-Matches to the Form 5500
23Plan End Year
Valid Multi-Unit
Employment Found
Through  Valid EINs
Valid Multi-Unit
Employment Found
Through Invalid EINs No Matches Total
1994 45,722,588 683,786 7,964,215 54,370,589
(row percentages) 84.09% 1.26% 14.65% 100.00%
1995 50,883,293 787,415 8,253,496 59,924,204
84.91% 1.31% 13.77% 100.00%
1996 48,524,345 931,159 7,383,275 56,838,779
85.37% 1.64% 12.99% 100.00%
1997 51,569,284 847,733 8,731,048 61,148,065
84.34% 1.39% 14.28% 100.00%
1998 55,274,593 1,027,975 9,391,358 65,693,926
84.14% 1.56% 14.30% 100.00%
1999 53,421,568 1,284,964 9,956,303 64,662,835
82.62% 1.99% 15.40% 100.00%
2000 55,574,990 1,141,437 8,884,169 65,600,596
84.72% 1.74% 13.54% 100.00%
2001 57,871,266 1,505,692 8,084,129 67,461,087
85.78% 2.23% 11.98% 100.00%
Table 1.14: Total Number of People Employed in Multi-Unit EINs and
Affiliates that are Matches and Non-Matches to the Form 5500
Matches to
Form 5500 File
Non-Matches to
Form 5500 File Total
1994 57,328,854 57,625,063 114,953,917
(Row Percentages) 49.87% 50.13% 100.00%
1995 63,673,178 59,793,967 123,467,145
51.57% 48.43% 100.00%
1996 62,485,409 60,230,590 122,715,999
50.92% 49.08% 100.00%
1997 65,053,432 59,645,798 124,699,230
52.17% 47.83% 100.00%
1998 69,511,043 62,857,718 132,368,761
52.51% 47.49% 100.00%
1999 67,940,617 64,038,108 131,978,725
51.48% 48.52% 100.00%
2000 71,324,332 63,579,571 134,903,903
52.87% 47.13% 100.00%
2001 74,820,364 61,471,082 136,291,446
54.90% 45.10% 100.00%
Table 1.15: Total Number of Employees Working for Business
Register EINs Matching and Not Matching to the Form 5500
24Single-Unit
EINs
Multi-Units
EINs Through
Valid Match
Multi-Unit EINs
through Invalid
Match Total
DB Plans Offered Only 816,416 1,627,614 29,231 2,473,261
(Row Percentages) 33.01% 65.81% 1.18% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 6.46% 3.16% 3.45% 3.80%
DC Plans Offered Only 11,144,389 22,560,243 509,717 34,214,349
32.57% 65.94% 1.49% 100.00%
88.19% 43.75% 60.13% 52.59%
DB and DC plans Offered 675,610 27,381,427 308,785 28,365,822
2.38% 96.53% 1.09% 100.00%
5.35% 53.10% 36.42% 43.60%
Total 12,636,415 51,569,284 847,733 65,053,432
19.42% 79.27% 1.30% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.16: Total Employees by Pension Type Offered by Multi-Unit and Single-
Unit Firms in 1997
I also determine what types of pensions the workers are eligible for. To avoid
redundancy, statistics from 1997 are discussed. Table 1.16 shows the coverage
rates by pension types for employees working for the single-unit and multi-unit
￿rms in year 1997. Most of the workers in single-unit ￿les are only eligible for
de￿ned contribution plans. Approximately 88% of employees working in a single-
unit ￿rm have only a de￿ned contribution plan. Most of the employees working
for multi-unit ￿rms also are only eligible for only de￿ned contribution plans with
approximately 44% of the workers. However, a large percentage of workers from
multi-unit ￿rms receive eligibility for both types of plans, approximately 53%.
25Plan End Year
Defined Benefit
Plans Only
Defined
contribution Plans
Only
Defined Benefit
Plans and Defined
Contribution Plans Total
1994 3,154,344 26,767,088 27,407,422 57,328,854
(Row Percentages) 5.50% 46.69% 47.81% 100.00%
1995 3,613,841 30,905,729 29,153,608 63,673,178
5.68% 48.54% 45.79% 100.00%
1996 2,637,699 31,280,973 28,566,737 62,485,409
4.22% 50.06% 45.72% 100.00%
1997 2,473,261 34,214,349 28,365,822 65,053,432
3.80% 52.59% 43.60% 100.00%
1998 2,387,525 38,266,686 28,856,832 69,511,043
3.43% 55.05% 41.51% 100.00%
1999 1,719,400 38,875,932 27,345,285 67,940,617
2.53% 57.22% 40.25% 100.00%
2000 1,670,404 42,464,331 27,189,597 71,324,332
2.34% 59.54% 38.12% 100.00%
2001 1,536,401 42,511,564 30,772,399 74,820,364
2.05% 56.82% 41.13% 100.00%
Table 1.17: Total Number of Employees Working for Business Register EINs That Offer
Different Pension Types
I next determine if there are trends in pension coverage by employment. Table
1.17 looks at the number of workers eligible for certain types of pensions over the
eight-year period. The number of workers eligible for only de￿ned contribution
plans increases by 59% from 1994 to 2001. The number of workers eligible for
de￿ned bene￿t plans decreases by 51% over the same period. Interestingly, al-
though a small percentage of ￿rms o⁄er both a de￿ned contribution and de￿ned
bene￿t plan, they are the largest employers. The number of employees eligible for
both types of plans remains fairly constant over the eight-year period even though
there was a slight dip in overall population coverage from 1995 to 2001. It seems
that the employees of ￿rms which o⁄er only de￿ned bene￿t plans seem to be most
likely a⁄ected by the conversion of pensions.
1.3.4 Second Stage of Integration: Integrating LEHD Data to Form
5500-Business Register Data Set
Using the Form 5500-U.S. Census Business Register data set created in the ￿rst
stage is very informative because using the data set can identify which ￿rms are
26o⁄ering pensions and what types, in addition to providing descriptive information
about the ￿rms. Unfortunately, the Form 5500-Business Register data set is
lacking important information about the employees. I now discuss how information
describing the workers￿race, sex, education attainment status, foreign-born status,
age, and annual earnings as well as other ￿rm statistics provided in the LEHD data
is integrated into the Form 5500-Business Register data set.
The LEHD state data is an employee-level ￿le, therefore the employer-level
statistics are calculated and are percentages and averages describing the workforce
for each ￿rm within the state. Once I calculate the descriptive statistics about
the workers on the ￿rm or EIN level, I use the EINs to link this information to the
Form 5500-U.S. Business Register data set.
There are several variables I chose to describe each ￿rm￿ s workforce. Using the
date of birth information that is provided, I determine the percentage of workers
that are considered the older workers by calculating the percentage of workers who
are over the age forty-￿ve. I also calculate the percentage of workers by race within
a ￿rm. The race variable identi￿es a worker as either white, black, Hispanic (and
not black), or a member of ￿ other race￿(Native American, Indian descent, Asian,
other). I use the foreign-born indicator on the data set to determine the percentage
of the ￿rm￿ s workers who are foreign-born. A sex identi￿cation variable exists on
the LEHD data which is used to calculate the percentages of the workers who are
male or female within each ￿rm. Since all workers who earn at least one dollar
are listed on the LEHD data set, I also calculate the average annual earnings of
the workers for each ￿rm within the state.
The only statistic that is not calculated by simply using a variable on the LEHD
data set is education attainment. Education attainment is multiply-imputed for
each worker by researchers in LEHD. Using the education imputation, I determine
27the percentage of workers in a ￿rm with at least a college degree.
Unfortunately, not all of the forty-three state partners provide UI records for
workers prior to the year 2000. One limitation of the LEHD data is that only
twelve states provide data that go back to the mid-1990￿ s. These twelve states
are California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
North Carolina, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin. Using these states provides
information about workers for 320,000 EINs and they employ approximately 23
million people. However, the advantage of having a longitudinal structure of this
data set is that more states can be added in the future when later years of the
Form 5500 become available.
Tables 1.18 and 1.19 show the descriptive statistics for ￿rms that exist in these
twelve states and o⁄er pensions in 1997. To avoid redundancy, only data from
the year 1997 are discussed. As seen in the tables, most of the EINs in the LEHD
data that match are in California and employ most of the workers. Approximately,
25% of the EINs in the LEHD data are in California and 28% of the workers are
in California. The smallest state that is represented from these twelve states
is Montana. Only 1.25% of EINs are from this state and these ￿rms employee
approximately 1% of the total workers.
The percentage of employees with at least a college degree varies quite a bit
among the twelve states. The state with the largest percentage of college-educated
workers is Maryland with 45.4% while the state with the lowest percentage of
workers is Wisconsin with 26.5%. Also, the state with the most diverse workforce
is California with an average percentage of ￿rms￿ employees who are white is
70.5%. The lease diverse is Montana in which the average percentage of the ￿rms￿
employees who are white is 94.6%. The average annual earnings vary quite a bit as
well. The state that has the highest annual earnings with an average of $50,112.34
28is California, and the state with the lowest annual earnings is Montana, which has
the average annual earnings of $31,565.43.
In Tables 1.18 and 1.19, I also have the average number of establishments with
the same EIN within the twelve states separately. This number is low, averaging
between one and two establishments within a state. Thus, it is not surprisingly
that most of the ￿rms that o⁄er pensions within the twelve states are single es-
tablishments. Also, the average numbers of employees within a ￿rm varies quite
a bit as well. The state that has the largest average number of employees within
a ￿rm is Florida with approximately 86 employees per EIN. The state that has
the smallest average of workers in one ￿rm is Montana with approximately 35
employees.
29California Florida Idaho Illinois Maryland Minnesota
Average Number of
Establishments 1.823 2.378 1.588 1.403 1.498 1.809
(Standard Deviation) 10.428 50.038 3.252 5.396 4.89 6.018
Average Percentage of
Workers age 45-99 34.80% 37.88% 34.40% 35.30% 34.20% 32.00%
0.269 0.291 0.305 0.278 0.287 0.272
Average Percentage of
Foreign-Born Workers 20.90% 14.30% 3.50% 9.60% 8.70% 3.40%
0.243 0.224 0.106 0.172 0.169 0.099
Average Percentage of
White Workers 70.50% 81.60% 92.90% 84.20% 79.20% 93.10%
0.272 0.229 0.146 0.215 0.252 0.134
Average Percentage of
Black Workers 3.23% 5.79% 0.40% 5.10% 12.40% 1.40%
0.084 0.12 0.147 0.122 0.199 0.054
Average Percentage of
Hispanic Workers 11.30% 7.40% 2.10% 3.90% 1.50% 0.60%
0.166 0.153 0.068 0.096 0.062 0.03
Average Percentage of
'Other Race' Workers 11.20% 2.30% 1.90% 3.30% 3.30% 1.80%
0.188 0.079 0.077 0.101 0.106 0.069
Average Percentage of
Female Workers 45.50% 44.20% 38.90% 41.30% 42.70% 38.60%
0.317 0.332 0.351 0.32 0.336 0.321
Average Percentage of
College-Educated
Workers 41.50% 38.00% 30.00% 37.60% 45.40% 34.00%
0.257 0.271 0.269 0.266 0.273 0.268
Average Annual
Earnings Within State 50,112.34 40,335.69 41,244.19 47,984.98 39,317.76 41,612.09
114384 33604 451804 57418 27903 52713
Average Total Workers
Employed Within State 81.373 86.124 46.891 71.741 58.513 69.39
681.577 913.873 222.972 471.55 262.387 408.387
Total Number of EINs
Within State 81,466 40,206 5,145 48,262 21,078 22,249
Total Number of
Workers Within State 6,583,213 3,368,736 239,815 3,438,882 1,130,111 1,441,004
Table 1.18: Descriptive Statistics of LEHD State Data that Matched to the Form 5500-
U.S. Business Register Data Set in 1997
30Missouri Montana
North
Carolina Oregon Washington Wisconsin
Average Number of
Establishments 1.75 1.455 2.043 1.504 1.532 1.552
(Standard Deviation) 5.362 2.552 9.248 3.97 6.883 3.807
Average Percentage of
Workers age 45-99 34.80% 36.00% 34.10% 35.10% 32.30% 32.90%
0.274 0.302 0.283 0.286 0.284 0.265
Average Percentage of
Foreign-Born Workers 3.00% 2.10% 3.90% 6.40% 8.30% 3.00%
0.099 0.079 0.111 0.143 0.16 0.098
Average Percentage of
White Workers 90.50% 94.60% 85.00% 90.20% 88.30% 92.20%
0.17 0.125 0.206 0.165 0.179 0.146
Average Percentage of
Black Workers 4.90% 0.30% 9.50% 1.00% 1.70% 2.20%
0.123 0.031 0.164 0.047 0.056 0.146
Average Percentage of
Hispanic Workers 0.70% 0.60% 0.90% 2.10% 1.90% 0.90%
0.034 0.04 0.04 0.069 0.064 0.041
Average Percentage of
'Other Race' Workers 1.50% 1.80% 1.70% 3.20% 5.00% 1.40%
0.067 0.069 0.069 0.093 0.064 0.062
Average Percentage of
Female Workers 39.50% 40.40% 40.00% 40.10% 41.50% 39.70%
0.332 0.353 0.335 0.337 0.35 0.033
Average Percentage of
College-Educated
Workers 34.30% 35.70% 35.50% 33.00% 36.50% 26.50%
0.274 0.278 0.28 0.27 0.275 0.238
Average Annual Earnings
Within State 40,669.17 31,565.43 40,955.14 39,204.62 38,812.30 36,982.78
46796 33126 38129 60164 48905 47248
Average Total Workers
Employed Within State 71.842 35.693 85.592 55.938 63.722 73.258
396.549 122.472 502.196 286.889 689.012 311.404
Total Number of EINs
Within State 20,207 4,026 25,467 14,726 20,991 21,856
Total Number of Workers
Within State 1,445,965 141,248 2,158,982 819,974 1,330,447 1,592,374
Table 1.19: Descriptive Statistics of LEHD State Data that Matched to the Form 5500-
U.S. Business Register Data Set in 1997-Continued
Thus, using the LEHD data provides more details about the workers and pro-
vides some variation in the types of workers that are o⁄ered pensions. This
information along with the pension information and the ￿rm information makes
this data set one of the most comprehensive data sets available which can be used
to help understand the roles of pensions in the ￿rm.
311.4 Comparisons to Public Use Files and Government-Provided
Statistics
To understand how good this new data set is in representing pension coverage
and pension e⁄ects on ￿rms and workers in the United States, I make four com-
parisons. I ￿rst compare the coverage rates from the Form 5500-U.S. Census
Business Register data set with coverage rates generated from the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS) Annual Demographic ￿les for years 1994 to 2001. I then
compare trends in the number of de￿ned bene￿t plans o⁄ered by ￿rms in the same
eight-year period with the number of de￿ned bene￿t plans insured by the Pen-
sion Bene￿ts Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). I then use the information from the
CPS Annual Demographic ￿les and the Social Security Administration￿ s Detailed
Earnings Records (DER) to determine if there are any mismatches between what
employees say about their pension coverage and participation verses if their em-
ployers ￿le a Form 5500. I ￿nally determine if using information on EINs found
only in the twelve states is adequate in discussing employee pension coverage by
comparing the pension o⁄erings in the national data set I created with those in
the twelve-state subset.
1.4.1 Comparisons of Trends
I ￿rst compare coverage rates from the Form 5500-Business Register data set to
coverage and participation rates that are estimated using the CPS Annual De-
mographic Files which is the March supplemental ￿le. The estimates used for
comparison are from years 1994-2001 and are based on answers from respondents
who work in the private sector. These data sets are comparable because in both
data sets all employees are age ￿fteen and older and work for ￿rms that are part of
the private sector. The question I use from the CPS to determine coverage rates
is
32"Other than Social Security, did the employer or union that [the respondent]
worked for in 1997 have a pension plan for any of the employees?￿
0: Not in Universe
1: Yes
2: No.
The question I used to determine participation rates is the follow-up question
￿Was [the respondent] included in that plan?￿(Given that the respondent said
yes to the previous question?)
0: Not in Universe
1: Yes
2: No
Table 1.20 shows that the coverage rates found in the Form 5500-Business
Register ￿le are very close to those found in the CPS.
Coverage Rates Found
in CPS for All Workers in
Private Firrms
Coverage Rates Estimated
Using the Form 5500 and
Business Register for All
Workers
1994 47.61% 49.87%
1995 50.82% 51.57%
1996 49.57% 50.92%
1997 53.91% 52.17%
1998 52.80% 52.51%
1999 50.49% 51.48%
2000 53.96% 52.87%
2001 53.26% 54.90%
Table 1.20: Comparison of Coverage Rate Estimates from the
CPS with Coverage Rate Estimates from the Form 5500-Business
Register
I also compare the number of de￿ned bene￿t plans found in the Form 5500 over
the eight-year period to the number of de￿ned bene￿t plans insured by the Pension
Bene￿ts Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC protects the pensions of
workers in private de￿ned bene￿t pension plans. The PBGC insures most single-
employer plans but excludes insuring plans o⁄ered by professional service ￿rms
33with less than twenty-six employees, by church groups and by federal, state or
local governments. When comparing the number of de￿ned bene￿t plans insured
by PBGC to the number of the de￿ned bene￿t plans found in the Form 5500-U.S.
Census Bureau over the eight-year period, there is a parallel trend in the reduction
in the number of de￿ned bene￿t plans. Previously, I stated that the number of
de￿ned bene￿t plans o⁄ered by the ￿rms in the Form 5500 declined by 41% from
1994 to 2001 and the number of EINs in the Form 5500-Business Register data
that o⁄er de￿ned bene￿t plans dropped by 40% in the same period. Similarly, the
number of de￿ned bene￿t plans insured by the PBGC dropped by 41%. Table 1.21
compares the numbers.
Plan End Year
DB Plans Found in
Form 5500-Business
Register File
EINs offering DB
Plans Found in Form
5500-Business
Register File
Single-Employer
DB Plans Insured
by PBGC
1994 81,042 71,662 57,010
1995 75,218 66,485 53,589
1996 70,268 62,089 48,748
1997 65,070 57,468 43,902
1998 59,486 52,730 41,462
1999 46,523 41,380 37,536
2000 48,450 43,177 35,373
2001 48,300 42,709 32,954
Table 1.21 Comparisons of Number of DB Plans in Form 5500-Business Register
File, Number of EINs Offering DB Plans from Form 5500-Business Register File
and DB Plans Insured by the PBGC
1.4.2 Discussion of Mismatches Between Self-Reports and Administra-
tive Files
Even though the comparisons of trends discussed earlier show that the coverage
rates reported on the CPS and the rates calculated from the Form 5500￿ Business
Register are close, it is important to determine if on an individual basis, the data
set correctly identi￿es who is eligible. To determine this, I make additional com-
parisons using estimates I calculate using the responses from the CPS Annual
34Demographic ￿les for years 1994-2001. Using Social Security Administration￿ s
Detailed Earnings Records (DER) ￿le available in LEHD, I am able to determine
a work history for most of the CPS workers who respond to questions about the
jobs. With this added information, I compare whether the CPS responses about
pensions are consistent to results I have in my data set. I ￿rst compare what
respondents say about their dominant or primary employers o⁄ering pensions to
whether their employers ￿led a Form 5500 form with the IRS and DOL or not.
Again, the variable used to represent pension eligibility corresponds to the response
to the CPS question:
"Other than Social Security, did the employer or union that [the respondent]
worked for in 1997 have a pension plan for any of the employees?"
0: Not in Universe
1: Yes
2: No
The variable used to represent pension plan participation corresponds to the
response to the follow-up CPS question discussed earlier:
"Was [the respondent] included in that plan?" (Given that the respondent said
yes to the previous question?)
0: Not in Universe
1: Yes
2: No
I use only CPS respondents identi￿ed as full-time employees working in the
private sector.
35Worker Resonse to CPS Yes No Total
Yes, my employer provides a
pension plan 30,543 7,578 38,121
(Row Percentage) 80.12% 19.88% 100.00%
(Column Percentage) 76.78% 35.64% 62.45%
(Cell Percentages) 50.04% 12.42%
No, my employer does not
provide a pension plan 9,236 13,682 22,918
40.30% 59.70% 100.00%
23.22% 64.36% 37.55%
15.13% 22.42%
Total 39,779 21,260 61,039
65.17% 34.83% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.22: CPS Responses Regarding Whether the Dominant Employer
Provided Pensions in 1997
The Firm has a Pension Plan
in the Form 5500
Worker Resonse to CPS Yes No Total
Yes, I am included in a
pension plan through my
employer 25,034 5,563 30,597
(Row Percentage) 81.82% 18.18% 100.00%
(Column Percentage) 81.96% 73.40% 80.26%
(Cell Percentages) 65.67% 14.59%
No, I am not included in a
pension plan through my
employer 5,509 2,016 7,525
73.21% 26.79% 100.00%
18.04% 26.60% 19.74%
14.45% 5.29%
Total 30,543 7,579 38,122
80.12% 19.88% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
The Firm has a Pension Plan
in the Form 5500
Total 1.23: CPS Responses Regarding Whether the Worker Is Included in the
Dominant Employer's Pension Plan in 1997
Table 1.22 shows the results of comparing the responses to whether the em-
ployer o⁄ering a pension plan to whether the primary employer ￿led a pension plan
with the Form 5500 for year 1997. Most of these workers in the CPS responded
correctly that their employer provided a pension plan or not. However, 12.42% of
36the workers in the CPS said their employer o⁄ers a pension plan, but the employer
is not found in the Business Register and 15.13% of workers said their employer
does not o⁄er a pension plan, but the employer is found in the Form 5500. Table
1.23 shows the results of comparing whether the workers participate in a pension
plan to whether their primary employer ￿led a pension plan with the Form 5500
for year 1997. Approximately 66% of the workers responded in the CPS to having
employer-sponsored pension work for an employer found in the Form 5500. How-
ever, approximately 15% of the workers responded to having a pension plan, but
the employer is not found in the Form 5500.
Thus, it seems that comparing administrative data to self-reports lead to some
discord between what respondents say and verses what ￿rms report. However,
many researchers have noted that some workers do not fully understand their
own pension plan eligibility and participation rules in their ￿rms. This is a
common problem among ￿rms when communicating their bene￿t package to their
employees. Therefore, one should not simply dismiss this new data set because the
pension coverage outcomes are di⁄erent than those calculated using CPS responses.
It may be that some workers are reporting their pension eligibility and coverage
erroneously.
1.4.3 National Data Set Verses Twelve State Data Set
As mentioned above, the biggest limitation with the LEHD data is that most
states provide data beginning in year 2000 or later, so only twelve states are used
to include worker characteristics. These twelve states represent 34.86% of the
U.S. Population. To determine if using a subset of EINs which include employee
information is still appropriate for analyses even though it includes ￿rms from
only twelve states, I compare the percentage of ￿rms that o⁄er di⁄erent pension
plans and pension coverage rates from the Form 5500-Business Register data to
37the percentage of ￿rms that o⁄er di⁄erent pension plans and pension coverage
rates from the twelve-state subset. Table 1.24 shows the number of ￿rms and
employees with only a de￿ned bene￿t plan, the number of ￿rms with only a de￿ned
contribution plans, and the number of ￿rms with both pension plans from the Form
5500-Business Register data and from the twelve-state subset. In Table 1.24, the
percentage of ￿rms that o⁄er only a de￿ned bene￿t plan in the national data set is
close to the percentage of ￿rms that o⁄er de￿ned bene￿t plans in the twelve-state
data set. However, the percentage of ￿rms that o⁄er both a de￿ned bene￿t plan
and a de￿ned contribution plan is half the percentage of ￿rms o⁄ering both plans
and exist in only the twelve states. The percentage of people who are eligible
for a de￿ned contribution plan is slightly higher for ￿rms within the twelve states
than the workers in the national data set. However, the workers who are eligible
for only a de￿ned bene￿t plan or both types of plans is slightly smaller for the
workers in ￿rms that exist in the twelve states than those that are employed in the
national data set.
Number of
Firms
Number of
Employees Number of Firms
Number of
Employees
Defined Benefit Plans
Only 30,540 2,473,261 11,343 651,557
(Column Percentages) 4.92% 3.80% 3.52% 2.75%
Defined Contribution
Plans Only 538,010 34,214,349 258,689 13,791,171
86.74% 52.59% 80.32% 58.21%
Defined Benefit Plans
and Defined
Contribution Plans 51,700 28,365,822 52,048 9,248,021
8.34% 43.60% 16.16% 39.04%
Total 620,250 65,053,432 322,080 23,690,749
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Firms from National Set
Created in First Integration
Unique Firms from 12 States Created
in Second Integration
Table 1.24: Comparison of the National Data Set to the 12-State Data Set That Includes
Employee Information
Although the pension coverage estimates is slightly di⁄erent, I believe the data
set is still a good source to be used for studying the role of pensions in the ￿rms.
38The twelve-state data set is appropriate because although this sample uses data
from twelve states that covers 34.86% of the population, this data set includes much
more information about the employees of these ￿rms. This added information will
become very useful when determining if certain types of workers respond di⁄erently
when o⁄ered certain types of pensions or not.
1.5 Reasons for Non-Matches when Integrating the Data
Although the Form 5500-Business Register-LEHD data set provides good estimates
for pension eligibility, it does not include all private ￿rms. There are some EINs on
the Form 5500 that are not matched to any EINs in the U.S. Business Register, and
there are EINs in the U.S. Census Business Register which are commonly known
to have a pension plan, but are not listed on the Form 5500 ￿le. It is important to
look at the information provided in the Form 5500 and the U.S. Business Register
to fully understand why some ￿rms are not identi￿ed as having a pension plan.
1.5.1 Reasons Why Form 5500 EINs Are Not Found on the Business
Register
When trying to identify ￿rms that o⁄er pensions using the Form 5500, there are
limitations to what is available on the Form 5500 ￿le. One reason why some ￿rms
are not part of this data set is because the ￿rm is listed under a di⁄erent EIN on
the Business Register. It is not unusual for a ￿rm to change its EIN. Because
of timing di⁄erences between when the Form 5500 is ￿led and when the ￿rm￿ s
tax return is ￿led, this may create some problems. Another reason why there is
no match is because the EIN on the Form 5500 may be coded incorrectly. The
Form 5500 data as provided is very messy. Unfortunately, without more speci￿c
information there is no way, other than with an EIN, to determine if these ￿rms
are the same as the some of ones listed on the U.S. Business Register. Another
reason why a ￿rm on the Form 5500 may not be found in the Business Register is
39because the EIN listed on the Form 5500 is an administrative EIN. Administrative
EINs are not considered active EINs and are dropped. A ￿nal reason why some
EINs on the Form 5500 ￿le are not found on the Business Register is because they
are public administrative ￿rms. Public administrative ￿rms are excluded from the
U.S. Census Business Register.
1.5.2 Reasons Why Business Register EINs Are Not Found in the Form
5500
Although the U.S. Census Business Register is very useful, some of the EINs listed
on the ￿le may not have a match. As a result, there are ￿rms that are not identi￿ed
as o⁄ering a pension plan even though they do provide one. The primary reason
why some EINs from the Business Register do not have a match is because, as
stated before, some of the ￿rms are not obligated to ￿le a Form 5500 form to the
IRS and DOL. Some ￿rms are exempt from ￿ling their pension plan speci￿cations
if the plans are, for example, SIMPLE or SEP plans. This is quite a problem for
some of the small ￿rms which typically o⁄er SEP and SIMPLE plans.
Thus, even though this data set is much more comprehensive on what types
of ￿rms are o⁄ering pensions and what types are workers are eligible for these
pensions, the data set still does not have all ￿rms that o⁄er pension plans to its
workers. However, the integration of the Form 5500 to the Business Register is
very successful with approximately 95% of the EINs from the Form 5500 matching.
This data set along with the information about employees located in the twelve
states from the LEHD data provides much more information than any previously
used data sets.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper discusses a new data set that is created by integrating information from
the Form 5500, the U.S. Census Business Register and the LEHD state data. This
40data set includes all private ￿rms in the U.S. and is longitudinal covering years 1994
to 2001. It is much more complete than any other data set because not only does
it have a list of ￿rms that o⁄er pensions, it also includes the company structure
and descriptive statistics about the ￿rms￿workforce such as age and sex pro￿les
as well as ￿rm characteristics like sales information and industry classi￿cation.
The results of the integration show that in 1997, 4.92% of ￿rms o⁄er a de￿ned
bene￿t plan, 86.74% o⁄er only a de￿ned contribution plan, and 8.34% o⁄er both.
The employee coverage rates are also quite interesting. A large percentage of
employees are eligible for both a de￿ned bene￿t plan and a de￿ned contribution
plan. As discussed, there is a trend demonstrating that the number of ￿rms
o⁄ering de￿ned bene￿t plans is dropping. There number of ￿rms o⁄ering de￿ned
contribution plans, however, is increasing.
There are several limitations to this data set. One limitation in this data set
is that there is little information about the pensions themselves. There is no
information about accrual rates or eligibility requirements. There is also no infor-
mation about changes in the pension formulas. The data set may also erroneously
imply that the employees that work for a ￿rm which o⁄ers both a de￿ned bene￿t
plan and a de￿ned contribution plan are eligible for both. In actuality, it is possi-
ble that only one part of the ￿rm￿ s workforce is eligible for a de￿ned bene￿t plans
and the other part is eligible for only the de￿ned contribution plan. Also, the total
number of employees includes part-time and leased workers, so the total number
of workers eligible for a pension plan may be overstated. Overall, however, after
comparing this data set with other pension coverage and participation estimates
from other sources, this data set clearly can be used for further research about
pensions. This data set provides which ￿rms are o⁄ering pensions and what types
of workers are eligible for them.
411.7 Appendix A
Singl- Unit
Valid
Matches
Single-Unit
Non Matches Total
No Employees 10,653 952,607 963,260
(Row Percentages) 1.11% 98.89% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 2.53% 18.87% 17.61%
1-4 Employees 106,888 2,448,469 2,555,357
4.18% 95.82% 100.00%
25.42% 48.50% 46.72%
5-24 Employees 207,017 1,397,070 1,604,087
12.91% 87.09% 100.00%
49.24% 27.67% 29.33%
25-99 Employees 77,976 208,953 286,929
27.18% 72.82% 100.00%
18.55% 4.14% 5.25%
100-499 Employees 16,490 34,827 51,317
32.13% 67.87% 100.00%
3.92% 0.69% 0.94%
500-999 Employees 892 3,746 4,638
19.23% 80.77% 100.00%
0.21% 0.07% 0.08%
1000-2499 Employees 439 1,998 2,437
18.01% 81.99% 100.00%
0.10% 0.04% 0.04%
2500 or More Employees 99 926 1,025
9.66% 90.34% 100.00%
0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
Total 420,454 5,048,596 5,469,050
7.69% 92.31% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.25: Single-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 1994
42Singl- Unit
Valid
Matches
Single-Unit
Non Matches Total
No Employees 10,954 939,805 950,759
(Row Percentages) 1.15% 98.85% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 2.53% 18.33% 17.10%
1-4 Employees 104,153 2,496,195 2,600,348
4.01% 95.99% 100.00%
24.09% 48.68% 46.77%
5-24 Employees 211,039 1,431,896 1,642,935
12.85% 87.15% 100.00%
48.82% 27.92% 29.55%
25-99 Employees 85,998 217,126 303,124
28.37% 71.63% 100.00%
19.89% 4.23% 5.45%
100-499 Employees 18,618 36,019 54,637
34.08% 65.92% 100.00%
4.31% 0.70% 0.98%
500-999 Employees 965 3,867 4,832
19.97% 80.03% 100.00%
0.22% 0.08% 0.09%
1000-2499 Employees 476 2,032 2,508
18.98% 81.02% 100.00%
0.11% 0.04% 0.05%
2500 or More Employees 115 936 1,051
10.94% 89.06% 100.00%
0.03% 0.02% 0.02%
Total 432,318 5,127,876 5,560,194
7.78% 92.22% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.26: Single-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 1995
43Singl- Unit
Valid
Matches
Single-Unit
Non
Matches Total
No Employees 11,465 948,928 960,393
(Row Percentages) 1.19% 98.81% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 2.54% 18.15% 16.91%
1-4 Employees 101,896 2,547,559 2,649,455
3.85% 96.15% 100.00%
22.59% 48.72% 46.64%
5-24 Employees 219,738 1,467,237 1,686,975
13.03% 86.97% 100.00%
48.71% 28.06% 29.70%
25-99 Employees 95,490 222,186 317,676
30.06% 69.94% 100.00%
21.17% 4.25% 5.59%
100-499 Employees 20,786 36,624 57,410
36.21% 63.79% 100.00%
4.61% 0.70% 1.01%
500-999 Employees 1,077 3,963 5,040
21.37% 78.63% 100.00%
0.24% 0.08% 0.09%
1000-2499 Employees 499 2,066 2,565
19.45% 80.55% 100.00%
0.11% 0.04% 0.05%
2500 or More Employees 118 920 1,038
11.37% 88.63% 100.00%
0.03% 0.02% 0.02%
Total 451,069 5,229,483 5,680,552
7.94% 92.06% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.27: Single-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 1996
44Singl- Unit
Valid
Matches
Single-Unit
Non Matches Total
No Employees 12,024 945,134 957,158
(Row Percentages) 1.26% 98.74% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 2.71% 18.24% 17.02%
1-4 Employees 99,329 2,544,468 2,643,797
3.76% 96.24% 100.00%
22.35% 49.12% 47.00%
5-24 Employees 216,429 1,440,204 1,656,633
13.06% 86.94% 100.00%
48.70% 27.80% 29.45%
25-99 Employees 94,533 208,890 303,423
31.16% 68.84% 100.00%
21.27% 4.03% 5.39%
100-499 Employees 20,469 34,722 55,191
37.09% 62.91% 100.00%
4.61% 0.67% 0.98%
500-999 Employees 1,049 3,908 4,957
21.16% 78.84% 100.00%
0.24% 0.08% 0.09%
1000-2499 Employees 448 2,099 2,547
17.59% 82.41% 100.00%
0.10% 0.04% 0.05%
2500 or More Employees 100 921 1,021
9.79% 90.21% 100.00%
0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
Total 444,381 5,180,346 5,624,727
7.90% 92.10% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.28: Single-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 1997
45Singl- Unit
Valid
Matches
Single-Unit
Non Matches Total
No Employees 12,028 933,170 945,198
(Row Percentages) 0.01 0.99 1.00
(Column Percentages) 0.03 0.18 0.17
1-4 Employees 96,999 2,596,522 2,693,521
0.04 0.96 1.00
0.21 0.49 0.47
5-24 Employees 221,571 1,477,716 1,699,287
0.13 0.87 1.00
0.49 0.28 0.30
25-99 Employees 101,129 216,257 317,386
0.32 0.68 1.00
0.22 0.04 0.06
100-499 Employees 21,290 35,787 57,077
0.37 0.63 1.00
0.05 0.01 0.01
500-999 Employees 1,037 4,039 5,076
0.20 0.80 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
1000-2499 Employees 441 2,149 2,590
0.17 0.83 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
2500 or More Employees 106 976 1,082
0.10 0.90 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 454,601 5,266,616 5,721,217
0.08 0.92 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 1.29: Single-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 1998
46Singl- Unit
Valid
Matches
Single-Unit
Non Matches Total
No Employees 10,218 929,919 940,137
(Row Percentages) 1.09% 98.91% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 2.45% 17.41% 16.33%
1-4 Employees 83,415 2,626,954 2,710,369
3.08% 96.92% 100.00%
20.02% 49.18% 47.07%
5-24 Employees 202,877 1,511,098 1,713,975
11.84% 88.16% 100.00%
48.68% 28.29% 29.77%
25-99 Employees 97,062 228,769 325,831
29.79% 70.21% 100.00%
23.29% 4.28% 5.66%
100-499 Employees 21,338 37,165 58,503
36.47% 63.53% 100.00%
5.12% 0.70% 1.02%
500-999 Employees 1,188 4,078 5,266
22.56% 77.44% 100.00%
0.29% 0.08% 0.09%
1000-2499 Employees 522 2,131 2,653
19.68% 80.32% 100.00%
0.13% 0.04% 0.05%
2500 or More Employees 125 995 1,120
11.16% 88.84% 100.00%
0.03% 0.02% 0.02%
Total 416,745 5,341,109 5,757,854
7.24% 92.76% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.30: Single-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 1999
47Singl- Unit
Valid
Matches
Single-Unit
Non Matches Total
No Employees 11,891 939,983 951,874
(Row Percentages) 1.25% 98.75% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 2.70% 17.54% 16.41%
1-4 Employees 85,864 2,610,172 2,696,036
3.18% 96.82% 100.00%
19.51% 48.70% 46.49%
5-24 Employees 212,052 1,528,217 1,740,269
12.19% 87.81% 100.00%
48.19% 28.51% 30.01%
25-99 Employees 103,835 236,274 340,109
30.53% 69.47% 100.00%
23.60% 4.41% 5.86%
100-499 Employees 24,231 37,649 61,880
39.16% 60.84% 100.00%
5.51% 0.70% 1.07%
500-999 Employees 1,395 4,164 5,559
25.09% 74.91% 100.00%
0.32% 0.08% 0.10%
1000-2499 Employees 620 2,155 2,775
22.34% 77.66% 100.00%
0.14% 0.04% 0.05%
2500 or More Employees 151 1,031 1,182
12.77% 87.23% 100.00%
0.03% 0.02% 0.02%
Total 440,039 5,359,645 5,799,684
7.59% 92.41% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.31: Single-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 2000
48Singl- Unit
Valid
Matches
Single-Unit
Non Matches Total
No Employees 11,495 920,271 931,766
(Row Percentages) 1.23% 98.77% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 2.55% 17.20% 16.06%
1-4 Employees 84,782 2,618,831 2,703,613
3.14% 96.86% 100.00%
18.82% 48.95% 46.61%
5-24 Employees 217,130 1,527,940 1,745,070
12.44% 87.56% 100.00%
48.20% 28.56% 30.09%
25-99 Employees 108,996 237,261 346,257
31.48% 68.52% 100.00%
24.20% 4.44% 5.97%
100-499 Employees 25,752 37,871 63,623
40.48% 59.52% 100.00%
5.72% 0.71% 1.10%
500-999 Employees 1,451 4,180 5,631
25.77% 74.23% 100.00%
0.32% 0.08% 0.10%
1000-2499 Employees 678 2,202 2880
23.54% 76.46% 100.00%
0.15% 0.04% 0.05%
2500 or More Employees 162 1,055 1217
13.31% 86.69% 100.00%
0.04% 0.02% 0.02%
Total 450,446 5,349,611 5,800,057
7.77% 92.23% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.32: Single-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 2001
49Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Valid EINs
Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Invalid
No
Matches Total
No Employees 958 85 11,364 12,407
(Row Percentages) 7.72% 0.69% 91.59% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 1.12% 9.74% 9.17% 5.91%
1-4 Employees 1,515 38 10,236 11,789
12.85% 0.32% 86.83% 100.00%
1.78% 4.35% 8.26% 5.61%
5-24 Employees 19,112 100 53,226 72,438
26.38% 0.14% 73.48% 100.00%
22.42% 11.45% 42.97% 34.49%
25-99 Employees 31,653 188 34,370 66,211
47.81% 0.28% 51.91% 100.00%
37.13% 21.53% 27.74% 31.53%
100-499 Employees 22,348 265 12,591 35,204
63.48% 0.75% 35.77% 100.00%
26.21% 30.36% 10.16% 16.76%
500-999 Employees 4,126 74 1,239 5,439
75.86% 1.36% 22.78% 100.00%
4.84% 8.48% 1.00% 2.59%
1000-2499 Employees 2,991 66 614 3,671
81.48% 1.80% 16.73% 100.00%
3.51% 7.56% 0.50% 1.75%
2500 or More Employees 2,556 57 240 2,853
89.59% 2.00% 8.41% 100.00%
3.00% 6.53% 0.19% 1.36%
Total 85,259 873 123,880 210,012
40.60% 0.42% 58.99% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.33: Multi-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 1994
50Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Valid EINs
Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Invalid
No
Matches Total
No Employees 1,324 112 15,184 16,620
(Row Percentages) 7.97% 0.67% 91.36% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 1.53% 12.57% 12.54% 7.97%
1-4 Employees 1,578 37 10,459 12,074
13.07% 0.31% 86.62% 100.00%
1.83% 4.15% 8.64% 5.79%
5-24 Employees 18,755 95 49,354 68,204
27.50% 0.14% 72.36% 100.00%
21.69% 10.66% 40.76% 32.72%
25-99 Employees 31,827 168 32,012 64,007
49.72% 0.26% 50.01% 100.00%
36.81% 18.86% 26.44% 30.71%
100-499 Employees 23,001 258 11,970 35,229
65.29% 0.73% 33.98% 100.00%
26.60% 28.96% 9.88% 16.90%
500-999 Employees 4,225 90 1,219 5,534
76.35% 1.63% 22.03% 100.00%
4.89% 10.10% 1.01% 2.65%
1000-2499 Employees 3,081 67 620 3,768
81.77% 1.78% 16.45% 100.00%
3.56% 7.52% 0.51% 1.81%
2500 or More Employees 2,668 64 276 3,008
88.70% 2.13% 9.18% 100.00%
3.09% 7.18% 0.23% 1.44%
Total 86,459 891 121,094 208,444
41.48% 0.43% 58.09% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.34: Multi-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 1995
51Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Valid EINs
Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Invalid
No
Matches Total
No Employees 1,062 29 6,534 7,625
(Row Percentages) 13.93% 0.38% 85.69% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 1.34% 5.26% 7.20% 4.47%
1-4 Employees 1,122 13 6,478 7,613
14.74% 0.17% 85.09% 100.00%
1.42% 2.36% 7.14% 4.46%
5-24 Employees 15,314 35 37,690 53,039
28.87% 0.07% 71.06% 100.00%
19.32% 6.35% 41.54% 31.10%
25-99 Employees 29,580 81 27,244 56,905
51.98% 0.14% 47.88% 100.00%
37.31% 14.70% 30.03% 33.36%
100-499 Employees 22,105 221 10,745 33,071
66.84% 0.67% 32.49% 100.00%
27.88% 40.11% 11.84% 19.39%
500-999 Employees 4,216 64 1,160 5,440
77.50% 1.18% 21.32% 100.00%
5.32% 11.62% 1.28% 3.19%
1000-2499 Employees 3,180 60 592 3,832
82.99% 1.57% 15.45% 100.00%
4.01% 10.89% 0.65% 2.25%
2500 or More Employees 2,699 48 282 3,029
89.11% 1.58% 9.31% 100.00%
3.40% 8.71% 0.31% 1.78%
Total 79,278 551 90,725 170,554
46.48% 0.32% 53.19% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.35: Multi-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 1996
52Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Valid EINs
Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Invalid
No
Matches Total
No Employees 405 36 2,444 2,885
(Row Percentages) 14.04% 1.25% 84.71% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 0.43% 3.57% 2.29% 1.43%
1-4 Employees 1,072 51 6,600 7,723
13.88% 0.66% 85.46% 100.00%
1.14% 5.06% 6.18% 3.83%
5-24 Employees 19,347 125 48,190 67,662
28.59% 0.18% 71.22% 100.00%
20.61% 12.40% 45.11% 33.54%
25-99 Employees 37,067 269 34,752 72,088
51.42% 0.37% 48.21% 100.00%
39.48% 26.69% 32.53% 35.73%
100-499 Employees 25,253 338 12,630 38,221
66.07% 0.88% 33.04% 100.00%
26.90% 33.53% 11.82% 18.95%
500-999 Employees 4,629 72 1,302 6,003
77.11% 1.20% 21.69% 100.00%
4.93% 7.14% 1.22% 2.98%
1000-2499 Employees 3,300 64 613 3,977
82.98% 1.61% 15.41% 100.00%
3.51% 6.35% 0.57% 1.97%
2500 or More Employees 2,815 53 303 3,171
88.77% 1.67% 9.56% 100.00%
3.00% 5.26% 0.28% 1.57%
Total 93,888 1,008 106,834 201,730
46.54% 0.50% 52.96% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.36: Multi-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 1997
53Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Valid EINs
Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Invalid
No
Matches Total
No Employees 979 63 5,708 6,750
(Row Percentages) 14.50% 0.93% 84.56% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 1.06% 6.46% 5.36% 3.37%
1-4 Employees 1,255 41 6,851 8,147
15.40% 0.50% 84.09% 100.00%
1.35% 4.21% 6.44% 4.07%
5-24 Employees 18,457 119 45,055 63,631
29.01% 0.19% 70.81% 100.00%
19.91% 12.21% 42.33% 31.79%
25-99 Employees 36,370 214 33,728 70,312
51.73% 0.30% 47.97% 100.00%
39.22% 21.95% 31.69% 35.13%
100-499 Employees 24,968 314 12,746 38,028
65.66% 0.83% 33.52% 100.00%
26.93% 32.21% 11.97% 19.00%
500-999 Employees 4,538 88 1,335 5,961
76.13% 1.48% 22.40% 100.00%
4.89% 9.03% 1.25% 2.98%
1000-2499 Employees 3,299 70 686 4,055
81.36% 1.73% 16.92% 100.00%
3.56% 7.18% 0.64% 2.03%
2500 or More Employees 2,858 66 335 3,259
87.70% 2.03% 10.28% 100.00%
3.08% 6.77% 0.31% 1.63%
Total 92,724 975 106,444 200,143
46.33% 0.49% 53.18% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.37: Multi-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 1998
54Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Valid EINs
Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Invalid
No
Matches Total
No Employees 1,464 74 12,299 13,837
(Row Percentages) 10.58% 0.53% 88.88% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 1.72% 7.65% 10.81% 6.93%
1-4 Employees 1,133 44 7,449 8,626
13.13% 0.51% 86.36% 100.00%
1.33% 4.55% 6.55% 4.32%
5-24 Employees 16,034 69 44,048 60,151
26.66% 0.11% 73.23% 100.00%
18.88% 7.14% 38.72% 30.12%
25-99 Employees 32,468 197 33,928 66,593
48.76% 0.30% 50.95% 100.00%
38.22% 20.37% 29.82% 33.35%
100-499 Employees 23,335 325 13,421 37,081
62.93% 0.88% 36.19% 100.00%
27.47% 33.61% 11.80% 18.57%
500-999 Employees 4,415 93 1,474 5,982
73.80% 1.55% 24.64% 100.00%
5.20% 9.62% 1.30% 3.00%
1000-2499 Employees 3,242 86 749 4,077
79.52% 2.11% 18.37% 100.00%
3.82% 8.89% 0.66% 2.04%
2500 or More Employees 2,849 79 405 3,333
85.48% 2.37% 12.15% 100.00%
3.35% 8.17% 0.36% 1.67%
Total 84,940 967 113,773 199,680
42.54% 0.48% 56.98% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.38: Multi-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 1999
55Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Valid EINs
Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Invalid
No
Matches Total
No Employees 1,793 79 16,242 18,114
(Row Percentages) 9.90% 0.44% 89.67% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 2.10% 7.70% 14.63% 9.18%
1-4 Employees 1,139 40 7,446 8,625
13.21% 0.46% 86.33% 100.00%
1.34% 3.90% 6.71% 4.37%
5-24 Employees 15,468 87 41,126 56,681
27.29% 0.15% 72.56% 100.00%
18.14% 8.48% 37.03% 28.72%
25-99 Employees 31,851 199 31,548 63,598
50.08% 0.31% 49.61% 100.00%
37.34% 19.40% 28.41% 32.22%
100-499 Employees 24,138 348 12,311 36,797
65.60% 0.95% 33.46% 100.00%
28.30% 33.92% 11.09% 18.64%
500-999 Employees 4,616 106 1,342 6,064
76.12% 1.75% 22.13% 100.00%
5.41% 10.33% 1.21% 3.07%
1000-2499 Employees 3,274 82 697 4,053
80.78% 2.02% 17.20% 100.00%
3.84% 7.99% 0.63% 2.05%
2500 or More Employees 3,010 85 335 3,430
87.76% 2.48% 9.77% 100.00%
3.53% 8.28% 0.30% 1.74%
Total 85,289 1,026 111,047 197,362
43.21% 0.52% 56.27% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.39: Multi-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 2000
56Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Valid EINs
Multi-Unit
Alphas
Through
Invalid
No
Matches Total
No Employees 550 25 2,549 3,124
(Row Percentages) 17.61% 0.80% 81.59% 100.00%
(Column Percentages) 0.71% 2.67% 3.16% 1.96%
1-4 Employees 890 16 5,145 6,051
14.71% 0.26% 85.03% 100.00%
1.15% 1.71% 6.37% 3.80%
5-24 Employees 12,943 53 32,664 45,660
28.35% 0.12% 71.54% 100.00%
16.69% 5.67% 40.46% 28.68%
25-99 Employees 28,820 200 27,136 56,156
51.32% 0.36% 48.32% 100.00%
37.17% 21.39% 33.61% 35.27%
100-499 Employees 23,559 343 10,969 34,871
67.56% 0.98% 31.46% 100.00%
30.38% 36.68% 13.59% 21.90%
500-999 Employees 4,572 112 1,298 5,982
76.43% 1.87% 21.70% 100.00%
5.90% 11.98% 1.61% 3.76%
1000-2499 Employees 3,252 90 654 3,996
81.38% 2.25% 16.37% 100.00%
4.19% 9.63% 0.81% 2.51%
2500 or More Employees 2,960 96 324 3,380
87.57% 2.84% 9.59% 100.00%
3.82% 10.27% 0.40% 2.12%
Total 77,546 935 80,739 159,220
48.70% 0.59% 50.71% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.40: Multi-Unit EINs by Firm Size for Year 2001
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59Chapter 2
Do Changes in Deferred Compensation Lead to Changes in
Productivity?
2.1 Introduction
One important theory in personnel economics discusses the e⁄ects of pensions on
employee behavior and productivity. How do certain compensation packages si-
multaneously allocate productivity gains and discourage layo⁄s and quits? How
do compensation and bene￿ts provide incentives to attract quality workers? How
sensitive is worker behavior to pensions and what speci￿c changes in behavior are
elicited when pensions change? Although there is much research on these ques-
tions, there are no conclusive answers. This is because of the lack of data. There
are many theoretical models that demonstrate that pensions play an important role
in enhancing productivity and lowering turnover. However, empirical evidence on
how exactly pensions a⁄ect productivity and turnover is debatable.
The relationship between pensions and productivity is undetermined for one
main reason. Most data used in this research prevent economists from directly
testing the theory. Since pensions and productivity are considered endogenous,
instrumental variables must be used. However, appropriate instrumental vari-
ables are unavailable in most data sets. Thus, the best any researcher can do is
to indirectly test the theory by showing some association between pensions and
productivity and between pensions and employee behavior.
In this paper, I contribute signi￿cantly to this research by being the ￿rst to
directly test how pensions a⁄ect productivity and employee behavior. I do this by
creating a new data set in which I integrate administrative ￿les from three di⁄erent
sources: the Form 5500, U.S. Business Register, and the Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics (LEHD) program. This unique data set provides detailed,
60longitudinal information about the ￿rms including their pension bene￿t structure
and demographic information about their workers. In addition to whether or not a
￿rm o⁄ers a certain type of pension, this data set also has other variables associated
with pensions that can be used as instruments. In this paper, I use a subset
of this data set to tackle the issue of how changing pensions a⁄ect productivity
and employee behavior. Particularly, I examine how workers￿behavior, worker
attraction and retention, and productivity change after a ￿rm changes its pension
from a de￿ned bene￿t plan to a de￿ned contribution plan.
Thus, this paper is two fold. The ￿rst objective is to introduce the new longitu-
dinal data set in which the unit of observation is the ￿rm and contains information
about the ￿rm￿ s industry classi￿cation, imputed total sales, employment size, ￿rm
age and pension bene￿ts as well as the characteristics of a ￿rm￿ s employees includ-
ing their wages, turnover rates, age, education attainment, gender and race. The
second objective is to determine if converting de￿ned bene￿t plans to de￿ned con-
tribution plans a⁄ect productivity in the ￿rm. The paper is organized as follows.
The second section provides background information on pensions. The third sec-
tion discusses the reasons why ￿rms convert their de￿ned bene￿t plan to de￿ned
contribution plan. The fourth section discusses the discrepancies in previous re-
search on how providing de￿ned bene￿t plans a⁄ect productivity. The ￿fth section
discusses my theoretical model on how de￿ned bene￿t plans are used as incentives
and replacing these plans with de￿ned contribution plans a⁄ect productivity. The
sixth section describes in more detail the new longitudinal data set I created using
the Form 5500 information, Unites States Business Register and LEHD data. The
seventh section discusses the empirical results. The eighth section has concluding
remarks. The ninth section has ideas for future research.
612.2 Overview
Pensions are a very complicated part of a worker￿ s compensation. Before investigat-
ing the e⁄ects of pensions on productivity and employee behavior, it is important
to understand what exactly are pensions. This section discusses the two main
types of pensions, the demand- and supply-sides of pensions, and how pensions
are funded.
2.2.1 De￿nition of Pensions
Pension bene￿ts are a form of compensation that a worker receives after she retires
from a ￿rm. The pension bene￿t is provided as either a de￿ned bene￿t plan,
which is a form of deferred compensation or as a de￿ned contribution plan which
is considered an immediate payment. The decision for a ￿rm to o⁄er a de￿ned
bene￿t plan, a de￿ned contribution plan, both or neither is determined when a
￿rm examines the role of pensions as part of its personnel policy.
The two types of pension plans are calculated very di⁄erently. In a de￿ned
bene￿t plan, a ￿rm promises to pay a calculated bene￿t that usually depends
on the employee￿ s salary, age and length of service. Because a ￿rm must pro-
vide speci￿c bene￿t amounts, the ￿rm is at risk with respect to the investment
performance of the pension fund, the age of the participating employees, the age
which the employees plan to retire, their salary progression over the years, turnover
probabilities and other plan experience. To provide an example of how a de￿ned
bene￿t pension is calculated, suppose, for example, a worker reaches the retirement
age of sixty-￿ve making $75,000. She put in twenty-￿ve years of service before
retiring. If, for example, the de￿ned bene￿t formula is one percent of ￿nal pay for
every year of service, then the worker is guaranteed every year until death $18,750
dollars (0.01 x 25 x 75,000).
Under a de￿ned contribution plan, the ￿rm and/or the employees contribute
62to individual accounts. Each employee ultimately receives a bene￿t equal in
value to the vested account balance. The value of the account depends on the
investment performance and the contributions made by the ￿rm and the employee.
The bene￿ts are not guaranteed, leaving the employees at risk of poor investment
performance and in￿ ation. Typical examples of a de￿ned contribution plan are a
401(k) plan and a 403(b) plan. A 401(k) plan is o⁄ered typically by employers
in the private sector. A 403(b) plan is o⁄ered to employees who work in public
schools and certain tax-exempt organizations. In both of these types of de￿ned
contribution plans, a worker chooses how to allocate her money into di⁄erent fund
options in the plan.
Although it varies by the ￿rm, the most common funds o⁄ered in a de￿ned
contribution plan are an aggressive fund, an international fund, a conservative
fund, and a stock ownership fund. An aggressive fund is comprised of stocks with
greater-than-average potential for growth. Such stocks may include start-up com-
panies, smaller companies or companies in high-risk industries. As a result, these
funds have a high degree of risk and a high potential for return. An international
fund only has stocks from countries outside the United States. Investors in these
funds take on a higher degree of additional risk, since international issues contain
risks not present with domestic issues, such as currency exchange rate ￿ uctuations
and di⁄erent economic conditions, governmental regulations and accounting stan-
dards. The risks and potential rewards for investing in an international fund are
also very high. A conservative fund is designed to provide consistent, predictable
growth over the long term. This option is generally considered low risk and is
guaranteed by the issuing insurance company, but ￿xed interest rates and rising
in￿ ation can erode its earning power. The stock ownership fund allows employees
to acquire an ownership interest in the company. This is popular among publicly
63traded ￿rms. A typical example of how a worker would allocate her money into
di⁄erent funds would be to put twenty-￿ve percent of her money in an aggressive
fund, ￿fteen percent of her money in an international fund, thirty-￿ve percent of
her money in a conservative fund, and twenty-￿ve percent of her money in a stock
ownership fund.
The de￿ned bene￿t plan and the de￿ned contribution plan also have di⁄erent
vesting rules or a minimum tenure requirement. In most de￿ned contribution
plans, a worker is not required to work for a certain number of years at the ￿rm
in order to keep everything in her account. The worker can leave her job at any
time and still keep her accrued bene￿t. This is not the case under the rules of a
de￿ned bene￿t plan. If a worker does not have the requisite tenure and/or age
needed to attain the bene￿t, the worker usually leaves with a much smaller bene￿t
or worse, leaves with no bene￿t at all if she decides to leave prior to retirement.
The most common required retirement age and required tenure is age sixty-￿ve
and ￿ve years of service.
Because of these di⁄erences and other factors, the decision of the ￿rm to have
a particular type of deferred compensation is critical. When making the decision,
the ￿rm must recognize that there are advantages and disadvantages to o⁄ering
the di⁄erent pension plans. De￿ned bene￿t plans provide incentives that promote
higher productivity and fewer turnovers. However, de￿ned bene￿t plans have
higher administrative costs and are not portable, which could lead to bad job
matches between the workers and the ￿rm. On the other hand, de￿ned contri-
bution plans are simpler and cost less, which is also advantageous, but the plan
does not o⁄er incentive to keep valued workers and to maintain optimal produc-
tivity levels. There are also advantages to o⁄ering both plans together. Having a
de￿ned bene￿t plan provides the incentives, while simultaneously o⁄ering the de-
64￿ned contribution plan help ￿rms align pay with performance by giving employer
matches to the workers￿contributions. Typically, only large ￿rms with workers
receiving high wages provide these types of bene￿t packages.
Even when a decision on which type of bene￿t package is made, a ￿rm is not
obligated to keep it. A ￿rm must always re-evaluate its personnel policy to ensure
its needs as well as the needs of its workers are met. A ￿rm that currently has a
de￿ned bene￿t plan may have to reconsider whether its incentives for meeting its
productivity goals outweigh the costs in providing a de￿ned bene￿t plans. This
is very important as a ￿rm is always faced with changing ￿nancial circumstances
and changing workforce demographics. Because the costs are sometimes more
important, not only do ￿rms regularly change bene￿t formulas and eligibility rules,
it is also not uncommon for ￿rms to grandfather, freeze, or close de￿ned bene￿t
plans and replace it with de￿ned contribution plans. Therefore, it is important
that pensions and its role and function in the labor market are understood before
any decision is made.
2.2.2 Demand- and Supply-Sides of Pensions
A large body of research has explored both the demand- and supply-oriented the-
ories of pension coverage. Demand-sided theories start from the proposition that
employers are indi⁄erent between paying cash wages and making contributions to
a pension fund. Thus, pensions are sponsored to satisfy the employee demand for
a retirement savings tool. Supply-sided theories are used to explain how pensions
are used as incentives and as a way of lowering labor costs. The interaction of
the two leads to the type and design of a pension bene￿t package that maximizes
meeting the needs of the workers and the ￿rm.
When studying the demand side of pensions, there are several reasons why
workers may want to have one. One reason is workers often view pensions as
65retirement insurance. Many workers may want to make sure they do not out-
live their assets and that they are ￿nancially stable in case of Social Security or
Medicare cuts. Thus, having a pension plan enables workers to have more control
over their ￿nancial security (Dorsey, 1995). Another reason why workers want
pension coverage is because of the economies of scale. It is more e¢ cient and less
expensive to save through an employer-sponsored pension plan than for workers
to try to save individually. Although some scale economies can be captured us-
ing pooling mechanism like mutual funds, investing through a company-provided
pension plan provides the lowest administrative costs to the worker. Another
reason why workers want pensions is for the tax quali￿cations. When an employee
places money into a company-provided group pension plan, the money is sheltered
from income and payroll tax. This is particularly useful to high-income workers
because pensions reduce the cost of each dollar of savings by a greater amount for
high-income workers than for lower-income workers. Lastly, workers may prefer to
have pension coverage if they belong to a union. Workers who are employed with
unionized ￿rms are more likely provided pension plans through their employer.
Presumably, unionized workers are paid more than non-unionized workers because
of the existence of rents (Dorsey, 1995). Given these rents, unionized ￿rms will
more likely distribute compensation according to the median employee and not the
last hired employee. Hence, the rents are distributed toward older union workers
and away from younger employees6.
As for the supply-sided theories, again there are several motivations as to why
￿rms o⁄er pensions. One motivation for a ￿rm to o⁄er a pension plan is to help
regulate worker e⁄ort and worker quality. A ￿rm may choose a certain accrual
6Collectively bargained de￿ned bene￿t plans tend to have a di⁄erent type of formula than
non-union plans. Instead of a plan based on ￿nal average pay, union plans often have formulas
that pay a ￿xed dollar amount times years of service and some pay a ￿xed amount to all quali￿ed
retirees. These formulas tend to equalize lifetime compensation across workers which is often
given as an objective of unions.
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for a certain length of tenure. By de￿ning certain eligibility rules and accrual
patterns, a worker leaving the job earlier than the pension requires would mean
forfeiture of his pension bene￿t. Hence, an employee has the incentive to maintain
a certain level of productivity to meet the ￿rm￿ s standards and not quit. Another
motivation for o⁄ering pensions is the ￿rm￿ s use in regulating worker turnover
other than retirement. Firms with pensions typically have lower turnover than
those without, and this leads to lower training costs. Another motivation for
o⁄ering pensions is its use in regulating when workers retire. A ￿rm may want to
have control over retirement ￿ ows because worker productivity may decrease as a
worker ages (Gustman, 1994). However, because of age discrimination, a ￿rm is
forbidden to lower wages that meet a worker￿ s marginal productivity. Instead, a
￿rm can use de￿ned bene￿t pensions that are designed to pay a certain bene￿t when
a worker becomes a certain age, encouraging them to retire. Another motivation
for providing a certain type of pension is that the ￿rm may want to keep their
older workers. The employer may be experiencing a slowly growing labor force.
Because of this, the ￿rm may want to shift from a de￿ned bene￿t plan to a de￿ned
contribution plan. Doing so removes the de￿ned retirement age and removes
incentives for older workers to leave the ￿rm.
When the interaction of workers￿demand and ￿rms￿interest in meeting ￿nan-
cial and human resource goals is realized, several outcomes are determined. First,
pension-related outcomes occur. A ￿rm can now determine what types of pen-
sions, if any, to o⁄er its employees. The pension plans are designed with speci￿c
requirements for coverage eligibility and the shape and value of the pension accrual
pattern are determined in a way to meet the ￿rm￿ s goals (Gustman and Mitchell,
1992). Second, employment-related outcomes are determined. A ￿rm that o⁄ers
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clearly de￿ned retirement age. De￿ning a tenure requirement in a de￿ned bene￿t
pension plan is advantageous to the ￿rm because doing so increases tenure at their
￿rm (Ippolito, 1997), and having a clearly de￿ned retirement age allows the ￿rm
to encourage older workers to leave. A ￿rm that o⁄ers only a de￿ned contribution
plan may have a larger share of older workers and may have on average shorter
tenure than those that o⁄er de￿ned bene￿t plans.
Even when a decision on which type of pension to o⁄er has been made by the
￿rm, it is important to know that the demands of the workers and the ￿rms￿human
resource and ￿nancial goals are always changing. As such, so is the resulting
deferred compensation plan. Right now the common trends in HR policy are that
￿rms are reducing their pension bene￿ts and are moving away from de￿ned bene￿t
plan o⁄erings. Now, more workers are bearing the responsibility of saving for
their retirement because de￿ned contribution plans are becoming more prominent
as part of the workers￿compensation.
2.2.3 Pension Funding
The way a pension plan is funded or ￿nanced can be quite complicated. In a
de￿ned contribution plan, the total amount of money in the employees￿de￿ned
contribution accounts is the total amount the employees are entitled to at that
current time. However, when calculating the amount owed to workers in a de￿ned
bene￿t plan, the process is much more complex. The ￿rm has a de￿ned bene￿t
pension asset fund that is used to pay the pension amount based on the bene￿t
formula. The amount of money owed to the workers mainly depends on whether
the workers leave now or whether they leave at retirement.
Pension funding is very signi￿cant in the ￿nancial structure of the ￿rm. For
funding and accounting purposes, it is necessary for a ￿rm to assign, in a systematic
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that give rise to that cost. Two measures that are used to determine the expected
cost are current liability and accrued liability. Current liability is the sum of (1)
the value of bene￿ts for retirees, (2) the value of bene￿ts for employees who have
left the ￿rm with vested pension rights, but have not yet retired, (3) the value of
vested bene￿ts accrued to date for active employees and (4) the value of nonvested
bene￿ts for active employees. Accrued liability is the sum of the current liability
and the e⁄ect of future pay increases on past service bene￿ts.
To illustrate7, suppose that a plan provides bene￿ts of 1% of ￿nal salary for each
year of service. Consider a 45-year-old employee with ten years of service, currently
earning $40,000, but with a projected salary of $75,000 at the normal retirement
age of sixty-￿ve. The current liability is equal to the 10% of the $40,000 salary, or
$4,000 payable annually beginning at age sixty-￿ve. For an ongoing plan, however,
we must recognize that at retirement, the 10% bene￿t already earned will apply to
the projected ￿nal salary of $75,000, rather than a current salary of $40,000. The
calculation should therefore re￿ ect an annual bene￿t of $7,500, rather than $4,000.
The value of $3,500 goes into the portion that represents the e⁄ect of future salary
increases on past service bene￿ts. This value is often argued as the equivalent of
a bond that a worker accepts from the employer as a condition of employment.
Upon reaching retirement, the bond can be fully redeemed. An example of the
worker￿ s current and accrued liability is present in Figure 2.1. The pension quit
penalties in Figure 2.2 represent the bond that is forgone if a worker leaves after
a certain number of years of service.
7This example is in Bader (1995).
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When the liabilities are compared to the actuarial value of assets, the funding
status of a plan is determined. For instance, if the value of plan assets is $300
70million and the current and accrued liabilities are $225 million and $350 million
respectively, the plan is underfunded on an ongoing basis, but is overfunded on a
current liability or termination basis.
Hence, determining how much money is owed to an employee and the status of
a de￿ned bene￿t plan￿ s funding is very important when the ￿rm makes a decision
whether to maintain the plan or to convert it. There are di⁄erent motivations for
converting the plan depending on whether the plan is overfunded or underfunded
on a termination basis. So not only is the impact on the workers a factor, but the
funded status of the de￿ned bene￿t plan is also important when a ￿rm debates
whether to terminate their pensions.
2.3 Reasons for Converting De￿ned Bene￿t Plans
The shift from de￿ned bene￿t plans to de￿ned contribution plans has been preva-
lent in the past three decades. However, the motivations behind the shift have
evolved with changes in legislative and regulatory laws as well as with changes in
￿rms￿workforce demographics and ￿rms￿structure. This section discusses how
the motivations for shifting from de￿ned bene￿t plans have evolved over the past
twenty-￿ve years and what happens to the accrued bene￿ts in the de￿ned bene￿t
plans when the shift occurs.
2.3.1 Conversions in the 1980s
In the 1980s, there were several motivations that led to the shift toward de￿ned
contribution plans. One, the o⁄ering and utilization of de￿ned contribution plans
became much more widespread after the Internal Revenue Code was modi￿ed to
include section 401(k) provisions that allowed workers to make pretax contributions
to thrift and pro￿t sharing plans. The regulatory burden on 401(k) was less
onerous than that on de￿ned bene￿t plans and the administrative costs were much
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converted from o⁄ering a traditional pension to providing a de￿ned contribution
plan and used this shift as an opportunity to take the excess assets from their
frozen or terminated de￿ned bene￿t plans.
There were two explanations as to why a ￿rm would convert its de￿ned bene￿t
plans for excess pension assets at that time. One reason why ￿rms converted to
de￿ned contribution plans was because some of them were facing internal ￿nancial
problems. If a ￿rm had insu¢ cient internally generated cash ￿ ows and its de￿ned
bene￿t plans had assets that exceeded the liability during that time, then the
￿rm sometimes would freeze or terminate the pension and draw on excess pension
assets. This relieved the need for external ￿nancing which could negatively impact
the ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial status. Another motivation for ￿rms converting to de￿ned
contribution plans in the 1980s was related to a common merger strategy utilized
at that time. Excess pension plan were frequently in ￿rm acquisitions, including a
number of hostile takeovers. The acquiring entity would make a bid for a company
with excess pension assets, close its pension and use the excess assets to ￿nance
the takeover. When General Electric bought RCA in 1986, it terminated RCA￿ s
pension plan after acquisition and claimed over 1 billion dollars in assets [GE 10K
Statement]. In the case of Schick￿ s acquisition in 1986, up to 20 million dollars
of Newreeveco￿ s excess pension assets were used to reduce acquisition debt issues
[Schick 10K Statement].
Policymakers came to view this particular use of pension assets to be abusive
and by the late 1980￿ s, laws were passed to prevent ￿rms from terminating pension
plans as an e⁄ort to attain more cash. The Tax Reform of 1986 levied a ten
percent excise tax on reverted pension assets, and in 1988, the rate was increased
to ￿fteen percent. In 1990, Congress increased the excise tax to twenty percent
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as a cushion for a replacement plan, or that bene￿ts are increased by twenty-￿ve
percent; otherwise, the excise tax is ￿fty percent. Most plan sponsors have been
reluctant to close plans with excess assets and use the surplus to increase bene￿ts
for plan participants so the ￿fty percent tax is the e⁄ective hurdle they face in
most terminations. But the ￿fty percent is an excise tax on top of regular income
taxes on any excess assets. The combination of taxes virtually expropriates excess
assets in any plan termination. However, although ￿rms now no longer had the
incentive to terminate de￿ned bene￿t plans for the excess assets, in the 1990s, plan
closures continued.
2.3.2 Conversions in the 1990s
In the mid and late 1990s many ￿rms saw a large increase in their pension assets
because of the economic boom. However, despite these huge increases, ￿rms were
still converting their healthy de￿ned bene￿t plans. There are several reasons
behind these conversions. According to Munnell et al (2006) and Schieber (2006),
one reason why ￿rms were converting their plans in the 1990s was the desire to cut
compensation in order to meet competition. As many ￿rms became more global in
the 1990s, it became increasingly di¢ cult to remain competitive with rival foreign
￿rms. American ￿rms typically spend a signi￿cant amount of money on bene￿ts
for their employees while competing ￿rms in other countries do not have this cost
because the governments provide a bulk of these bene￿ts. Also, older companies
that were o⁄ering de￿ned bene￿t plans were now competing with newer domestic
￿rms that did not have a de￿ned bene￿t plan at that time.
Another reason why ￿rms shifted to de￿ned contribution plans in the 1990s
was for demographic reasons. By the turn of the century, baby boomers were ap-
proaching retirement age. The life expectancies for men and women have increased
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bles typically underestimate how long a person is expected to live. If bene￿ciaries
of de￿ned bene￿t plans end up living longer than is expected, ￿rms would have a
serious ￿nancial liability that had not been provided for in earlier plan funding.
A third reason why ￿rms were terminating their de￿ned bene￿t pensions in
the late 1990s was because of the emergence of a two-tiered pension system in
￿rms. The gap between the salaries of the executives and the non-executives
had grown tremendously. Pension regulations, however, signi￿cantly limited the
share of executives￿earnings that were covered under tax-quali￿ed pensions and
they became increasingly dependent on supplemental executive retirement plans
for their retirement bene￿ts (SERPs). Some analysts suggest that since highly
paid top management no longer has a signi￿cant interest in the quali￿ed pension
plans because they do not bene￿t from the plan they have been willing to freeze
these plans for their rank-and-￿le workers..
A fourth reason why ￿rms began converting their de￿ned bene￿t plans in the
1990s was because of an increase in worker demand for 401(k) plans. There are
primarily three reasons why some workers preferred de￿ned contribution plans.
The ￿rst reason was because there was a decline in job stability. There is evidence
to suggest that ￿rms with a higher share of workers who change jobs with no spell
of unemployment were more likely to convert their de￿ned bene￿t pension plans
(Anderson and Coronado 2005). The second reason for the increased preference
in de￿ned contribution plans in the 1990s was the presence of more women in the
workforce. Between 1979 and 1998, the share of workers who were female rose
sixteen percent. This rise in the share of women in the labor force implied an
increase in the share of workers who are caring for children or elderly parents.
These working women with shared responsibilities would not be as attached to
74the workforce and particular jobs. Hence, there would be a greater demand for a
portable pension bene￿t. The third reason for an increase in workers￿preference
for de￿ned contribution plans was there had been changes to production technology
over the past few decades. Workers were now gaining skills that can be used in
other places of work. Thus, the return of human capital had increased sharply
and more people had become mobile in the labor market. Thus, there was an
increased demand for a more portable pension bene￿t to match.
Unfortunately, by the turn of the century the economic boom began to wane
and a recession was on the horizon. As the recession set in, the ￿rms were still
converting their pension plans, but now by the 2000, they converted them more
for ￿nancial reasons.
2.3.3 Conversions in the 2000s
In the current decade, the number of de￿ned bene￿t plans that have been ter-
minated or frozen has skyrocketed. There are several reasons why this surge of
conversions has occurred. One reason is because of the drop in the stock market
and the rapid decline in interest rates decreased the pension assets and increased
the liabilities resulting in signi￿cant pension underfunding. This was compounded
by the fact that in the 1990s, the combination of growing asset values and reg-
ulatory constraints allowed ￿rms to make little or no cash contributions to their
pension funds (Schieber 2006). As a result, the median ratio of pension assets to
current liability in ￿rms was below one by 2000 (Hill 2006) and ￿rms went from
making no contributions to now being required to make seven or eight percent of
payroll contributions (Schieber). The ￿rms not wanting to make contributions
began converting their plans.
Also, at the beginning of this decade, the healthcare bene￿t increases reached
double-digits and the in￿ ation rate became three times as high as general in￿ ation
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ing both health insurance for current employees and post-retirement health care
bene￿ts for retirees. Health insurance for current employees began to rise toward
the end on the 1990s when ￿rms began to loosen managed care provisions. Post-
retirement health care costs began to increase because of the absence of a funding
requirement and rapidly rising costs have led to increasing unfunded liabilities.
As a result, in order to curtail total bene￿t costs, ￿rms began converting de￿ned
bene￿t plans as a way of restructuring the total compensation package.
2.3.4 Process in Converting Pension Plans
Although there have been many motivations for converting de￿ned bene￿t plans,
it is important to understand how the transition takes place. When a ￿rm decides
to convert all of its de￿ned bene￿t plans to a de￿ned contribution plan, there are
two choices that are o⁄ered to its employees in regards to the accrued bene￿t in
the de￿ned bene￿t plan. One choice is to let the worker keep its vested pension
amount in the de￿ned bene￿t plan which no longer grows. The ￿rm will buy annu-
ities through an insurance company which will take over the terminated accounts.
Upon retirement, the worker will receive pension annuity payouts administered
through the insurance company and the workers will begin investing in the de￿ned
contribution plan beginning at the value of zero. The second choice is taking the
accrued bene￿t, calculating a lump sum value, and then rolling it over into the new
de￿ned contribution plan. The worker no longer will get a pension annuity upon
retirement, but will have considerable amount of money in their 401(k) plans when
she begins investing. Typically, a majority of the employees place their accrued
bene￿t into a 401(k) plan.
Thus, the change in deferred compensation packages can quickly change a ￿rm￿ s
￿nances as well as the workers￿compensation package and retirement patterns.
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tion is whether in the long term, converting de￿ned bene￿t plans a⁄ects worker
productivity.
2.4 Previous Research on the Relationship between Pen-
sions and Productivity
There has been much research on how de￿ned bene￿t pension incentives result
in productivity gains. Regrettably, productivity studies have long been hindered
by the lack of direct measures of employee output or ￿rm productivity, and the
endogenous nature of pension coverage results in even more stringent data require-
ments. However, some economists have made attempts to indirectly determine
how pensions a⁄ect productivity at the ￿rm by ￿nding associations discovered in
OLS and logit regression models. Unfortunately, because of limitations in data
sets, the results are contradictory. The following cases demonstrate the inconsis-
tencies found in this literature.
Lazear (1979) was the ￿rst to address the e⁄ects of pensions on productivity
by researching why workers with de￿ned bene￿t plans might be more productive
than workers without them. The Lazear theory states that workers agree to an
"implicit contract" by accepting a cash compensation in their early career below
what they would receive at an alternative job. Because quitting will result in
losing her pension bene￿ts, the worker has an incentive to work up to a ￿rm￿ s
standards. Thus, she becomes more productive. At the end of a worker￿ s career,
the worker receives a pension for her service.
Lazear tests his production enhancement theory empirically by estimating re-
gression models where the dependent variable is whether a worker had a pension
plan or not. He ￿nds evidence that providing pensions is a consequence of an
optimal wage scheme that re￿ ects di⁄erences in productivity and it makes both
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Hutchens (1987) also has evidence that support the production enhancement
theory. He argues that implicit contracts introduce ￿xed costs into the worker-
￿rm relationship. These ￿xed costs lead ￿rms to hire primarily young people who
are willing to work long term with the ￿rm and gain ￿rm-speci￿c skills. He tests
his argument by adding an index that measures jobs that employ older workers,
but do not hire them into his logit regression models. He ￿nds evidence that ￿rms
with pension plans tend to not hire older workers although they do employ older
workers.
However, other researchers draw di⁄erent conclusions about the use of pensions
to enhance productivity. Allen and Clark (1987) try to explain with cross-sectional
di⁄erences the productivity consequences of pension choices. By adding a produc-
tivity index to an industry-level wage equation where a pension measure already
appeared as a control, they ￿nd the productivity factor has no signi￿cant impact
on the estimated pension-wage trade-o⁄. Thus, they ￿nd there is no evidence that
￿rms with pensions would have to pay lower wages in the worker￿ s early career to
o⁄set having a pension, refuting the production enhancement theory.
Ippolito (1994,2002) also explored the role of pensions in preserving productive
job matches. He argues that based on the production enhancement theory, work-
ers must forgo wages for a pension. However, his evidence shows that workers
with pensions actually have higher wages than workers without pensions. But
Ippolito feels that rather than argue that the production enhancement theory is
incorrect, the theory may instead just be oversimpli￿ed. Ippolito argues that work-
ers with pensions are more likely to remain at the ￿rm because pensions generally
attract workers who have a propensity to save. These low-discounters would also
have higher productivity because ￿rm-speci￿c skills are gained during their tenure.
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pensions. He argues that once the sorting of low-discounters and high discounters
are taken into account, the production enhancement theory has validity.
With almost no direct evidence on pensions￿e⁄ects on productivity and what
little evidence available has contradicting results, there is a call for more work
in understanding the relationship between pensions and productivity. The lack
of information on the productivity e⁄ects of pensions extends to wage premiums,
wage structures, bonuses, and other direct incentives. How workers respond to
bonus systems, stock incentives, or merit pay is also relevant. If these di⁄erent
forms of compensation do not a⁄ect worker performance, then it is also unlikely
that workers will respond to the less direct incentives of de￿ned bene￿t plans
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 1993). Unfortunately, because of data limitations,
economists cannot answer these questions.
2.5 Theoretical Model
In order to demonstrate that pensions a⁄ect productivity and employee behavior,
I establish a theory which argues that a ￿rm provides a de￿ned bene￿t plan to
ensure that its workers have an incentive to remain at the ￿rm. The incentive is if
the workers leave prior to retirement, then the workers would forfeit their promised
pension bene￿t. Thus, the workers want to stay until retirement, gain ￿rm-speci￿c
skills, and maintain a minimum level of productivity to avoid shirking. However,
when a ￿rm faces ￿nancial problems, often times the ￿rm quickly converts its
de￿ned bene￿t pension to a de￿ned contribution plan. Doing so reduces the
￿rms￿ s pension liabilities which brings down the ￿rm￿ s costs. I follow Lazear￿ s
argument about incentives and productivity (2000) in explaining that although a
￿rm now has met its ￿nancial goals, productivity may not be as high because the
average worker at the ￿rm is more likely to leave and miss receiving ￿rm-speci￿c
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e⁄ort to keep her job because the pension penalty is gone.
The conditions of the job determine what types of workers accept employment
when the ￿rm ￿rst o⁄ers a de￿ned bene￿t plan. If the standards are too strict,
only the most able will ￿nd the job suitable, even at a high wage. I de￿ne p to
be the productivity level chosen by a worker with a de￿ned bene￿t plan. The
productivity output is a function dependent on A, the ability of the workers and
X, the level of e⁄ort a worker chooses to avoid shirking. I make the assumption
that the ￿rm can observe the productivity level.
I also make the assumption that the ￿rm cannot observe the level of e⁄ort a
worker has chosen to avoid shirking. Workers who are more willing to remain at
the ￿rm for an extended period, and workers who are more likely to leave after
a short tenure are not easily identi￿ed. Thus, the ￿rm does not know which
workers would bene￿t the most from the ￿rm-speci￿c training and which would
not. To screen high types from low types, a ￿rm o⁄ers a de￿ned bene￿t plan.
If the worker leaves prior to retirement, the worker loses her promised bene￿t at
retirement. Thus, all low types would face the penalty of leaving by receiving
a large reduction in pension bene￿ts or would not bother accepting the job to
begin with. The high types are attracted to the ￿rm because they want to stay
and gain ￿rm-speci￿c training. This leads to more employees working at optimal
productivity level. This is particularly bene￿cial if the training is very costly.
To ensure the workers are at the optimal productivity level after receiving ￿rm-
speci￿c training, the ￿rm speci￿es some minimally acceptable level of productivity
output, say p￿. Thus, the ￿rm ￿res workers whose productivity level falls consis-
tently below p￿. The ￿rm also o⁄ers a wage that is proportional to the level of
worker￿ s productivity. Thus, the worker￿ s utility function is given by
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where W is income and X is the level of e⁄ort chosen to avoid shirking (U1 > 0
and U2 < 0):
The productivity output p depends on the level of e⁄ort chosen to avoid shirking
and ability which is de￿ned as
p = f(X;A)
where (f1 > 0 and f2 > 0):
For any given level of productivity p, and ability level A, there is a unique chosen
level of e⁄ort X that satis￿es p in the above equation. Denote by X￿(A) the level
of e⁄ort chosen to avoid shirking that is necessary to satisfy p￿ = f(X￿(A);A) for
the required level of productivity p￿. It is clear that
dX
dA
=
￿f2
f1
is negative. Thus higher-ability workers need less e⁄ort to achieve a given level of
productivity. Thus, it is easier for them to stay and receive training.
For any given pair of required output and wage (p￿;W) there is a group of
workers who will accept the job with the ￿rm. The minimum-ability individual
who will accept a job in lieu of leisure that requires p￿ of output to be produced is
A￿ such that
U(W;X(A
￿)) = U(0;0)
where U(0;0) is de￿ned as the utility associated with leisure.
All workers with ability levels that exceed A￿ earn rents from employment be-
cause they are required only to produce p￿ of productivity, and the pain associated
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just indi⁄erent between working and not. However, because there is competition
from other ￿rms, a worker must compare the rents earned at this ￿rm with those
o⁄ered elsewhere.
Those willing to work at the ￿rm must not have work alternatives that are
preferred to those at the current job. The utility that a worker of ability A can
get at another ￿rm that does not necessarily pay workers of all types the same
amount is given by U(W 0(A);X0(A)) where W 0and X0 refer to the wage and the
level of e⁄ort chosen to avoid shirking at the best alternative job for the worker of
ability A. Higher-ability workers are likely to ￿nd that the alternative job with
a de￿ned bene￿t plan is not as attractive if it is more demanding, but pays more.
Thus, there may exist an upper cut-o⁄ for ability, Ah, such that
U(W;X
￿(Ah)) = U(W
0(Ah);X
0(Ah)):
Those who work at the current ￿rm have ability A, such that A￿ ￿ A ￿ Ah.
Suppose the ￿rm faces a ￿nancial situation and responds by converting its
de￿ned bene￿t pension plan. Two things happen. First, some current workers
will no longer put forth e⁄ort to avoid shirking and will leave because the pension
penalty is gone. Second, new workers are hired to replace the workers who left.
However, the new de￿ned contribution plan does not easily screen the workers so
we have high types and low types being hired. The new utility under the de￿ned
contribution plan is
Utility = U(W;X0(A))
where W is the wage and X0 is the level of e⁄ort that a worker with ability A
now chooses when she has a de￿ned contribution plan. This can be stated more
formally with three propositions.
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￿rm switches its de￿ned bene￿t plan to a de￿ned contribution plan. As long as
the workers are not at minimum levels of e⁄ort, average level of e⁄ort to not shirk
will decrease.
Proof. If the new productivity level under a de￿ned contribution plan is below
p￿, then for some level of ability A, where A0 ￿ A ￿ A￿;
U(W
￿;X
￿(A
￿)) > U(W;X(A))
where X(A) is the new level chosen by a worker of type A who is now under a
de￿ned contribution plan. As long as a worker has some type A which is below
A￿, when the de￿ned bene￿t pension plan is converted, the average output must
decrease.
Another proposition can be stated, given two conditions:
Condition 1 If a worker with some ability A chooses to work at a certain level of
e⁄ort to avoid shirking when having a de￿ned contribution plan, then any worker
with ability less than A also chooses to work at an e⁄ort level appropriate for a
de￿ned contribution plan.
Condition 2 If a worker with ability A chooses to work at a certain level of e⁄ort
to avoid shirking when having a de￿ned bene￿t plan, then any worker with ability
greater then A also chooses to work at an e⁄ort level appropriate for a de￿ned
bene￿t plan.
Then,
Proposition 2 A su¢ cient condition for the average ability of the workforce to be
non-increasing, and more generally, to fall after the de￿ned bene￿t plan is switched
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for the ￿rm because the required level of e⁄ort to avoid shirking is too high now
accept the job with a de￿ned contribution plan. Some current high-ability workers
opt to lower their e⁄ort to avoid shirking because the de￿ned contribution plan
provides no incentives for the workers to maintain a certain level of productivity
or to stay until retirement. As a result, some current high ability workers leave.
Proof. If any worker chooses to work for a job o⁄ering a de￿ned bene￿t plan,
then surely the worker with the highest ability would choose to work. But the
highest-ability workers cannot, except in the rarest coincidence, be at the maximum
which is de￿ned as Ah. If a worker of type Ah works for a ￿rm o⁄ering a de￿ned
bene￿t plan, then she would be at worse indi⁄erent in working for a ￿rm o⁄ering
a de￿ned contribution plan, but more generally, strictly prefers the de￿ned bene￿t
plan. Since Ah would earn rents under the de￿ned contribution plan, the worker
with type Ah is no longer the marginal worker. There exists a worker with type
b Ah with b Ah < Ah who would now be the marginal worker for whom
U(W;X( b Ah)) = U(W
0;X
0)
where X( b Ah) is de￿ned as the new level of e⁄ort to avoid shirking for worker of
type b Ah under the de￿ned contribution plan and where W 0 and X0 are the wage
and level of e⁄ort at the alternative job.
Also, suppose any worker can accept the de￿ned contribution plan, and the
worker with the minimum ability type, A0, would accept the job. The worker
with type A0 is willing to work for wage W at the level of e⁄ort X0 because
she does not plan to stay long enough to gain ￿rm-speci￿c skills. Furthermore,
since the de￿ned contribution plan is not any more attractive, no worker with
type ability less than A0 is willing to work for the job now o⁄ering the de￿ned
84contribution plan. Since the lower bound remains unchanged and the upper
bound does not increase and may in fact fall, the average ability does not increase
and generally decreases after the ￿rm switches from a de￿ned bene￿t plan to a
de￿ned contribution plan.
Thus, average ability decreases because the ability of the lowest quality worker
does not need to change as a result of the switch in pension plans. Low ability
workers who are attracted to the ￿rm work at minimum ability. They are actually
better o⁄because there are no penalties when they shirk. The high ability workers,
just like the low ability workers, can also leave without any pension penalty. Thus,
switching pension plan types has the e⁄ect of changing the class of workers now
attracted to and retained at the ￿rm. This means that overall, the workers at the
￿rm are not producing at optimal productivity as before and they are receiving
less ￿rm-speci￿c training.
Finally,
Proposition 3 A su¢ cient condition for the range of worker ability and pro-
ductivity output to decrease after the switch from de￿ned bene￿t plans to de￿ned
contribution plans exists because fewer workers would still want to work in the ￿rm
after the switch.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 2, b Ah ￿ Ah. But A0 cannot change
because the job with the de￿ned contribution plan is available only for those willing
to produce the productivity output at level p0. This is su¢ cient to imply that the
range or variance in ability falls. Also before, all workers chose to produce at
level p￿ when working under the de￿ned bene￿t plan. Now only some produce in
the de￿ned contribution range the positive variance in A: This implies positive
variance in p under the de￿ned contribution plan.
Even if underlying ability levels did not change, variance in productivity would
85decrease. When it is recognized that the maximum ability levels decrease under
the de￿ned contribution plan, the change in output variance decreases also. Thus,
not only do workers under the de￿ned contribution plan on average produce at a
lower output, but the range in which they produce is smaller because the upper
bound of the level of e⁄ort to avoid shirking decreases.
In conclusion, when a ￿rm converts its de￿ned bene￿t plan to a de￿ned con-
tribution plan, there is no longer a promised pension bene￿t which is used as an
incentive to keep workers at the ￿rm. Some of the workers currently at the ￿rm
leave because the incentive to stay is gone. Now that the de￿ned bene￿t plan is no
longer used to screen the di⁄erent types of workers, low-types and high-types are
now being hired, so there is a di⁄erent class of workers. Turnover is now higher
and costs are higher. As a result, overall productivity declines at the ￿rm.
2.6 Data
Before discussing the empirical speci￿cations, it is important to discuss the new
data set I created. The longitudinal data set I use is created by integrating in-
formation from the Form 5500, the U.S. Business Register and LEHD data from
twelve states. The states used from LEHD are California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington,
and Wisconsin. The integration takes place in two stages. The ￿rst stage is
the integration of the Form 5500 and the U.S. Business Register, which creates
a national data set of ￿rms and their information on an Employer Identi￿cation
Number (EIN) level. The second stage is the integration of this national data set
to the LEHD data for twelve states, which takes a subset of ￿rms from the national
data and adds information about the workers. Figure 2.3 shows how the two in-
tegrations take place. To fully understand the variables in this new data set, one
needs to understand the structure of the original data sets, the information they
86entail, and how the information is integrated.
All pension information comes from the Form 5500 and is provided by the De-
partment of Labor (DOL) and the Internal Revenue services (IRS). The Form 5500
details information about all pension, health and fringe bene￿t plans and stems
from the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
in 1974. The information is on plan level and includes identifying information
about the ￿rms including company name and EIN, statistics on participants, a
balance sheet, a statement of income and expense, and other information about
the operation of the plan. The Form 5500 also has schedule forms, which provide
supplemental information about the plan. These schedule forms provide actuarial,
insurance, and trustee information as well as other accounting information about
the plans.
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88Not all pension plans are included in the Form 5500 data. Some pension plans
are not in the Form 5500 ￿le because some ￿rms may not be obligated to ￿le.
The following are the plans that are exempt from ￿ling. (1) Pension plans that
are unfunded and the bene￿ts go only to a select group of management of highly
compensated employees. (2) Pension plans maintained outside the United States
if they are quali￿ed foreign plans. (3) Simpli￿ed Employee Pensions (SEP) which
are pension plans that meet certain minimum quali￿cations regarding eligibility
and employer contributions. (4) Savings Incentive Match Plans for Employees
(SIMPLE) of Small Employers that involve SIMPLE Individual Retirement Ac-
counts (IRAs). (5) Pension plans that are church plans. (6) Pension plans that
cover residents of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, Wake Island, or
American Samoa.
The information from the Form 5500 in its original state is not very clean. Some
of the information is missing or clearly incorrect, so edits are made by researchers
in LEHD. Once the data is edited, the information about the pension plans is
collapsed to a ￿rm or EIN level. This is important because many ￿rms o⁄er
more than one pension plan and some ￿rms o⁄er more than one type of pension
plan. By collapsing to the EIN level, information on how much a ￿rm pays for
its entire bene￿t coverage and the total number of employees covered at a ￿rm are
more accurate. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the number of pension plans found in the
Form 5500 and the number of EINs by pension type used for integration. To fully
understand how the Form 5500 data is edited and collapsed to an EIN level, refer
to Hill (2006).
89Plan End Year
Defined
Benefit Plans
Defined
Contribution
Plans Total
1994 81,042 610,265 691,307
(Row Percentages) 11.72% 88.28% 100.00%
1995 75,218 629,058 704,276
10.68% 89.32% 100.00%
1996 70,268 648,160 718,428
9.78% 90.22% 100.00%
1997 65,070 669,101 734,171
8.86% 91.14% 100.00%
1998 59,486 672,735 732,221
8.12% 91.88% 100.00%
1999 46,523 611,209 657,732
7.07% 92.93% 100.00%
2000 48,450 654,420 702,870
6.89% 93.11% 100.00%
2001 48,300 672,020 720,320
6.71% 93.29% 100.00%
Table 2.1: Listed and Missing Pension Plans from Form 5500 File
To Be Used for Integration
Plan End Year
EINs with Defined
Benefit Plans Only
EINs with Defined
Contribution Plans
Only
EINs with Defined
Benefit and Defined
Contribution Plans Total EINs
1994 47,216 495,044 24,446 566,706
(row Percentage) 8.33% 87.35% 4.31% 100.00%
1995 42,943 514,188 23,542 580,673
7.40% 88.55% 4.05% 100.00%
1996 39,651 532,148 22,438 594,237
6.67% 89.55% 3.78% 100.00%
1997 35,673 556,269 21,795 613,737
5.81% 90.64% 3.55% 100.00%
1998 32,467 564,726 20,263 617,456
5.26% 91.46% 3.28% 100.00%
1999 26,464 521,401 14,916 562,781
4.70% 92.65% 2.65% 100.00%
2000 26,891 551,737 16,286 594,914
4.52% 92.74% 2.74% 100.00%
2001 25,980 564,031 16,729 606,740
4.28% 92.96% 2.76% 100.00%
Table 2.2: Number of EINs That Offer Defined Benefit Plans Only, Defined Contribution
Plans Only, and Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans Based on Form 5500
The Business Register is a ￿le that is maintained by the United States Cen-
sus Bureau and contains information about all multi-establishment and single-
90establishment employer ￿rms in the United States. This ￿le is a list of all estab-
lishments that have tax return records at the Internal Revenue Services. In the
single-unit ￿le, the establishments are listed on an EIN level. In the multi-unit ￿le,
the establishments are listed on an enterprise level, which are identi￿ed by an alpha
number. The minimum information for each organizational unit of the company
includes the company name and EIN, industry code, geographical code, legal form
of organization, employment size, imputed total sales8, and other economic vari-
ables. The Business Register includes both part-time and full-time workers. All
public administrative establishments are excluded. Thus, government businesses
on all levels are not available. Once all establishments from the Business Regis-
ter are matched using the EIN, the information from the U.S. Business Register
multi-unit ￿le is collapsed to an EIN level.
Integrating the Form 5500 into the Business Register in the ￿rst stage creates
a data set that is more complete than using the Form 5500 alone for two reasons.
First, the Form 5500 only lists one EIN per plan record even though workers from
other a¢ liates in an enterprise have the same coverage. By using the Business
Register ￿le and getting the list of all a¢ liates listed under an enterprise, the data
set now shows pension coverage for all a¢ liates. Second, by using the Business
Register, one is now able to look at ￿rms that do not o⁄er pension coverage and
do comparative analyses. Table 2.3 shows the number of matches found when
I integrate the Form 5500 to the Business Register. Approximately 95% of the
EINs found in the Form 5500 ￿le match to an EIN found on the U.S. Business
Register. However, some of the EINs that match are listed as out-of-business,
sold, duplicate, predecessor of another EIN, an administrative EIN, or have zero
8Forty-￿ve percent of sales are missing on the single-unit ￿le. Eighty-nine percent of sales are
missing on the multi-unit ￿le. I multiply-imputed the total sales on an establishment level and
then sum the results to an EIN level. I make no disctinction between a single unit establishment
and a multi-unit establishment when imputing the sales information.
91payroll. After using the alpha variable to ￿nd the a¢ liates, I drop all inactive
EINs from any future analyses. This sometimes means dropping an enterprise in
its entirety. Having an enterprise that is entirely inactive but still has an EIN
listed in the Form 5500 is not uncommon because by law, the enterprise is still
obligated to ￿le a Form 5500 form if it still has positive assets in a pension plan or
if retirees are still receiving pensions. Table 2.4 lists the EIN matches by pension
plan type after using the alpha to collect the a¢ liates and removing the inactive
EINs. About ten percent of all employers are found to o⁄er some form of pension
plan. Table 2.5 shows the number of employees that work for the ￿rms that o⁄er
di⁄erent types of pension plans. Slightly more than half of the employees are
working for a ￿rm that o⁄ers some form of pension. More information on this
national data set and how it is created is found in Hill (2006).
Plan End Year
Form 5500
EINs
Single Unit
Matches
Through Valid
EINs
Multi-Unit
Matches
Through  Valid
EINs
Multi-Unit
Matches
Through Invalid
EINs
Total
Matches to
Form 5500
1994 566,706 420,454 97,562 30,936 548,952
74.19% 17.22% 5.46% 96.87%
1995 580,673 432,318 98,498 33,366 564,182
74.45% 16.96% 5.75% 97.16%
1996 594,237 451,069 91,384 16,196 558,649
75.91% 15.38% 2.73% 94.01%
1997 613,737 444,381 106,386 32,205 582,972
72.41% 17.33% 5.25% 94.99%
1998 617,456 454,601 105,210 33,742 593,553
73.62% 17.04% 5.46% 96.13%
1999 562,781 416,745 93,893 30,671 541,309
74.05% 16.68% 5.45% 96.18%
2000 594,914 440,039 94,674 33,663 568,376
73.97% 15.91% 5.66% 95.54%
2001 606,740 450,446 86,626 36,964 574,036
74.24% 14.28% 6.09% 94.61%
Table 2.3: EINs from the Form 5500 That Are Found in the U.S. Census
Business Register
92Plan End Year
Defined
Benefit Plans
Only
Defined
Contribution
Plans Only
Defined Benefit Plans
and Defined
Contribution Plans Total
Percentage of
All Firms In U.S.
Business
Register
1994 42,748 488,017 58,988 589,753 10.19%
(row percentages) 7.25% 82.75% 10.00% 100.00%
1995 38,594 507,951 56,697 603,242 10.26%
6.40% 84.20% 9.40% 100.00%
1996 34,959 526,927 52,380 614,266 10.31%
5.69% 85.78% 8.53% 100.00%
1997 30,540 538,010 51,700 620,250 10.46%
4.92% 86.74% 8.34% 100.00%
1998 28,331 555,922 49,422 633,675 10.51%
4.47% 87.73% 7.80% 100.00%
1999 22,844 521,015 43,294 587,153 9.68%
3.89% 88.74% 7.37% 100.00%
2000 23,202 544,401 42,606 610,209 10.00%
3.80% 89.22% 6.98% 100.00%
2001 21,459 547,789 44,064 613,312 10.11%
3.50% 89.32% 7.18% 100.00%
Table 2.4: EINs Offering Pensions by Type from the Form 5500-Business Register
File
Plan End Year
Defined
Benefit Plans
Only
Defined
Contribution
Plans Only
Defined Benefit Plans
and Defined
Contribution Plans Total
Percentage of
Employees
Covered
1994 3,154,344 26,767,088 27,407,422 57,328,854 49.87%
(Row Percentages) 5.50% 46.69% 47.81% 100.00%
1995 3,613,841 30,905,729 29,153,608 63,673,178 51.57%
5.68% 48.54% 45.79% 100.00%
1996 2,637,699 31,280,973 28,566,737 62,485,409 50.92%
4.22% 50.06% 45.72% 100.00%
1997 2,473,261 34,214,349 28,365,822 65,053,432 52.17%
3.80% 52.59% 43.60% 100.00%
1998 2,387,525 38,266,686 28,856,832 69,511,043 52.51%
3.43% 55.05% 41.51% 100.00%
1999 1,719,400 38,875,932 27,345,285 67,940,617 51.48%
2.53% 57.22% 40.25% 100.00%
2000 1,670,404 42,464,331 27,189,597 71,324,332 52.87%
2.34% 59.54% 38.12% 100.00%
2001 1,536,401 42,511,564 30,772,399 74,820,364 54.90%
2.05% 56.82% 41.13% 100.00%
Table 2.5: Number of Employees Covered by Pensions by Type from the Form 5500-
Business Register File
To determine whether the estimates I created are consistent with other es-
timates publicly released, I compare my coverage rates with coverage rates and
participation rates calculated from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual
Demographic Files. The CPS coverage and participation rates are based on two
questions that ask if the ￿rm the respondent worked for o⁄ered a pension plans and
93if the respondent participated in the ￿rm￿ s pension plan. I only used respondents
in the CPS who work in the private sector. Table 2.6 shows that when I compare
my pension coverage rates with the coverage rates from the CPS, they are similar.
The participation rates are somewhat smaller, however.
Coverage Rates Found
in CPS for All Workers in
Private Firrms
Coverage Rates Estimated
Using the Form 5500 and
Business Register for All
Workers
1994 47.61% 49.87%
1995 50.82% 51.57%
1996 49.57% 50.92%
1997 53.91% 52.17%
1998 52.80% 52.51%
1999 50.49% 51.48%
2000 53.96% 52.87%
2001 53.26% 54.90%
Table 2.6: Comparison of Coverage Rate Estimates from the CPS
with Coverage Rates Estimates from the Form 5500-Business
Register
I also make more comparisons using additional estimates I calculate using the
CPS. Using Social Security Administration (SSA) earnings records available in
LEHD, I am able to determine the employers in which the respondents work for.
With this added information, I compare what the respondents say about their
dominant employer o⁄ering pensions to whether this employer ￿led a Form 5500
form with the IRS and DOL or not. I use only CPS respondents identi￿ed as full-
time employees working in the private sector. To avoid redundancy, only results
from 1997 are shown and are found in Table 2.7. When I compare responses, I
￿nd that there are some mismatches. There are several reasons for this. Again,
as stated earlier, not all pensions are listed in the Form 5500. Some respondents
may work for ￿rms that o⁄er pensions that are exempt from ￿ling. Also, some
EINs may have been listed erroneously on the Form 5500 ￿le. The Form 5500 in
its original form is not clean and it is impossible to determine whether the EIN
listed is correct or not. It is also possible that some employees may not fully
94understand their pension bene￿ts. There are some respondents that say their
￿rms do not o⁄er pensions, but their ￿rms are listed in the Form 5500. More
detailed information comparing my data set with similar statistics from the CPS
is provided in Hill (2006).
Worker Resonse to CPS Yes No Total
Yes, my employer provides a
pension plan 30,543 7,578 38,121
(Row Percentage) 80.12% 19.88% 100.00%
(Column Percentage) 76.78% 35.64% 62.45%
(Cell Percentages) 50.04% 12.42%
No, my employer does not
provide a pension plan 9,236 13,682 22,918
40.30% 59.70% 100.00%
23.22% 64.36% 37.55%
15.13% 22.42%
Total 39,779 21,260 61,039
65.17% 34.83% 100.00%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
The Firm has a Pension Plan
in the Form 5500
Table 2.7: CPS Responses Regarding Whether the Dominant Employer
Provided Pensions in 1997
Once I have the national data set, I proceed with the second integration by using
LEHD data from twelve states. The LEHD data are administrative information
about workers constructed primarily from quarterly Unemployment Insurance (UI)
system wage reports. Every state in the U.S. through its Employment Security
Agency collects quarterly earnings and employment information to manage its un-
employment compensation program. The characteristics of the UI wage state
vary slightly from state to state, but the UI coverage is broad and comparable
from state to state. Using these records, LEHD creates a database that provides
longitudinal information on workers and the matches to their employers. The
LEHD data includes approximately 96% of private, non-farm and salary workers.
The coverage of agricultural and federal government workers is less comprehen-
sive. Self-employed individuals and independent contractors are also not covered.
95Although the identi￿ers in the administrative records are subject to some error,
researchers have invested substantial resources in editing the identi￿ers and mak-
ing them internally consistent. More information can be found in Abowd and
Vilhuber (2002).
Basic demographic information (date of birth, foreign-born status, sex, race,
education imputation) is integrated via the person identi￿er link for almost all
workers in the data. The non-match rate is less than 4%. The quarterly earn-
ings listed are a measure of total compensation, including gross wages and salary,
bonuses, stock options, tips and gratuities and the value of meals and lodging when
these are supplied. Once the employee demographic information is collected, the
information is collapsed to an EIN level creating averages and totals.
Once the LEHD data is integrated with the national data set, the ￿nal data
set is a subset of ￿rms from the LEHD data. I only select ￿rms that o⁄er de￿ned
bene￿t plans in 1995 and keep information from year 1995 and 2000 only. This
￿nal data set includes information from 35,109 ￿rms on an EIN level, and they
employed a total of 6,311,921 people in 1995. It is important to note that a ￿rm
may appear more than once in this data set if it exists in more than one state. By
using information from 1995 and 2000 only, I can determine if the pension plans
were converted over the ￿ve-year period. I can also track the ￿rms￿changing
demographics including their employees￿age pro￿le, sex and race composition,
foreign born composition, average education level, average earnings, turnover rates,
total sales on the national EIN level, industry classi￿cation on a national EIN level,
and pension assets and liabilities on a national EIN level.
The number of ￿rms found in the national data set that o⁄er at least one de￿ned
bene￿t plan in 1995 represents 15.8% of all EINs. Table 2.8 shows the number of
unique ￿rms on the national level that o⁄er de￿ned bene￿t plan in 1995 and the
96changes in their pension plans in 2000. I also examine the ￿rms found in the twelve
states, which o⁄ered at least one de￿ned bene￿t plan in 1995. Again, these ￿rms
are not unique since it is possible that a ￿rm exists in more than one state. Since
the non-unique ￿rms in the data set have the same pension information, I only
examine a list of unique ￿rms to determine which ￿rms converted their pensions.
The number of unique ￿rms in my data set is 18,448. When comparing these
￿rms that o⁄ered de￿ned bene￿t plans in 1995 to the ￿rms in the national data
set o⁄ering de￿ned bene￿t plans in 1995, the changes in pensions is similar. The
percentage of ￿rms in the national data set that converted their de￿ned bene￿t
plans to de￿ned contribution plans is 30.78%. The percentage of ￿rms found in
the twelve states that converted their de￿ned bene￿t plans to de￿ned contribution
plans is 31.43%.
1995 2000 1995 2000
Defined Benefit Plans
Only 18,464 11,873 5,590 3,534
(Column Percentages) 35.45% 22.79% 30.30% 19.16%
Defined Benefit Plans
and Defined
Contribution Plans 33,622 24,179 12,858 9,116
64.55% 46.42% 69.70% 49.41%
Defined Contribution
Plans Only 0 16,034 0 5,798
0.00% 30.78% 0.00% 31.43%
Total 52,086 52,085 18,448 18,448
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Firms from National Set
Created in First Integration
Unique EINs from 12 States Created
in Second Integration
Table 2.8: Year 2000 Changes in Pension Plans for EINs Offering Defined Benefit Plans in
Year 1995
Table 2.9 and 2.10 lists of summary statistics for ￿rms that switched their
pensions during the ￿ve-year time period and pensions who kept their pension
plan9. Several things are striking when I make the comparison. Approximately,
9In Table 2.10, the Churning Rate=2(jA+Sj-jE-Bj)/(B+E) where A=Accessions,
S=Separations, B=Employment at Beginning of Qtr, and E=Employment at End of Qtr. Quit
Rate=2S/(B+E). Net Growth=2(E-B)/(E+B)
9722% of the ￿rms terminated all of their de￿ned bene￿t plans within the ￿ve-year
period. Firms that converted their pensions o⁄ered lower salaries than those that
kept their pensions. Also, although the ￿rms that converted and the ￿rms that
kept their pensions had similar churning rates in 1995, by the year 2000 ￿rms that
converted their pensions had signi￿cantly higher churning rates. When comparing
the percentage of females employed, the ￿rms that converted their de￿ned bene￿t
plans have on average a much higher percentage of females. Approximately, 43%
of the workforce is female compared to 35% of the workforce who are women
in the ￿rms that kept their de￿ned bene￿t plans. It also appears that ￿rms
with lower revenue are the ones that are more likely to convert their pension
plans. Surprisingly, the ￿rms that switched their pensions on average have a higher
productivity. Labor productivity is de￿ned as the logarithm of total national sales
divided by the total of national employees.
Offer DB Plans
in 2000
No DB plans in
2000
Offer DB plans
in 2000
No DB plans in
2000
N 27,329 7,780 27,329 7,780
Percentage of Workers age 45
or older 0.3552 0.3308 0.4237 0.3974
(Standard Deviation) (0.2693) (0.2593) (0.2800) (0.2694)
Percentage of Workers with at
least a College Degree 0.4046 0.3794 0.3675 0.3440
(0.2622) (0.2501) (0.2566) (0.2437)
Percentage of Foreign Born
Workers 0.0976 0.1034 0.1101 0.1152
(0.1784) (0.1822) (0.1867) (0.1882)
Percentage of Female Workers 0.3523 0.4323 0.3573 0.4355
(0.2994) (0.3145) (0.3036) (0.3164)
Percentage of Black Workers 0.05467 0.0596 0.0592 0.0667
(0.1144) (0.1288) (0.1199) (0.1412)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers 0.0405 0.0480 0.0525 0.0616
(0.1033) (0.1156) (0.1206) 0.1313
Percentage of "Other Race"
Workers 0.04100 0.0424 0.0464 0.0482
(0.1088) (0.1080) (0.1151) (0.1148)
Average Earnings 51651.11 45739.77 56254.65 50445.01
(49372.10) (50206.25) (70819.32) (95269.39)
Table 2.9: Means and Standard Deviations for Firms That Offered a Defined
Benefit Plan in 1995-State-EIN Level
1995 2000
98Offer DB Plans
in 2000
No DB plans in
2000
Offer DB plans
in 2000
No DB plans in
2000
N 27,329 7,780 27,329 7,780
Multi-Unit Firm 0.1618 0.1167 0.1680 0.1292
(0.3682) (0.3211) (0.3739) (0.3354)
Firm has 0-4 Employees
Nationally 0.3051 0.2758 0.3030 0.2847
(0.4605) (0.4470) (0.4596) (0.4513)
Firm has 5-99 Employees
Nationally 0.4625 0.5508 0.4499 0.5203
(0.4986) (0.4974) (0.4975) (0.4996)
Firm has 100-999 Employees
Nationally 0.1916 0.1523 0.1960 0.1659
(0.3936) (0.4974) (0.3970) (0.3720)
Firm has 1000 or More
Employees Nationally 0.0407 0.0211 0.0426 0.0213
(0.1977) )0.1437) (0.2019) (0.1445)
Firm Age 16.2286 15.8563 21.1286 20.7754
(5.0959) (5.7845) (5.3992) (6.1278)
Churning Rate for First Quarter
1 0.2137 0.2285 0.3121 0.4131
(1.9442) (0.7009) (16.7198) (11.8434)
Quit Rates in First Quarter
2 0.1586 0.1723 0.1586 0.1723
(0.9994) (0.4173) (0.9994) (0.4173)
Net Growth in Employees  in
First Quarter
3 (On State-EIN
Level) 197.1914 121.2236 197.1915 121.2236
(1113.27) (682.1247) (1113.27) (682.1247)
Current Liabilites (OBRA 1987) 45265108 143321466 818586858 0
(2206084318) (1006504614) (4402662766) 0
Current Assets 543333768 160469102 1577576569 0
(2724957273) (1205432361) (9425411393) 0
lg(Sales) 35.4019 15.91223 45.4437 15.9726
(138.8677) (101.1643) (1419.08) (1228.97)
Productivity 0.7101 1.1893 0.7014 1.2232
(1.6205) (1.7834) (1.6935) (2.0190)
Table 2.10: More Means and Standard Deviations for Firms That Offered a Defined
Benefit Plan in 1995-State-EIN Level
1995 2000
2.7 Empirical Results
This section discusses the empirical results from analyses on the data set described
above. I break down the analyses into four di⁄erent areas. I ￿rst discuss the
di⁄erent associations between the characteristics of the ￿rms and their workforce
with the conversion of de￿ned bene￿t plans, reduction in bene￿ts per worker and
the reduction in pension funding per worker. I then discuss how a change in the
number of employees, which is measured in di⁄erent ways, is a⁄ected when de￿ned
99bene￿t pension plans are converted. I follow with a discussion on the relationship
between the conversion of de￿ned bene￿t pensions and productivity in the year
2000 only. I ￿nally discuss how converting de￿ned bene￿t plans possibly leads to
a reduction in productivity over the ￿ve-year period.
Before discussing the regression results, it is important to acknowledge again
that there is possibly endogeneity between converting pensions plans and produc-
tivity. Thus, I use a two step estimation. In addition to using an indicator in the
regressions for converting pensions, I calculate estimations using the di⁄erence in
current liabilities per employee from 1995 to 2000 and the di⁄erence in pension as-
sets per employee from 1995 to 2000 as instruments for pension conversions. The
di⁄erence in liabilities per worker and the di⁄erence in pension assets per worker
are ways of measuring the reduction in bene￿ts for each worker and the reduction
in pension funding for each worker, respectively.
I argue that these instruments are positively correlated to converting pensions,
but are exogenous to productivity. As stated earlier, current liabilities are the total
pension amount the employees are obligated to get if the plan is converted or the
employees leave prior to retirement. Liabilities may drop over a ￿ve-year period
not only when ￿rms reduce their workers￿pensions or convert the de￿ned bene￿t
plans, but also when ￿rms change discount rates, use a di⁄erent pension bene￿t
accrual cost method, or use a di⁄erent expected mortality rate. Assets in the
de￿ned bene￿t pension fund not only drop when ￿rms convert their pension plan
and seize the assets to pay other debts, but also as a result of market ￿ uctuations.
Table 2.11 shows the correlations between converting pensions, the di⁄erence in
current liabilities per worker from 1995 to 2000 and the di⁄erence in pension assets
per worker from 1995 to 2000. The correlations are positive and signi￿cant at the
1% level among all three variables.
100Conversion of
Pension Plan
Difference in Liability
per Worker
Difference in Assets
per Worker
Conversion of Pension
Plans 1 0.22090 0.22056
(p-value) - <0.0001 <0.0001
N 35109 35078 35081
Difference in Liability
per Worker 1 0.98074
- <0.0001
34936 35078
Difference in Assets
per Worker 1
-
34939
Table 2.11: Correlations Between Coverting Pension Plan, Differences in Liability and
Differences in Assets
In order to estimate the two step estimation system using the di⁄erence in
current liabilities per worker or the di⁄erence in pension assets per worker as an
instrument, I need to de￿ne the ￿rst equation. Suppose there are k regressors on
the right hand side and i represents the ith ￿rm in the data set. Then the ￿rst
equation used for the two step estimation model is de￿ned as
CPi = ￿0 + ￿1X1i + ::: + ￿kXki +  Di + ui
where CPi is the change in pension indicator for the ith ￿rm, and Di is either
the di⁄erence in current liabilities per worker or the di⁄erence in pension assets
per worker for the ith ￿rm in the data set. The results of the ￿rst equation where
the instrument is the change in current liability is listed in Table 2.12. The results
of the ￿rst equation where the instruments is the change in pension assets is listed
in Table 2.13. The second regression equation is de￿ned as
Yi = ￿0 + ￿1iX1i + ::: + ￿kiXki + ￿CPi + ￿i
In performing the two step estimation both equations are estimated simulta-
neously and are discussed in the analyses below.
101(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -0.7351*** 0.8965*** -0.0015
(Chi Square Values) (26.90) (67.06) (0.00)
Difference in Liability from 1995 to 2000 -0.2832*** -0.2765*** -0.2716***
(1517.38) (1348.70) (1270.87)
DC Plan in 1995 -0.0308 -0.0970*** -0.1338***
(2.19) (20.43) (37.31)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older 0.0541* 0.0340
(3.06) (1.15)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree 0.0886*** 0.1404***
(6.96) (15.75)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers 0.0138 -0.0094
(0.05) (0.02)
Percentage of Female Workers -0.2749*** -0.1873***
(99.74) (36.36)
Percentage of Black Workers 0.2091*** -0.1653**
(8.45) (0.0263)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers -0.0520 -0.0818
(0.30) (0.71)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers 0.1657* 0.1772**
(3.13) (3.51)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) 0.1508*** 0.0934***
(128.20) (41.48)
Multi-Unit Firm 0.1363*** 0.1453***
(26.64) (29.86)
Firm has 5-99 Employees -0.2172*** -0.1652***
(124.25) (66.04)
Firm has 100-999 Employees -0.0554** 0.0115
(3.97) (0.15)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees 0.2028*** 0.2649***
(14.86) (24.26)
Firm Age 0.0489*** 0.0455***
(14.86) (50.75)
Firm Age Squared -0.0021*** -0.0020***
(77.94) (67.55)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 34,754 34,938 34753
log likelihood -17056.6176 -16938.30064 -16776.35462
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Table 2.12:  Regression Results for the First Equation in the Two Step Estimation
where Instrument is Change in Liability
Dependent Variable is Indicator Variable
for Converting Defined Benefit Plans,
1=Conversion Occurred,0=No Conversion
102(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -0.7462*** 0.8870*** -0.0199
(Chi Square Values) (27.69) (65.60) (0.01)
Difference in Pension Assets from 1995 to 2000 -0.2808*** -0.2740*** -0.2692***
(1530.78) (1362.33) (1285.15)
DC Plan in 1995 -0.0280 -0.0946*** -0.1314***
(1.81) (19.41) (35.94)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older 0.0581* 0.0374
(3.52) (1.39)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree 0.0901*** 0.1424***
(7.18) (16.18)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers 0.0117 -0.0115
(0.03) (0.03)
Percentage of Female Workers -0.2742*** -0.1863***
(99.04) (35.93)
Percentage of Black Workers 0.2079*** 0.1636**
(8.34) (4.83)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers -0.0425 -0.0735
(0.20) 90.57)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers 0.1657* 0.1776*
(3.12) (3.52)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) 0.1514*** 0.0941***
(128.97) (41.97)
Multi-Unit Firm 0.1358*** 0.1448***
(26.44) (269.68)
Firm has 5-99 Employees -0.2168*** -0.1644***
(123.66) (65.39)
Firm has 100-999 Employees -0.0551* 0.0134
(3.78) (0.20)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees 0.2040*** 0.2666***
(15.04) (24.57)
Firm Age 0.00500*** 0.0466***
(15.04) (53.19)
Firm Age Squared -0.0022*** -0.0020***
(80.08) 969.58)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 34,751 34,935 34750
log likelihood -17046.69132 -16928.04288 -16765.41674
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Table 2.13:  Regression Results for the First Equation in the Two Step Estimation
where Instrument is Change in Pension Assets
Dependent Variable is Indicator Variable
for Converting Defined Benefit Plans,
1=Conversion Occurred,0=No Conversion
2.7.1 Workforce and Firm Characteristics and Pension Conversion
To determine the relationship between the characteristics of the ￿rm and its work-
force with the conversion of de￿ned bene￿t pensions, I ￿rst estimate probit re-
gressions and use an indicator for the conversion of de￿ned bene￿t plans as the
dependent variable. The dependent variable is one if all of the ￿rm￿ s de￿ned
bene￿t plans was converted during the ￿ve-year time period, zero otherwise. The
103estimates found are for modeling the probabilities of keeping the de￿ned bene￿t
plans. In Table 2.14, the ￿rst and third regression results show that ￿rms with
a larger percentage of women in the workforce have a negative and signi￿cant as-
sociation with converting pension plans. Also, the percentage of college-educated
workers is positive and signi￿cant in the ￿rst and third regressions. This implies
that ￿rms with more college-educated workers and fewer women are less likely to
convert their de￿ned bene￿t plans. This seem understandable because workers
without college degrees and women may not value their de￿ned bene￿t plan as
much because they are more mobile in the labor market. Also, the logarithm
of earnings from 1995 is positive and signi￿cant in the ￿rst and third regressions.
Thus, ￿rms that paid higher salaries in 1995 are more likely to not convert their
pension plans over the ￿ve-year period. Older ￿rms are also more likely to keep
their de￿ned bene￿t plans. Firm age has a positive and signi￿cant association.
In the second regression, it is interesting to note that di⁄erent ￿rm sizes have
di⁄erent associations. For small ￿rms, there is a negative association with the
indicator variable. However, for middle-size and large ￿rms, there is a positive
association. This remains true when the workforce characteristics are included in
the model as demonstrated in the third regression.
I next use the di⁄erence in pension liabilities per employee from 1995 to 2000 as
my dependent variable and estimate OLS regression models. Again, the dependent
variable implies that the larger the di⁄erence, the larger the reduction in bene￿ts
per employee. The results of the ￿rst and third regressions found in Table 2.15
show that ￿rms with a larger percentage of women have a positive association with
the di⁄erence in liability per person and is signi￿cant. Also, in the ￿rst and third
regressions, the percentage of workers over the age of forty-￿ve both has a negative
association and is signi￿cant. However, the percentage of college-educated workers
104is insigni￿cant. The logarithm of average total earnings of workers in 1995 is
negatively associated with the di⁄erence in liabilities per worker. It seems that
￿rms with higher paid employers in 1995 were less likely to reduce bene￿ts of
workers over the ￿ve-year period.
In the second regression in Table 2.15, di⁄erent ￿rm sizes all have the same
associations unlike in Table 2.14. There is a negative and signi￿cant association
for all three ￿rm sizes. However, the largest ￿rm size has the most negative
association. The results are similar when the dependent variable is the di⁄erence
in pension assets per employee found in Table 2.16.
105(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -1.1645*** 0.5462*** -0.5015***
( Chi square values) (73.62) (30.57) (8.35)
DC Plan in 1995 -0.0249 -0.0804*** -0.1268***
(1.55) (14.65) (35.93)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older 0.0554* 0.0308
(3.37) (1.00)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree 0.0777** 0.1224***
(5.63) (12.78)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers -0.0143 -0.0297
(0.05) (0.23)
Percentage of Female Workers -0.3601*** -0.2676***
(183.44) (79.35)
Percentage of Black Workers 0.1891*** 0.0747
(7.55) (1.09)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers 0.1890** -0.0203
(4.49) (0.05)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers 0.0745 0.1758*
(0.67) (3.84)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) 0.1890*** 0.1142***
(222.49) (65.16)
Multi-Unit Firm 0.1574*** 0.1718***
(33.83) (41.79)
Firm has 5-99 Employees -0.1015*** -0.0375*
(29.08) (3.81)
Firm has 100-999 Employees 0.0906*** 0.1745***
(10.32) (36.39)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees 0.3229*** 0.4258***
(26.39) (44.76)
Firm Age 0.0577*** 0.0533***
(86.82) (75.47)
Firm Age Squared -0.0023*** -0.0022***
(95.31) (84.61)
Net Growth Rate in 2000 Quarter 1 0.0000 0.0000
(1.51) (0.79)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 34,920 33,532 34779
Log-Likelihood -17130.90257 -17130.90257 -17584.96227
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Table 2.14:  Probit Model Regression Results
Dependent Variable is Indicator Variable for
Converting Defined Benefit Plans,
1=Conversion Occurred,0=No Conversion
Estimates are for modeling the probabilities of keeping the defined benefit plan
106(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 1.74776*** 0.20127* 1.17458***
( Chi Square values) (12.20) (1.94) (6.52)
DC Plan in 1995 0.22372*** 0.19842*** 0.23396***
(10.57) (9.22) (10.69)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older -0.08329*** -0.06700**
(-2.75) (-2.21)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree -0.02138 0.01401
(-0.65) (0.42)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers 0.06856 0.06794
(1.09) (1.10)
Percentage of Female Workers 0.21673*** 0.22632***
(7.77) (7.38)
Percentage of Black Workers 0.08883 0.28222***
(1.24) (3.88)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers -0.38584*** -0.26246***
(-4.02) (-2.76)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers -0.17656* -0.09110
(-1.95) (-1.02)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) -0.18100*** -0.10050***
(-13.50) (-6.94)
Multi-Unit Firm -0.09991*** -0.10585***
(-3.86) (-4.09)
Firm has 5-99 Employees -0.19755*** -0.25456***
(-10.58) (-13.15)
Firm has 100-999 Employees -0.26520*** -0.35630***
(-9.60) (-12.37)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees -0.29434*** -0.39357***
(-5.34) (-7.06)
Firm Age -0.03469*** -0.03156***
(5.15) (-4.92)
Firm Age Squared 0.00126*** 0.00117***
(5.15) (4.78)
Net Growth Rate in 2000 Quarter 1 -0.00000829 -0.00000718
(-0.93) (-0.80)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 34,754 34,654 34653
Adjusted R-Square 0.0168 0.0447 0.0493
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Table 2.15:  OLS Model Regression Results
Dependent Variable is Difference in
Liabilities Per Worker from 1995 to 2000
107(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 1.76629*** 0.14799 1.14872***
( Chi Square values) (12.14) (1.40) (6.27)
DC Plan in 1995 0.24101*** 0.21324*** 0.24943***
(11.21) (9.75) (11.21)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older -0.07434** -0.05869
(-2.41) (-1.90)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree -0.01610 0.02084
(-0.48) (0.61)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers 0.05208 0.05406
(0.82) (0.86)
Percentage of Female Workers 0.21016*** 0.22006***
(7.42) (7.06)
Percentage of Black Workers 0.09236 0.28343***
(1.27) (3.83)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers -0.34012*** -0.22153***
(-3.49) (-2.29)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers -0.15292* -0.06518
(-1.66) (-0.71)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) -0.18486*** -0.10358***
(-13.58) (-7.04)
Multi-Unit Firm -0.10518*** -0.11124***
(-4.00) (-4.23)
Firm has 5-99 Employees -0.19223*** -0.24909***
(-10.13) (-12.66)
Firm has 100-999 Employees -0.25416*** -0.34547***
(-9.06) (-11.80)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees -0.28683*** -0.38592***
(-5.12) (-6.81)
Firm Age -0.03004*** -0.02689***
(-4.60) (-4.12)
Firm Age Squared 0.00114*** 0.00105***
(4.60) (4.22)
Net Growth Rate in 2000 Quarter 1 -0.00000788 -0.00000677
(-0.87) (-0.75)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 34,751 34,651 34,650
Adjusted R-Square 0.0171 0.0439 0.0483
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Table 2.16:  OLS Model Regression Results
Dependent Variable is Difference in
Pension Assets Per Worker from 1995 to
2000
2.7.2 Changes in Employment and Pension Conversion
Before determining how converting pensions a⁄ect employee change, I ￿rst de￿ne
two di⁄erent ways of measuring employee growth. A ￿rm that grows by one
employee may do so by simply hiring one new employee, or by hiring ten workers
and letting go of nine. Having to replace workers who left in the second case is more
costly to the ￿rm because the ￿rm now must invest in training ten workers instead
of one like in the previous case. Thus, it is important to look at the net growth
108(adding one new worker) and churning (total of 10+9-1= 18 extra employees who
came and left above those needed to increase the number by 1) separately. The
net growth rate is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the number of workers at the
end of the quarter minus the number of employees at the beginning of the quarter
divided by the average number of employees between the beginning and end of the
￿rst quarter in the year 2000. The churning rate is de￿ned as churning described
above divided by the average number of employees between the beginning and end
of the ￿rst quarter in the year 2000. I also calculate quit rates for the ￿rms. A
quit rate is de￿ned as the number of separations divided by the average number
of employees between the beginning and end of the ￿rst quarter in the year 2000.
Table 2.17 shows the OLS regression results where the churning rates and quit
rates are the dependent variables. Unfortunately, variance in the data is not
explained by these regressions. There are no or little signi￿cant results. However,
when I estimate OLS regressions where net growth rate is the dependent variable,
I have some estimates that are signi￿cant. Table 2.18 has the results of the
regressions. The conversion of the de￿ned bene￿t pension plans is negatively
associated with net growth in the ￿rst regression once I only control for worker
characteristics. This implies that converting de￿ned bene￿t plans some time over
the ￿ve-year period negatively a⁄ects employee growth by the year 2000. However,
the estimate is insigni￿cant in the second and third regressions.
When I use the di⁄erence in liabilities per worker as an instrumental variable
for the change in pension plans, the results are similar. In Table 2.19, I use
the churning rate and quit rate as dependent variables. Again, the results are
mostly insigni￿cant. However, I have some signi￿cant results when I use the net
growth rate as the dependent variable and the di⁄erence in liabilities per worker
as an instrument. In Table 2.20, the estimate for the predicted probability of
109converting the de￿ned bene￿t plan is negatively associated with the net growth
rate and it is signi￿cant in all three regressions. This again implies that converting
de￿ned bene￿t plans negatively a⁄ects employee growth by the year 2000. These
similar conclusions are also found when I use the di⁄erence in pension assets per
worker as an instrumental variable for the change in pensions. These results are
found in Table 2.21 and Table 2.22.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 2.11427 0.12707 1.16210 1.29208 0.15339 0.83214
( t values) (1.32) (0.12) (0.58) (1.60) (0.28) (0.83)
Changed to a DC plan by 2000 Indicator 0.09365 0.13452 0.14748 0.04582 0.06230 0.06775
(0.45) (0.64) (0.69) (0.44) (0.59) (0.63)
DC Plan in 1995 0.04105 -0.011134 -0.05446 0.04504 0.02254 0.00316
(0.18) (-0.05) (-0.22) (0.39) (0.19) (0.03)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older -0.01121 0.04539 -0.00223 0.02714
(-0.03) (0.13) (-0.01) (0.16)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree -0.02409 -0.02687 -0.01361 -0.01754
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.09)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers -0.33822 -0.35899 -0.15732 -0.16816
(-0.49) (-0.52) (-0.45) (-0.48)
Percentage of Female Workers -0.36083 -0.49551 -0.19563 -0.25744
(-1.16) (-1.43) (-1.25) (-1.48)
Percentage of Black Workers -0.13878 -0.76138 -0.06497 -0.35269
(-0.17) (-0.92) (-0.16) (-0.85)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers -0.18133 -0.18344 -0.14877 -0.13473
(-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.28) (-0.25)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers 0.18364 -0.03418 0.06553 -0.03766
(0.18) (-0.03) (0.13) (-0.08)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) -0.18072 -0.08280 -0.10815 -0.05700
(-1.20) (-0.51) (-1.44) (-0.70)
Multi-Unit Firm 0.05687 0.03696 0.02579 0.01414
(0.19) (-.13) (0.18) (0.10)
Firm has 5-99 Employees 0.07145 0.13146 0.01170 0.03917
(0.34) (0.60) (0.11) (0.36)
Firm has 100-999 Employees 0.29022 0.40659 0.11492 0.16866
(0.94) (1.25) (0.74) (1.04)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees 2.21307*** 2.37569*** 1.06488*** 1.14331***
(4.04) (4.25) (3.88) (4.08)
Firm Age 0.01504 0.01628 0.00766 0.00879
(0.21) (0.23) (0.21) (0.24)
Firm Age Squared -0.00133 -0.00147 -0.00072312 -0.00081574
(-0.49) (-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.59)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 33,408 33,532 33370 33,408 33,663 33370
Adjusted  R-Square 0.0001 0.0010 0.0009 0.0002 0.0009 0.0010
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Dependent Variable is Churning
Rate for Year 2000 Quarter 1
Dependent Variable is Quit Rate in
Year 2000 Quarter 1
Table 2.17:  OLS Regression Results Using an Indicator for the Conversion of Defined Benefit
Plans
110(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 608.210011*** -101.81739 -400.24477***
( t values) (5.60) (-1.60) (-3.48)
Changed to a DC plan by 2000 Indicator -100.51569*** 12.21628 -16.06874
(-7.07) (-1.51) (-1.31)
DC Plan in 1995 189.80134*** 35.47809** 30.38105**
(12.01) (2.57) (2.13)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older -18.80134 -12.03311
(-0.81) (-0.61)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree -27.43409 17.70307
(-1.10) (0.81)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers -46.65976 -29.65421
(-0.99) (-0.74)
Percentage of Female Workers 146.22065*** 8.79649
(6.94) (0.44)
Percentage of Black Workers 633.90570*** 8.99597
(11.63) (0.19)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers 164.97794** 56.48136
(2.31) (0.92)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers 222.64324*** 35.84133
(3.29) (0.62)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) 54.13590* 29.29539***
(1.98) (3.11)
Multi-Unit Firm 122.40654*** 124.51767***
(7.24) (3.11)
Firm has 5-99 Employees 12.98873 18.14364
(1.07) (1.44)
Firm has 100-999 Employees 252.93663*** 260.94510***
(14.16) (13.91)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees 2997.46626*** 3006.93798***
(94.73) (92.99)
Firm Age 4.66626 3.95218
(1.13) (0.95)
Firm Age Squared -0.14723 -0.11490
(-0.93) (-0.72)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 33,408 33,532 33370
Adjusted  R-Square 0.0154 0.2842 0.2839
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Table 2.18:  OLS Regression Results Using an Indicator for the Conversion of
Defined Benefit Plans
Dependent Variable is Net Growth Rate for
Year 2000 Quarter 1
111(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 2.02922 0.05903 0.86625 1.22225 0.13637 0.71317
( t values) (1.14) (0.05) (0.41) (1.37) (0.23) 0.67
Predicted Probability that DB Plan Changed by 2000 0.20561 0.55889 0.73637 0.13162 0.24330 0.32976
(0.22) (0.57) (0.74) (0.29) (0.50) (0.66)
DC Plan in 1995 0.03898 -0.02428 -0.08126 0.04442 0.01704 -0.00896
(0.`7) (-0.10) (-0.32) (0.38) (0.14) (-0.07)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older -0.00901 0.05113 0.00001283 0.03043
(-0.03) (0.15) (0.00) (0.018)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree -0.02178 -0.00728 -0.01166 -0.00910
(-0.06) (-0.02) (-0.06) (-0.05)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers -0.34249 -0.36639 -0.15959 -0.17191
(-0.49) (0.52) (-0.46) (-0.49)
Percentage of Female Workers -0.37438 -0.53832 -0.20574 -0.27949
(-1.15) (-1.53) (-1.26) (-1.56)
Percentage of Black Workers -0.13226 -0.75317 -0.05799 -0.34884
(-0.16) (-0.91) (-0.14) (-0.84)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers -0.17954 -0.18249 -0.14866 -0.13400
(0.19) (-0.17) (-0.28) (-0.25)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers 0.19214 -0.00466 0.07199 -0.02459
(0.19) (-0.00) (-0.14) (-0.05)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) -0.17460 -0.06283 -0.10315 -0.04816
(-1.09) (-0.38) (-1.29) (-0.58)
Multi-Unit Firm 0.07398 0.06287 0.03293 0.02557
(0.25) (0.21) (0.22) (-0.17)
Firm has 5-99 Employees 0.05959 0.12658 0.00657 0.03676
(0.28) (0.58) (0.06) (0.33)
Firm has 100-999 Employees 0.30244 0.43940 0.12033 0.18332
(0.97) (1.33) (0.77) (1.11)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees 2.26232*** 2.45631*** 1.08668*** 1.17970***
(4.07) (4.29) (3.90) (4.11)
Firm Age 0.02092 0.02442 0.00977 0.01201
(0.28) (0.33) (0.26) (0.32)
Firm Age Squared -0.00158 -0.00181 -0.00081637 -0.00095630
(-0.56) (-0.64) (-0.57) (-0.67)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 33,264 33,421 33263 33,264 33421 33263
Adjusted  R-Square 0.0001 0.0010 0.0009 0.0002 0.0011 0.0010
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Dependent Variable is Churning Rate
for Year 2000 Quarter 1
Dependent Variable is Quit Rate in Year
2000 Quarter 1
Table 2.19: Two Step Regression Results Using the Difference in Pension Liabilities Per Worker as
the Instrumental Variable
112(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 885.49182*** -84.01064 -335.20933***
( t values) (7.40) (-1.22) (-2.75)
Predicted Probability that DB Plan Changed by 2000 -403.69628*** -140.37917** -119.57901**
(-6.54) (-2.50) (-2.09)
DC Plan in 1995 193.31908*** 37.88220*** 33.57901**
(12.19) (2.72) (2.33)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older -23.46137 -14.41501
(-1.03) (-0.73)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree -34.71344 14.00888
(-1.41) (0.64)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers -50.51613 -36.68708
(-1.07) (-0.91)
Percentage of Female Workers 174.73430*** 17.48794
(7.94) (0.85)
Percentage of Black Workers 614.92474*** 4.86424
(11.26) (0.10)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers 153.08494** 45.19058
(2.13) (0.73)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers 210.75931*** 37.24532
(3.11) (0.64)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) -79.49440*** 23.96930**
(-7.37) (2.50)
Multi-Unit Firm 116.74076*** 119.15772***
(6.85) (6.94)
Firm has 5-99 Employees 15.46119 17.71490
(1.27) (1.41)
Firm has 100-999 Employees 248.98088*** 254.35261***
(13.93) (13.42)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees 2988.45650*** 2996.75631***
(93.45) (90.99)
Firm Age 4.47046 4.32053
(1.05) (1.01)
Firm Age Squared -0.12532 -0.11437
(-0.77) (-0.70)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 33,264 33,421 33263
Adjusted  R-Square 0.0154 0.2865 0.2862
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Table 2.20:  Two Step Regression Results Using the Difference in Pension Liabilities
Per Worker as the Instrumental Variable
Dependent Variable is Net Growth Rate for
Year 2000 Quarter 1
113(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 2.02772 0.0612 0.87073 1.22120 0.13662 0.71435
( t values) (1.14) (0.05) (0.41) (1.37) (0.23) (0.67)
Predicted Probability that DB Plan Changed by 2000 0.20847 0.55580 0.73073 0.13322 0.24260 0.32841
(0.23) (0.57) (0.74) (0.29) (0.50) (0.66)
DC Plan in 1995 0.03859 -0.02440 -0.08134 0.04425 0.01697 -0.00905
(0.16) (-0.10) (-0.32) (0.38) (0.14) (-0.07)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older -0.00920 0.05068 -0.00006112 0.03024
(-0.03) (0.15) (0.00) (0.18)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree -0.02177 -0.00769 -0.01165 -0.00924
(-0.06) (-0.02) (-0.06) (-0.05)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers -0.34256 -0.36642 -0.15957 -0.17190
(-0.49) (-0.52) (-0.46) (-0.49)
Percentage of Female Workers -0.37487 -0.54423 -0.20596 -0.27951
(-1.15) (-1.53) (-1.26) (-1.56)
Percentage of Black Workers -0.13241 -0.75368 -0.05803 -0.34905
(-0.16) (-0.91) (-0.14) (-0.84)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers -0.18008 -0.18338 -0.14895 -0.13444
(-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.28) (-0.25)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers 0.19212 -0.00571 0.07200 -0.02499
(0.19) (-0.01) (0.14) (-0.05)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) -0.17446 -0.06306 -0.10306 -0.04821
(-1.09) (-0.38) (-1.29) (-0.58)
Multi-Unit Firm 0.07385 0.06260 0.03290 0.02550
(0.25) (0.21) (0.22) (0.17)
Firm has 5-99 Employees 0.05971 0.12668 0.00662 0.03681
(0.28) (-.58) (0.06) (0.33)
Firm has 100-999 Employees 0.30233 0.43910 0.12031 0.18326
(0.97) (.33) (0.77) (1.11)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees 2.26201*** 2.45568*** 1.08662*** 1.17957***
(4.07) (4.29) (3.90) (4.11)
Firm Age -0.00158 0.02433 0.00976 0.01200
(-0.56) (0.33) (0.26) (0.32)
Firm Age Squared -0.00158 -0.00181 -0.00081639 -0.00095596
(-0.56) -0.64) (-0.57) (-0.67)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 33,261 33,418 33260 33,264 33421 33263
Adjusted  R-Square 0.0001 0.0010 0.0009 0.0002 0.0011 0.0010
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Dependent Variable is Churning Rate
for Year 2000 Quarter 1
Dependent Variable is Quit Rate in Year
2000 Quarter 1
Table 2.21: Two Step Regression Results Using Difference in Pension Assets Per Worker as the
Instrumental Variable
114(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 877.34524*** -84.65233 -336.37652***
( t values) (7.33) (-1.23) (-2.76)
Predicted Probability that DB Plan Changed by 2000 -393.76912*** -138.05738** -117.61663**
(-6.40) (2.47) (-2.06)
DC Plan in 1995 193.18093*** 37.80731*** 33.51250**
(12.18) (2.71) (2.33)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older -23.25052 -14.37770
(-1.02) (-0.73)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree -34.47714 14.08739
(-1.40) (0.64)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers -50.65954 -36.71742
(1.08) (-0.91)
Percentage of Female Workers 173.68467*** 17.33507
(7.89) (0.85)
Percentage of Black Workers 615.44386*** 4.89460
(11.27) (0.10)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers 153.63207** 45.26128
(2.14) (0.73)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers 211.58356*** 37.41676
(3.12) (0.65)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) -78.91098*** 24.03350**
(-7.32) (2.50)
Multi-Unit Firm 116.84992*** 119.25428***
(6.85) (6.94)
Firm has 5-99 Employees 15.38677 17.68759
(1.26) (1.40)
Firm has 100-999 Employees 249.03981*** 254.45192***
(13.93) (13.43)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees 2988.67022*** 2996.98366***
(93.46) (91.01)
Firm Age 4.51764 4.35799
(1.06) (1.02)
Firm Age Squared -0.12713 -0.115581
(-0.78) (-0.71)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 33,261 33,418 33260
Adjusted  R-Square 0.0153 0.2869 0.2862
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Table 2.22: Two Step Regression Results Using the Difference in Pension Assets
Per Worker as the Instrumental Variable
Dependent Variable is Net Growth Rate in
Year 2000 Quarter 1
2.7.3 Productivity in the Year 2000 and Pension Conversion
To determine the relationship between productivity and converting pensions, the
dependent variable is productivity in year 2000 in the regressions. Again, pro-
ductivity is de￿ned as the logarithm of total sales divided by the total of national
workers. In Table 2.23, I use the indicator for converting pension plans where the
indicator equals one if there was a conversion by the year 2000, zero if there was
not. When looking at the association between converting de￿ned bene￿t plans
115and productivity in 2000, interestingly, there is a positive association, and it is
signi￿cant at the 1% level in all three regressions. However, what is surprising is
that when I use the two step estimation, I get di⁄erent results. In Table 2.24, I
use the di⁄erence in liabilities per worker as an instrument. It is very striking that
the probability of converting has a negative association and is signi￿cant at the
1% level in all three regressions. Thus, the more likely a ￿rm converts its de￿ned
bene￿t plans, the lower the productivity is in the year 2000. In Table 2.25, I
use the di⁄erence in assets per worker as an instrument. Again, the association
between the probability of converting a de￿ned bene￿t plan and productivity in
2000 is negative and signi￿cant at the 1% level in all three regressions. Using the
di⁄erence in liabilities per worker and the di⁄erence in pension assets per worker
as instruments in the two step estimation shows that converting de￿ned bene￿t
plans is negatively associated with productivity in the year 2000. Thus, ￿rms that
convert their de￿ned bene￿t plans have lower productivity than ￿rms that do not
convert their de￿ned bene￿t plans by the year 2000.
116(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 1.30553*** 3.34176*** 2.82640***
( t values) (7.31) (28.65) (13.61)
Changed to a DC plan by 2000 Indicator 0.42021*** 0.31310*** 0.28045***
(18.52) (14.64) (13.22)
DC Plan in 1995 -1.20118*** -1.10791*** -1.01226***
(-48.13) (-46.03) (-41.68)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older 0.50191*** 0.39845***
(12.58) (10.63)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree 0.07973* -0.13478***
(1.83) (-3.20)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers -0.12632 -0.20234***
(-1.57) (-2.72)
Percentage of Female Workers 0.92760*** 0.88198***
(26.77) (24.31)
Percentage of Black Workers -0.72167*** -0.20763**
(-8.36) (-2.55)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers -0.82975*** -0.35870***
(-7.14) (-3.33)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers 0.23318** 0.28930***
(2.10) (2.82)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) -0.02633 0.01691
(-1.56) (0.99)
Multi-Unit Firm 0.10953*** 0.10849***
(3.90) (3.90)
Firm has 5-99 Employees -1.11804*** -1.13316***
(-49.73) (-49.53)
Firm has 100-999 Employees -1.49103*** -1.52195***
(-47.44) (47.13)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees -1.62014*** -1.68545***
(-27.03) (-28.10)
Firm Age -0.03128*** -0.03066***
(-4.19) (-4.15)
Firm Age Squared -0.00022235 -0.00024412
(-0.79) (-0.87)
Net Growth Rate in 2000 Quarter 1 -0.00001750* -0.00001831*
(-1.83) (0.0526)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 29,812 29739 29738
Adjusted R-Square 0.1699 0.2767 0.2941
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Dependent Variable is Productivity in Year
2000
Table 2.23: OLS Regression Results Using an Indicator for the Conversion of
Defined Benefit Plans
117(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -1.62184*** 2.72980*** 1.72213***
( t values) (-8.50) (22.49) (7.91)
Predicted Probability that DB Plan Changed by 2000 -3.83480*** -2.31975*** -2.13390***
(41.59) (24.40) (22.29)
DC Plan in 1995 -1.24782*** -1.14602*** -1.07642***
(-51.06) (-47.12) (-43.41)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older 0.55584*** 0.41752***
(-14.23) (11.03)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree 0.15259*** -0.06489
(3.57) (-1.52)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers -0.13428* -0.21045***
(-1.71) (-2.81)
Percentage of Female Workers 0.56325*** 0.71506***
(15.98) (19.09)
Percentage of Black Workers -0.52001*** -0.10234
(-6.14) (-1.24)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers -0.72683*** -0.34857***
(-6.39) (-3.22)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers 0.41989*** 0.39590***
(3.86) (3.85)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) 0.18773*** 0.07444***
(10.79) (4.24)
Multi-Unit Firm 0.19769*** 0.19299***
(6.87) (6.75)
Firm has 5-99 Employees -1.15667*** -1.13888***
(-50.97) (-49.34)
Firm has 100-999 Employees -1.42043*** -1.41500***
(-44.53) (-42.61)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees -1.40864*** -1.45116***
(-23.09) (-23.55)
Firm Age 0.00454 0.00017040
(0.59) (0.02)
Firm Age Squared -0.00165*** -0.00149***
(-5.62) (-5.11)
Net Growth Rate in 2000 Quarter 1 -0.00002210** -0.00002283**
(-2.43) (-2.54)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 29,788 28653 28528
Adjusted R-Square 0.2065 0.2873 0.3032
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Table 2.24: Two Step Regression Results Using Difference in Liabilities Per Worker
as the Instrumental Variable
Dependent Variable is Productivity in Year
2000
118(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -1.63772*** 2.71728*** 1.69078***
( t values) (-8.59) (22.40) (7.77)
Predicted Probability that DB Plan Changed by 2000 -3.85014*** -2.36155*** -2.17771***
(41.94) (24.98) (22.90)
DC Plan in 1995 -1.24722*** -1.14665*** -1.07768***
(-51.05) (-47.17) (-43.48)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older 0.55412*** 0.41698***
(14.19) (11.02)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree 0.15251*** -0.06352
(3.57) (-1.49)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers -0.13272* -0.20934***
(-1.69) (-2.80)
Percentage of Female Workers 0.56331*** 0.71298***
(16.00) (19.05)
Percentage of Black Workers -0.51755*** -0.10009
(-6.12) (-1.21)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers -0.72778*** -0.34953***
(-6.40) (-3.23)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers 0.41613*** 0.39536***
(3.82) (3.85)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) 0.18888*** 0.07631***
(10.86) (4.35)
Multi-Unit Firm 0.19945*** 0.19497***
(6.94) (6.83)
Firm has 5-99 Employees -1.15676*** -1.13827***
(-51.00) (-49.34)
Firm has 100-999 Employees -1.41838*** -1.41186***
(-44.49) (-42.55)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees -1.40416*** -1.44555***
(-23.03) (23.47)
Firm Age 0.00532 0.00094108
(0.69) (0.12)
Firm Age Squared -0.00168*** -0.00152***
(-5.73) (-5.22)
Net Growth Rate in 2000 Quarter 1 -0.00002198** -0.00002273***
(-2.42) (-2.53)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 29,785 28650 28525
Adjusted R-Square 0.2072 0.2877 0.3037
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Table 2.25: Two Step Regression Results Using Difference in Pension Assets Per Worker
as the Instrumental Variable
Dependent Variable is Productivity in Year
2000
2.7.4 Change in Productivity Over Five-Year Period and Pension Con-
version
Finally, I determine if there is any evidence that suggests that converting pensions
reduces productivity over the ￿ve-year period. In Table 2.26, I use the di⁄erence
in productivity from 1995 to 2000 as my dependent variable. This variable im-
plies that the larger the di⁄erence in productivity from 1995 to 2000, the larger
the reduction in productivity. When using the indicator variable for converting
119pension plans in an OLS regression, there is no signi￿cant association with the
di⁄erence in productivity once I control for the workforce and ￿rm characteristics
in the three equations.
However, in Table 2.27 I use the di⁄erence of liabilities per worker as an instru-
ment and estimate the two step estimation system. Interestingly, when I control
for the workforce and ￿rm characteristics, the probability of converting de￿ned
bene￿t plans has a positive association with the di⁄erence in productivity, and it
is signi￿cant at the 1% level in all three regressions. This implies that when the
probability for ￿rms to convert their de￿ned bene￿t plans increase, productivity
fell from 1995 to 2000 after I control for the ￿rm and workforce characteristics. In
Table 2.28, I use the di⁄erence of assets per worker as an instrument when estimat-
ing the two step estimation system. The results are again similar to the results
found when using the liabilities per worker as an instrument. There is a positive
association between the probability of converting de￿ned bene￿t plans and the
reduction in productivity once I control for the ￿rm and workforce characteristics.
120(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -0.81139*** 0.06277 -0.28384*
( t values) (-6.05) (0.69) (-1.72)
Changed to a DC plan by 2000 Indicator -0.01670 -0.00517 0.00306
(-1.00) (-0.31) (0.18)
DC Plan in 1995 0.00256 0.02184 0.00067960
(0.14) (1.18) (0.04)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older -0.03879 -0.05972**
(-1.34) (-2.03)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree 0.07506** 0.06810**
(2.38) (2.08)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers 0.13452** 0.14124**
(2.32) (2.44)
Percentage of Female Workers -0.09300*** -0.10225***
(-3.65) (-3.54)
Percentage of Black Workers 0.08998 0.10718*
(1.41) (1.65)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers -0.00239 -0.02794
(-0.03) (-0.33)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers -0.20219** -0.17267**
(-2.53) (-2.17)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) 0.08286*** 0.03752***
(5.76) (2.74)
Multi-Unit Firm 0.03710 0.04183*
(1.58) (1.78)
Firm has 5-99 Employees -0.04187** -0.03076*
(-2.40) (-1.72)
Firm has 100-999 Employees -0.01796 -0.00237
(-0.72) (-0.09)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees -0.00480 0.01334
(-0.09) (0.25)
Firm Age -0.03216*** -0.03347***
(-5.51) (-5.73)
Firm Age Squared 0.00120*** 0.00126***
(5.42) (5.66)
Net Growth Rate in 2000 Quarter 1 -0.00000014826 0.000000719866
(-0.01) (-0.07)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 27,493 26633 27471
Adjusted  R-Square 0.0036 0.0054 0.0076
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Dependent Variable is Difference in Productivity
from 1995 to 2000
Table 2.26: OLS Regression Results Using an Indicator for Plan Change
121(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -3.17524*** -0.81497*** -2.55358***
( t values) (-22.36) (-8.94) (-15.26)
Predicted Probability that DB Plan Changed by 2000 2.62697*** 3.26466*** 3.39663***
(39.93) (45.29) (46.49)
DC Plan in 1995 -0.04115** -0.09981*** -0.17484***
(-2.33) (-5.46) (-9.30)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older 0.00809 -0.02268
(0.29) (-0.79)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree 0.13326*** 0.17074***
(4.34) (5.30)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers 0.12594** 0.09852*
(2.23) (1.74)
Percentage of Female Workers -0.38714*** -0.37576***
(-15.03) (-13.01)
Percentage of Black Workers 0.23712*** 0.14369**
(3.81) (2.25)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers 0.09230 0.02115
(1.13) (0.26)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers -0.05260 0.02796
(-0.68) (0.36)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) 0.24805*** 0.17987***
(19.11) (13.23)
Multi-Unit Firm 0.16484*** 0.18382***
(7.03) (7.84)
Firm has 5-99 Employees -0.10414*** -0.02237
(-6.08) (-1.27)
Firm has 100-999 Employees 0.09987*** 0.22192***
(4.03) (8.56)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees 0.26340*** 0.39517***
(5.05) (7.48)
Firm Age 0.03071*** 0.02453***
(5.24) (4.20)
Firm Age Squared -0.00131*** -0.00109***
(-5.90) (-4.92)
Net Growth Rate in 2000 Quarter 1 0.00001394 0.00001207
(1.52) (1.32)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 27,493 26519 26402
Adjusted  R-Square 0.0582 0.0775 0.0827
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Table 2.27: Two Step Regression Results Using Difference in Liabilities Per Worker as
the Instrumental Variable
Dependent Variable is Difference in Productivity
from 1995 to 2000
122(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -3.08267*** -0.78353*** -2.47292***
( t values) (-21.68) (-8.58) (-14.75)
Predicted Probability that DB Plan Changed by 2000 2.52733*** 3.15815*** 3.27597***
(38.49) (43.95) (45.01)
DC Plan in 1995 -0.03980** -0.09634*** -0.16919***
(-2.25) (-5.26) (-8.98)
Percentage of Workers age 45 or older 0.00423 -0.02625
(0.15) (-0.91)
Percentage of Workers with at least a College Degree 0.13075*** 0.16552***
(4.25) (5.13)
Percentage of Foreign Born Workers 0.12622*** 0.09982
(-14.59) (1.76)
Percentage of Female Workers -0.37620*** -0.36593***
(-14.59) (-12.64)
Percentage of Black Workers 0.23189*** 0.14112**
(3.72) (2.21)
Percentage of Hispanic Workers 0.08723 0.01698
(1.07) (0.21)
Percentage of "Other Race" Workers -0.06196 0.01613
(-0.80) (0.21)
Log(Average 1995 Earnings) 0.24121*** 0.17525***
(18.56) (12.86)
Multi-Unit Firm 0.16061*** 0.17872***
(6.84) (7.61)
Firm has 5-99 Employees -0.10227*** -0.02277
(-5.95) (-1.29)
Firm has 100-999 Employees 0.09554*** 0.21359***
(3.85) (8.22)
Firm has 1000 or More Employees 0.25350*** 0.38049***
(4.85) (7.19)
Firm Age 0.02864*** 0.02241***
(4.88) (3.82)
Firm Age Squared -0.00124*** -0.00101***
(-5.53) (-4.54)
Net Growth Rate in 2000 Quarter 1 0.00001376 0.00001189
(1.50) (1.30)
One Digit Industry Indicators No Yes Yes
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes
N 27,490 26516 26399
Adjusted  R-Square 0.0546 0.0739 0.0784
***-Denotes significance at 1%, **-Denotes significance at 5%, *-Denotes significance at 10%
Table 2.28: Two Step Regression Results Using Difference in Assets Per Worker as the
Instrumental Variable
Dependent Variable is Difference in Productivity
from 1995 to 2000
2.8 Conclusions
Using the Form 5500 data combined with the Business Register and LEHD state
data reveals much insight on how converting de￿ned bene￿t plans a⁄ect produc-
tivity. It also helps identify the characteristics of the ￿rms that are converting
and what types of workers are at risk of losing their de￿ned bene￿t pensions. The
reason why new information about the relationship between productivity and pen-
sions is discovered is because this unique data set has variables that can be used as
123instruments. Because of endogeneity, using an indicator variable is inappropriate
in determining how converting de￿ned bene￿t plans a⁄ects productivity. However,
when instrumental variables like the di⁄erence in current liabilities per worker and
the di⁄erence in pension assets per worker are used, the results I ￿nd are strongly
signi￿cant and show a distinct relationship between converting pensions and pro-
ductivity. There are several conclusions that can be made from analyzing this
new data set.
First, ￿rms that convert their de￿ned bene￿t plans appear to have lower pro-
ductivity than ￿rms that do not in the year 2000. This may be because ￿rms that
primarily have kept their de￿ned bene￿t plans over the ￿ve-year period are large
￿rms in the manufacturing sector. Training requirements in these ￿rms are higher
than the smaller, non-manufacturing ￿rms. Also, in large ￿rms, productivity is
not easily monitored. Using de￿ned bene￿t plans is a way of encouraging long
tenure and early retirement, so that the employees have a career over their peak
productivity performance. Union presence may also be a factor of which ￿rms
convert their de￿ned bene￿t plans. Most ￿rms that have a strong union presence
are more likely to maintain their de￿ned bene￿t plans.
Second, ￿rms that convert their de￿ned bene￿t plans experience a reduction in
productivity. This may occur because the workers who lost their de￿ned bene￿t
plans no longer have the incentive to remain at the ￿rm by the year 2000. The
￿rms lose valuable, trained employees as a result. Also, new employees who could
not easily be screened are now working and may not put forth as much e⁄ort to
avoid shirking. Thus, average productivity is decreasing. Unfortunately, in order
to test this directly, the employees￿human capital measures must be incorporated
in the empirical analyses.
Third, ￿rms that keep their de￿ned bene￿t plans and ￿rms that convert their
124plans are di⁄erent and each have a very distinct class of workers. Firms that have
less than 100 employees, have more female workers, and provide low paying jobs
are more likely to convert their de￿ned bene￿t plans. Also, ￿rms that tend to
have a smaller percentage of college-educated workers and a smaller percentage of
older employees are more likely to convert their de￿ned bene￿t plans. Firms that
are single establishments are also more likely to convert their pensions.
Finally, there are no signi￿cant results that reveal how converting de￿ned ben-
e￿t pensions a⁄ect the attraction or retention at the ￿rm. Using net growth rates
as a dependent variable in OLS and two step regressions provide some results that
show that workers are leaving more because there is no pension penalty. The
summary statistics show that ￿rms that convert their pensions do have higher
churning, higher quit rates and lower net growth than ￿rms that keep their de-
￿ned bene￿t pensions. However, using quit rates and churning rates as dependent
variables in the regression models yield insigni￿cant results.
2.9 Recommendations for Future Work
Currently, many ￿rms are making less dramatic changes to their pension bene￿ts
by converting their traditional de￿ned bene￿t plans to hybrid plans instead of tra-
ditional de￿ned contribution plans. Hybrid plans are pension plans that are based
on a formula like traditional de￿ned bene￿t plan, but are portable like de￿ned con-
tribution plans. It would be of interest to determine how converting traditional
de￿ned bene￿t plans to hybrid plans a⁄ect productivity. Another avenue to in-
vestigate is whether the e⁄ects of changing bene￿ts on employee training can be
determined. Third, it is not uncommon for some ￿rms to give their employees
a choice whether to have a de￿ned bene￿t plan or a de￿ned contribution plan as
their retirement bene￿t when they are ￿rst hired. It would be interesting to know
if giving workers a choice that better ￿ts their own needs for saving for retirement
125a⁄ect the productivity in the ￿rm. Lastly, in this paper I focus solely on de￿ned
bene￿t pension terminations. It may be interesting to look at pension freezes and
the conversion to de￿ned contribution plans.
1262.10 Appendix A: Certainty Model
To illustrate how a ￿rm makes a decision when it knows it cannot maintain its
de￿ned bene￿t pension plan because of costs, a certainty model is theorized. To
simplify, suppose the ￿rm only employs one worker and she starts working at the
￿rm at time zero. I make a restriction that once the worker starts working she
remains at the ￿rm until retirement at time T. There is a probability p(t) where
t 2 (0;T) that the ￿rm will switch plan types from a de￿ned bene￿t plan to a
de￿ned contribution plan. If a ￿rm does switch pension types, the ￿rm reneges
on the implicit contract and the worker loses the pension plan she is promised
at retirement. However, although the worker￿ s wage pro￿le remains unchanged
throughout her career, the worker now has a tax-deferred account in which she
and/or the ￿rm contribute. Since, the account is portable, and there is no vesting
rule, the combined wage and annual de￿ned contribution plan (DC) contribution
equals the value of marginal product (VMP) at the time of conversion and stays
equal for the worker￿ s remaining years at the ￿rm.
Figure 4 illustrates the worker￿ s wage and bene￿t pro￿les at a ￿rm that initially
o⁄ers a de￿ned bene￿t plan. Line V(t) represents the VMP expected for the worker
at the ￿rm throughout her career. Line W(t) is a wage pro￿le for a worker who
has a de￿ned bene￿t plan. As mentioned earlier, a worker receives a wage below
her VMP early in her career and receives a wage above her VMP later in her
career. When the worker retires at time T, she immediately receives an annual
pension until her death at time D. The annual pension bene￿t is represented by
line B(t). Line C(t) is the wage path for the worker who initially had a de￿ned
bene￿t plan, but the plan was replaced with a de￿ned contribution plan at time
S. The combined wage and de￿ned contribution account equals VMP at time of
conversion and remains equal until she retires.
127Since the ￿rm can legally terminate the de￿ned bene￿t plan, I de￿ne the present
value of total wages and bene￿ts over the worker￿ s career as
Z(W(t);B(t);C(t);S) =
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D Z
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5dt:
where
W(t) = Wage at time t
B(t) = Pension bene￿t at time t
C(t) = Wage plus DC contribution at time t
p(t) = Probability of ￿rm switching to DC plan
T = Retirement age
D = Time of death
S = Time of plan conversion
r = Discount rate
The ￿rst two terms are the total wage and pension bene￿t for a person who
remained at the ￿rm until she retired and has a de￿ned bene￿t plan throughout
her career. The remaining terms are the probability of the ￿rm switching plan
types times the new accumulated wages that now includes the DC contributions.
To ensure that a worker will accept an o⁄er from the ￿rm and remain there until
retirement, the worker must have a wage pro￿le and bene￿ts at least as large as
those at an alternative job. Otherwise, the ￿rm could lower the wage and pension
bene￿ts to increase its pro￿t and the worker will still remain at the ￿rm. Thus,
the constraint that must be satis￿ed for a worker to accept an o⁄er from the ￿rm
is
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3
5dt ￿ W:
128where W is the total present value of wages and pension bene￿ts at an alter-
native job.
Suppose a ￿rm hires a worker and provides a de￿ned bene￿t pension plan. The
￿rm later converts a de￿ned bene￿t plan to a de￿ned contribution plan in order to
cut costs. Once the plan is replaced, a worker is no longer bound to work a certain
number of years to get a bene￿t and can now leave at any time. As a result, the
worker may no longer be inclined to be as productive as before. Therefore, once
the contract is gone, the ￿rm now pays a reputation cost, which reduces overall
pro￿t.
Suppose the worker￿ s revenue is de￿ned as
R(W(t);B(t);C(t);S) = V + Ig(W(t);B(t);C(t);S)
where V is the total VMP over a worker￿ s career and g(W(t);B(t);C(t);S) is the
reputation cost. I equals one if there is a plan switch within a worker￿ s career
and zero otherwise.. The ￿rm will only hire a worker if pro￿t is not negative, so
the constraint that must be satis￿ed in order for the ￿rm to hire the worker is
R(W(t);B(t);C(t);S) ￿ Z(W(t);B(t);C(t);S) ￿ 0
For a ￿rm to decide what is the appropriate compensation package, the ￿rm
must choose the correct wage path, de￿ned bene￿t accrual and if necessary, the
time to switch plan types so that the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is maximized. Hence, the ￿rm￿ s
problem is to maximize the following pro￿t function:
max
W(t);B(t);C(t);S
fR(W(t);B(t);C(t);S) ￿ Z(W(t);B(t);C(t);S)g
s.t.
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To illustrate with an example, suppose the worker starts employment at age
twenty-￿ve and retires at age sixty-￿ve resulting in forty years of service for the
￿rm, and suppose the worker is expected to have a VMP equal to W every year. If a
worker has a de￿ned bene￿t plan, I de￿ne the worker wage path as W(t) = 0:5W
for the ￿rst thirty years and W(t) = 1:5W for the remaining ten years. Once
the worker retires at age sixty-￿ve, she receives an annual pension bene￿t accrual
B(t) = 0:5W. If the worker lives until eighty years old, then the ￿rm will pay the
pension bene￿t for ￿fteen years. Suppose the ￿rm cannot switch plan types after
the worker reaches age ￿fty-￿ve. If the ￿rm decides to switch pension plan types
prior to age ￿fty-￿ve, the new wage path plus the annual DC contributions is equal
to the VMP until the worker retires. Suppose the discount rate is zero and the
probability of a ￿rm switching pension plan types is constant at 0.1. Then the cost
of a worker to the ￿rm is Z(W;S) = 37:75W ￿ 0:05SW: If there is no switch, S
equals the years of service at retirement age.
Suppose, the worker￿ s total VMP over her career is V = 40W and the repu-
tation cost has the formula g(W(t);S) = I[5S ￿ 39W ￿ 0:05SW] where I is one
if there was a switch at any time during the worker￿ s career and zero otherwise.
To determine the optimal compensation package and time of switching plan types,
the ￿rm must ￿nd the solution to the following maximization problem:
130max
W;S
f40W + I[1000S ￿ 39W ￿ 0:05SW] ￿ 37:75W ￿ 0:05SWg
s.t.
37:75W ￿ 0:05SW ￿ W
40W + I[1000S ￿ 39W ￿ 0:05SW] ￿ 37:75W ￿ 0:05SW ￿ 0:
Solving this maximization problem, the optimal wage is W ￿ = $20;000 and
S￿ = 20. The optimal solution gives the ￿rm a pro￿t of $20;000￿W Hence after
twenty years of service, the ￿rm ￿nds it optimal to switch their plan to a de￿ned
contribution plans and pay the worker $20;000 for the remainder of her career.
In conclusion, although this example is a simpli￿ed scenario in which a ￿rm
knows in the future it has to change its pension plan, it easily shows that a worker
is always at risk of losing her bene￿t because the ￿rm wants to have the best human
resource policy which will optimize its pro￿t. Having a pension plan conversion
helps the ￿rm meet its goals while still providing the worker with an optimal salary.
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